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Award of Field Marshal KM Cariappa Research Fellowship - 1996

The Board of Management of the USI Research Centre has awarded the Field Marshal K M Cariappa Research Fellowship for 1996 to Lt Gen V K Nayar, PVSM, SM (Retd). The subject of the research project is :

"Emerging Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) Scenario in India".

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Inauguration of the USI Building Complex by the three Service Chiefs

GUEST EDITORIAL

Defence Budget

Indian defence budget peaked at 3.58 and 3.59 percent of the GDP in 1986/87 and 1987/88 respectively. It has steadily declined since to below 3 and was 2.43, 2.53, and 2.39 percent in 1993, 1994 and 1995. For some years now, the allocation has been the same with compensation for the inflation rate. For 1995 it was Rs. 25,500 crores which was revised to Rs. 26,879 crores. This year's budget estimate of Rs. 27,798 is 2.5 percent of the GDP and follows the same pattern. The message is clear : in the present state of resources crunch and fiscal deficit, the defence services should not expect an increase in defence allocation more than the inflation rate.

According to newspaper reports, the Expenditure Secretary has stated that there has been no compromise on the expenditure needs of the defence. Be that as it may, modernisation of the armed forces has taken a back seat and the fitness state of weapon systems is far from satisfactory. Media reports indicate that the Army is hard put to find funds for the upgradation of 400 T72 tanks and the optimum rate of production of the new main battle tank (MBT) Arjun, due to commence next year. In the Air Force the upgradation and modernisation of 125 MIG 21 aircraft has been delayed and the long pending induction of advanced jet trainer has still to take place. The production of LCA is also scheduled with effect from 1997 and may have to be prolonged for lack of funds. The replacement of Vikrant, the first of Navy's two aircraft carriers by the Russian carrier 'Admiral Gorshkov' would cost as much as Rs. 4,000 crores. The upgradation of Sea Harriers and the addition of VTOL (vertical take off and landing) version is also a matter of urgency.

The cost of weapon systems has gone up astronomically. The pay bill has also gone up considerably both because manpower figures have increased and there has been upward revision of pays as a result of tremendous increase in the cost of living. The armed forces are not well paid as is evident from the poor response of the youth and the shortage of officers; pay scales is certainly one of the reasons.

Defence budget for 1985/86 was Rs. 7,686 crores (revenue 6,754, capital 932). The sub division of the revenue allocation was Rs. 2,456 crores for pay and Rs. 3,614 crores for stores and equipment, that is about 36 percent for pays and about 54 percent for stores and equipment. The balance 10 percent was allocated for transportation, maintenance of buildings and installations as well as miscellaneous expenditure.

The position is now reversed in that more is spent on pay and allowances than on stores and equipment. The budget estimate for 1996 is Rs. 18,854

crores under the revenue head and 8,944 under capital making a total of 27,798 crores. The revenue expenditure figure of 18,854 crores is arrived at by deducting Rs. 2,082.48 crores for DGOF supplies and Rs. 1,121.63 crores as 'Receipts and Recoveries' from a total of Rs. 22,058.90 crores. Out of this Rs. 9,056.04 crores is for pay and allowances and Rs. 9,854.57 for stores and equipment. When the DGOF's figure of 2,082.48 crores is taken out from the last figure, the amount for stores for the armed forces is reduced to Rs. 7,772.9 crores.

This position of lower figure for stores and equipment is somewhat compensated by a larger capital budget (compared to 1985/86) providing about Rs. 3,000 crores for aircraft and aero engines, primarily for the Air Force (Rs. 2,655.83 crores). Similarly, the Navy gets Rs. 1,531 crores for the fleet and the Army Rs. 2,185.42 crores.

The allocation of Rs. 7,772.9 crores for stores and equipment as well as the amounts earmarked out of the capital head mentioned above are nowhere near those required to sustain the present inventories. To keep weapon systems in a state of fitness, and to replace obsolescent ones, it will be necessary to cut down numbers. India cannot afford an Air Force of 800 combat aircraft. It will not be possible to replace obsolete aircraft one for one as the present fleet wastes out. Navy too must carry out an analysis of affordable size and composition of the fleet. Equally, the number of divisions in the Army, which is 35 at present would have to be reduced from the infantry and the mountain lot.

Secondly, the Indian armed forces, particularly the Army are man intensive; heavy in manpower; 1,265,000, of which the Army is 1,100,000. Apart from the reduction of formations (divisions) already suggested, there is a requirement to streamline the organisations of these to reduce man power. Only if total manpower is reduced and inventories of weapon systems are scaled down would it be possible to keep the weapon systems serviceable and replace obsolete systems. It is better by far to have smaller armed forces which are well equipped and have a high fitness state.

The Chiefs of Staff cannot be expected to carry out such drastic restructuring on their own initiative. This can only take place if the political directive they receive, on which they base their operational plans, are well conceived and realistic. It is about time, India established a national security structure in the way of a National Security Council served by a competent National Security Staff to ensure realistic assessments and timely planning.

Lt. General A.M. Vohra, PVSM (Retd)
Former Vice Chief of the Army Staff

From Confrontation to Reconciliation: India and Pakistan at the Crossroads

FRANK G WISNER

It is easy to feel among friends in Pakistan. The history of friendship between our two nations has been long. It is one I have lived personally during my career as an American diplomat. For nearly 50 years, your diplomats, soldiers and statesmen have been held in high regard in the United States; they have represented Pakistan's interests with skill, and have left behind a legacy of close cooperation that all of us here today, guardians of our nation's interests, do well to reflect upon and should hope to emulate.

I am especially pleased to have this chance to visit Pakistan's Command and Staff College, an institution that for nearly a half-century has so ably trained and readied this nation's military leaders.

I know from my own experience as an Under Secretary of Defence the great respect the Pakistani armed forces enjoy in the United States, a tribute to this institution and its commitment to a well-trained, professional military dedicated to the preservation of Pakistan's national integrity, your democracy, the prosperity of your people and peace in this region.

During my stay in India, I have frequently been a guest of India's armed forces. Among them are men and women of pride, professionalism and dedication equal to your own. Like you they are dedicated to the cause of peace. Their hospitality is as warm as yours. I can only hope that one day circumstances will permit each one of you to know the other.

AMERICAN INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA

The United States has a long-standing interest in the nations of South Asia. Skeptics will claim our interest is solely motivated by our own strategic concerns, or economic interest. There is truth in these assertions. But there is a larger, more important truth that skeptics fail to appreciate: one-third of the world's population lives in South Asia and it lives under democratic rule. The United States cares about democracy wherever it exists in this world. Given our belief that democracies tend to be more stable, more productive, more responsive to the needs of their citizens than other political systems and less

Text of a talk given by His Excellency Frank G. Wisner, Ambassador of the United States of America to India at the Command and Staff College, Quetta, Pakistan on July 10, 1996.

likely to go to war with one another, we have a strong self-interest in strengthening South Asia's democratic nations' institutions and traditions - free press, an independent and vigorous judiciary, and armed forces under the control of freely elected civilian leadership. We have found further common ground with Pakistan over the decades, especially when the peace and independence of nations in your region were threatened. At the same time, our nations have over the years encountered issues on which we have disagreed - sometimes sharply. No sophisticated observer of international relations will find this surprising. The truth is, as our relationships grow in breadth and complexity, the likelihood also grows of divergent opinions surfacing. The same has been and is true of our relationship with India.

One of those issues - on which we have differences with both Pakistan and India - is what constitutes the most effective approach to national defence and security. This is a lively subject for debate in Delhi, as I know it is in Islamabad. The position I take with my Indian interlocutors is that nuclear weapons and their delivery systems are inherently destabilizing and detract from, rather than enhance, national defence. Given that premise, I argue that the most effective policy is one that eschews these weapons and strengthens conventional capabilities. The Gulf War made the point to me that a nation's defence in the modern world is preserved by small, professional, combat ready, armed forces equipped with modern communications, the means of mobility and precision guided weapons.

Frankly we would like Pakistan and India to join the great majority of nations in the world, travelling down the road to the end of the nuclear age. We believe CTBT is a good treaty and a step in the right direction. One day we hope you will be convinced.

I mention these issues because they are among the thorniest we must deal with. But I am also reminded that whatever disagreement over them, as mature nations, we must manage our differences. I am confident we can because of my conviction that the sum total of our interests in working with each other is greater than the total of our differences. Simply stated, we are in a time that is far too uncertain to allow ourselves to be fundamentally divided.

The very strategic geography of the world is being retraced, our economic circumstances are being defined and our values challenged. There is great promise and there is peril abroad in today's world. America and her friends in South Asia should face the future together.

But I have not come here today to speak of the issues that define our

bilateral relationship with Pakistan. I will leave that to Ambassador Simons, who knows these questions far better than I do.

REJUVENATING THE INDO-PAK DIALOGUE

I have come here today as the United States Ambassador to India, as a career diplomat in my nation's foreign service, as an observer of human events who, during 35 years of service to my country, has witnessed acts of great faith and, on occasion, acts of great folly. I have been fortunate in my career to have been present during moments of extraordinary courage and vision. I also have seen opportunities for greatness lost, the victim of blinding self-interest.

I have come here today because of my conviction that India and Pakistan, the two dominant nations of South Asia, have greatness within their grasp. I have come here to urge you, as I do every day with Indians to seize the opportunity you have before you, to bring an end to the generations of animosity and mistrust that have been permitted to define your bilateral relationship. Like all Americans, I ask that you move into a new century having shed the baggage of the recent past and with your eyes fixed firmly on the future.

Like India, Pakistan must engage itself fully and forcefully if peace and prosperity are to prevail in this region. If there is to be a stable and secure future here in South Asia, in war torn Afghanistan, in Central Asia, or the Middle East, Pakistan must play its rightful role as a great Muslim nation, a regional power, and a decisive actor in the subcontinent. Pakistan, like India and my own country, must face up to and deal with the scourges of our age - narcotics and terror.

We must if security, prosperity, and stability are to be achieved. None of us can do so alone. And the United States cannot be engaged at your side unless we understand and accept the objectives of your policies.

Around the world - in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and South Africa - we see bitter and bloody rivals struggling to put their enmity behind them and move towards an era of peace. In each place men and women, no different from you and India are trying hard to write a new future.

Gentlemen, the world looks to you and India to settle your differences. We have waited a long time. You have gone to war and you have threatened each other time and again. You have given all of us concern especially as you have respectively allowed for a nuclear option.

You have the resources of intellect to find solutions to your problems and to join the present march of nations around the world towards a future in which nations resolve differences peacefully. Soldiers, better than anyone, know there are no solutions on battlefields - especially modern ones.

Together you and India can build for prosperity and greatness. Together you can help shape the perspectives of Asia where the most important pages in human history will be written in the next century. At odds with one another India and Pakistan will spend where you can ill afford to do so. You will manacle yourselves while the rest of the world moves ahead. And your people will suffer for it.

BUILDING A CONSTITUENCY FOR PEACE

The tragedy of South Asian politics is not that brothers divide. History teaches us this will happen. The tragedy is the inability of the political leadership of India and Pakistan to build an effective constituency for peace. I believe there is a perceptible desire for peace on both sides of the border.

In India a change in generations is underway. The new generation is able to look at the events of 1947 with greater detachment.

India, which will be the fourth largest economy in the world by 2025, is engaged in taking advantage of the new liberalized economy and building better lives. Many Indians tell me they believe the future lies in stability and increasing economic interaction between the nations of this region and the rest of world. No Indian I know sees South Asian Nations solving their problems militarily. Political leaders in India reflect the mood of today's India.

The signals you and India are sending are encouraging. The United States - indeed, all friends of India and Pakistan - welcome the overture from your Prime Minister to the new Indian government of Deve Gowda to resume discussions on the entire range of issues between your two countries. Prime Minister Deve Gowda's measured response has kept the door open to a resumption of dialogue at senior government levels. He has told me he offers sincerity and will meet sincerity with sincerity. I am cheered for I believe Pakistan brings the same spirit to the table.

There are two areas to which, I hope, your government and that of India, will pay particular attention. I believe that progress with these will provide the foundation upon which a more constructive bilateral relationship can be built.

FORMALIZING TRADE TIES: AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP

The first area is trade and investment. In my travels throughout India and this region, I have come face-to-face with widespread and crushing poverty - the depth and breadth of which exists nowhere else in the world. The extent of this poverty and the social decay it breeds are as much a threat to the national security of the nations of South Asia as any ballistic missile.

Fortunately, there is a weapon that strikes at the heart of poverty - it is the free market where free men trade and invest freely, increase wealth and share it. Free trade is an extension of a free market. Simply stated, opening your markets to trade and investment with your neighbours will generate capital, create jobs and bring hope to millions of people.

The experience of the European Common Market, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and increasingly that of APEC, demonstrates that powerful and positive economic forces can be unleashed when nations adopt a regional approach to trade and investment. The countries of South Asia are not immune to the laws of economics. Nations that put aside differences in order to develop strong, regional economies prosper and their prosperity permits them to alleviate the burden of poverty.

I have spoken with India's new government. It supports moves to increase trade. Initiatives that have emerged through SAARC are seen as a very useful first step in a process to encourage closer regional economic integration, a process in which there are no losers, only winners.

There is a political dividend to improving trade ties. We have seen else - where that, in the absence of political solutions, developing economic links can serve as an important step towards better relations. Since October of last year, Pakistan has hosted delegations from two of India's more prominent chambers of commerce and industry. These visits show business is ready to break out of a long-standing impasse at the political level which is inhibiting opportunities for mutually beneficial economic relations.

Your government's willingness to consider expanding trade has sent a positive signal. The United States hopes your initiative will be followed by a decision to grant Most Favoured Nation trading status to India. Certainly, such a move will encourage American and other foreign investors who are dismayed by the fact that, under current circumstances, any manufacturing plants they might establish in India or Pakistan would be unable to service neighbouring markets.

The value of cross-border trade, which is not regularized but which is estimated to exceed \$ 650 million a year, supports the logic of formalizing bilateral trade. Manufacturers and consumers on both sides of the border benefit from trade. In addition, governments could recover substantial revenue in unpaid customs duties.

In short, gentlemen, there is a mood for economic cooperation which has not existed for many years. Give it a chance; one success can help breed others.

KASHMIR: A FORWARD-LOOKING APPROACH

The second area that cries out for attention is your bilateral political relationship, especially over Kashmir. The list of disagreements between India and Pakistan is long - the Siachen glacier, territorial claims, immigration questions and a host of other matters. Each begs for a solution and each merits one - unlinked to any other question. Progress is needed on all fronts in a measured and coordinated fashion. The way ahead, I would suggest is to follow the example set by Pakistani and Indian leaders at Tashkent, at Simla and at other moments, and work together to find solutions. Outsiders can wish you well, and may find ways to help, but you and India have what it takes to do the job. After all it will be your peace and only you can make what is yours.

No issue is more vexing than Kashmir. I know the depth of feeling about Kashmir in Pakistan. It runs deep. You will not be surprised when I say that this same depth of feeling exists in India. The challenge that your nations face is how to overcome passion in the cause of peace, in the interests of your people and the generations to come. Neither of you has a monopoly on pride, character, or strength of feeling and principle.

Furthermore, I believe firmly a solution does not lie in re-visiting the troubled history of the Kashmir dispute. I ask you to set this to one side - as I ask my Indian friends to do the same - and take a fresh look at your assumptions so that you can arrive at new conclusions. I submit there are compelling reasons why the time is right to look again at the issue of Kashmir.

A new government in Delhi has spoken of its desire to offer "maximum autonomy" to the people of Kashmir. This is a positive step forward, one that challenges Indians of goodwill to accept that the unique character of Kashmir requires unusually creative solutions. The Indian government's offer speaks volumes about the spirit of the Kashmiri people, who have demanded their voice be heard - a cause Pakistan has espoused.

An incipient dialogue has begun between political leaders from Kashmir and the government in Delhi. Prime Minister Deve Gowda has lent his support to dialogue last month, meeting with political parties and former militants in Delhi and travelling to Kashmir. Growing numbers of Kashmiris are engaged and hopefully more will join. This new disposition to communicate can serve to develop confidence between the parties, an essential element if a reconciliation and peace is to emerge. This dialogue gives us hope that while India and Pakistan talk, one day Kashmiris on both sides of the border may speak to one another and add their voice to the quest for peace.

Elections in the state. I know something about elections in Kashmir, including those just held for the Lok Sabha. I deeply believe that elections must be free and fair, not relatively so, if they are to legitimize a political process. I am also realistic to know that in circumstances of continuing violence a perfect poll is difficult to achieve. But it must be aspired to.

This said, I can accept that the elections, by the Election Commission's own account, were imperfect and still conclude that they contributed to the empowerment of the Kashmiri people - and to the beginning of a political process in the state. That, after all, is the objective. Elections are not an end in themselves. They contribute to a political process. Elections that could now take place for a state government in Jammu and Kashmir represent an alternative to the conflict that has produced six years of suffering and impoverishment for the people of Kashmir.

Elections in Indian Kashmir address a long-standing concern of Pakistan's -- that the Indian government seeks to impose a solution to the conflict in the state from outside. The United States has long maintained a binding solution in Kashmir can flow only from an understanding reached between India and Pakistan, one reached by taking into account the wishes of the people.

Finally, elections in Indian Kashmir pose no threat to Pakistan, to your borders, your sovereignty, your principles, or to your claims to Kashmir. A political process that enjoys broad participation is the single best antidote to the violence that plagues the Valley. It will rejuvenate a weary people and revitalize a moribund economy.

I would make one other observation regarding Kashmir: no effort to end the conflict in the state will succeed until all concerned acknowledge that, after nearly 50 years, there are certain fundamental realities that will not be changed. Acceptance of reality as it exists may provide a useful point of departure when serious discussion of the state's future begins, at the governmental level

between India and Pakistan, and in talks between the Indian government and Kashmiri interlocutors, and one day between Kashmiris. No thoughtful Indian I speak with argues that the reality of partition should be ignored or reworked.

FINDING THE REQUISITE POLITICAL WILL

Clearly, what I propose requires extraordinary political will, especially in the face of those in India — and I presume in Pakistan, as well -- who argue that any effort to improve relations is doomed to failure, that there is too much bad history between your countries, too many wars and too much misunderstanding.

Once again, I return to my perception of the foundations of an Indo-Pakistani relationship: the deep and abiding ties of history have remained in place during the protracted period of estrangement. Poets give voice to this fact better than diplomats. As your great poet Ahmad Faraz told a Delhi newspaper recently, "the frontiers of any country cannot stop the free flow of culture." His sentiment was echoed by Indian poet Ashok Vajpayee, who observed that "the politics of the sub-continent have failed to abide with the culture of the sub-continent."

BRINGING THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH ASIA TOGETHER

The good news for those who seek to restore normal dialogue and bring down the walls that separate a great family of people is that these efforts can begin from a base that has survived the years. Even today, individual citizens on both sides of the border struggle to ensure that contact continues unimpeded. Participants in the Indo-Pakistani people's Forum, for example, or the Neemrana Initiative, recognize a simple truth, that political obstacles to a normalization of relations will be removed only by a demonstration of popular will by ordinary citizens.

Today, the two great nations of South Asia have the opportunity to replace the language of confrontation with the vocabulary of reconciliation, to bring the suffering of the Kashmiri people to an end, to reverse the economic deterioration of a region with enormous potential and to join the rest of the world in dealing with the threats we inevitably face and the promise we can all share.

The United States has pledged its support. We are proud to count both Pakistan and India as our friends, and we are convinced that we can maintain out friendship with both. We also have faith in the ability of your two countries

to resolve differences and demonstrate to the world that conflict has been discredited as a method of problem-solving.

Let talk of missile development give way to talk of human development; let the job of building confidence begin and the history of mistrust and suspicion come to an end. Let the great civilization of this extraordinary part of the world unite and flourish once again. Let the voice of its Urdu poets speak of peace. Let families reunite across borders that are no longer armed camps. Let merchants and traders do business; let goods flow freely between markets. Most important, let your children grow without fear and without rancor, united in hope, speaking the common language of a people at peace with themselves.

Thank you very much.

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Intelligence Revamp : Some Aspects

B RAMAN

“**I**ntelligence capabilities are critical instruments of national power and integral to implementing the national security strategy. Strong intelligence capabilities are needed for providing warning of threats to national security, support to the policy and military communities to prevail over the threats and indentifying opportunities for advancing national interests through support to diplomacy. Decision-makers, military commanders and policy analysts at all levels rely on the intelligence community to collect information unavailable from other sources and to provide strategic and tactical analysis to help surmount challenges to national interests and security.. Intelligence producers must develop closer relationships with the users of intelligence to make products more responsive to consumer needs.”

— Extract from a paper titled “A National Security Strategy of Engagement And Enlargement” released by President Clinton in February, 1996.

Any intelligence revamp, to be meaningful, requires attention to the following aspects :

- (a) The intelligence collection machinery.
- (b) The assessment and monitoring machinery.
- (c) The co-ordination machinery.
- (d) The counter-intelligence machinery.

CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE

Before examining these aspects, a background of the craft of intelligence and of the Indian intelligence community would be useful.

Intelligence is divided into two categories - open and secret. Open intelligence is what one can get from the media, specialised publications, seminars open to the public, parliamentary or congressional records to which public has access etc. Secret intelligence is one which is classified and to which access is restricted.

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Secret intelligence, in turn, is divided into two subcategories - hard and soft. Hard secret intelligence is specific while soft intelligence is not so. A hypothetical example of hard intelligence would be; "To disrupt the elections, the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) has planned to activate a car bomb outside the Srinagar Secretariat on May 28, 1996. "A similar example of soft intelligence would be: "To disrupt the elections, the JKLF is likely to carry out explosions in Srinagar."

For the intelligence consumers, hard secret intelligence has the greatest value and helps in preventing surprises and disasters. The value of soft intelligence is limited. It does help in keeping the consumers alert, but too many instances of soft alerts, which do not subsequently prove to be correct, can result in the consumers developing a cynical attitude to the agencies.

It is a misconception to think that open intelligence has no value. The Franks Committee, appointed by Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, which went into the reasons for the failure of the British authorities to foresee the Argentine occupation of the Falklands in 1982, had concluded that if the authorities had carefully collated and analysed Argentine and US media reports on the emotional build-up in Argentina, they might not have been taken by surprise by the Argentine action. Open intelligence also helps the collection agencies in determining their targets which have to be penetrated and the assessment agencies in identifying the gaps in the coverage of the collection agencies.

There has traditionally been a debate as to whether collection agencies should confine themselves to reporting secret intelligence or whether they should also report open intelligence. In the UK and the US, the collection agencies report only secret intelligence though they may use open intelligence in their analysis, comments or assessment. Whenever they use open intelligence, they have to identify the source. Generally, scrutiny of open sources and drawing the attention of the Prime Minister and the concerned Minister to open information having a bearing on national security is the responsibility of the Ministry/Department concerned. This arrangement enables the collection agencies to concentrate on secret intelligence and, at the same time, enables the consumers to have a real idea of the secret intelligence collection capability of the agencies.

In the US, it has been laid down that it is the responsibility of the collection agencies to collect information "unavailable from other sources" that is, secret intelligence, and this yard-stick is used for evaluating their performance. In the UK, the external intelligence agency is called the Secret Intelligence Service to emphasise that its job is to collect secret and not open information.

In India, the agencies report open as well as secret intelligence and do not identify the sources of open intelligence. This creates difficulties for the consumers in assessing their secret intelligence collection capability, which is the real barometer of their professional performance.

Secret intelligence is collected through:

- (a) Human agents, conscious or unconscious. It is called human intelligence or HUMINT.
- (b) Technical means such as monitoring of wireless and fax transmissions, telephone conversations, satellite communications and photography, computer transmissions etc. It is called technical intelligence or TECHINT.

TECHINT provides hard, precise intelligence, but, by itself, it may not be adequate without HUMINT to give a complete picture. TECHINT can indicate that Pakistan's chief of the Army Staff has suddenly transferred one of his corps commanders, but to find out why he did so and what are the implications one has to depend on HUMINT. However, if officers had been carelessly talking about the transfer over telephone, one might find the answers to these questions even through TECHINT. Only HUMINT can indicate intangible things like feelings, mindsets, intentions etc. It is believed that the failure of the USA to foresee the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the collapse of the USSR was partly due to the over-concentration of manpower and resources on TECHINT to the detriment of HUMINT. Both are equally important.

Intelligence has offensive and defensive aspects. The offensive aspect is collection of intelligence about others. The defensive aspect is preventing others from collecting intelligence about us, either through human agents recruited in our set-up or through technical means. It is called counterintelligence or CI. CI against human agents requires attention to security vetting of staff, physical and document security in offices, control over contacts with foreigners, discreet watch over standard of living etc. CI against technical means relates to telephone and other communications security, computer security etc.

THE INDIAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The Indian intelligence community essentially consists of the Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs, which is responsible for internal intelligence and security, the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), which

is responsible for external intelligence and security and threats to internal security from external elements and the Intelligence Directorates/Directorates-General of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).

Organisations like the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the Narcotics control Bureau (NCB), the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) and the Enforcement Directorate (ED) have also limited collection capabilities related to their investigation requirements. As present, they play no strategic role, but with the increasing importance of financial intelligence, the NCB, the DRI and the ED would also acquire a strategic role.

The IB and the R&AW are responsible for the collection of strategic intelligence with long-term implications as well as tactical intelligence to meet short-term and crisis management needs. The intelligence set-ups of the armed forces are supposed to confine themselves to collection of tactical intelligence and use the IB and the R&AW to meet their strategic requirements.

Of the agencies in the intelligence community, the IB is the oldest, tracing its origin to the Anti-Thuggery Department set up by the British more than a hundred years ago. It is perhaps the first and the oldest civilian intelligence agency anywhere in the world. The intelligence set-ups of the armed forces came into being subsequently and the R&AW was created in September, 1968, through the bifurcation of the IB.

Between 1947 and 1968, the IB was responsible for internal and external intelligence. The majority of its officers at the senior supervisory levels came from the Indian Police Service, with a small number of military officers in the sections of the external division dealing with military intelligence. They generally worked under the supervision of IPS officers. The external division was small and headed by an IP officer of the rank of Joint Director (Joint Secretary). He also had additional responsibilities relating to internal intelligence and security.

During this period, there were three enquiries into allegations of intelligence failure levelled by the armed forces. These related to the Chinese invasion of 1962, the Indo-Pak War of 1965 (with special reference to the Lahore sector) and the Mizo revolt of 1966. The findings of the enquiry relating to 1962 are not known. The enquiry into the Mizo revolt reportedly exonerated the IB. The enquiry relating to 1965 reportedly drew attention to deficiencies in the handling of external intelligence in the IB because of its preoccupation with internal intelligence and security and ultimately led to its bifurcation and the creation of the R&AW.

While creating the R&AW, the Government took a number of important decisions to strengthen its capability. These were in line with prevailing practices in the external intelligence agencies of the West. Important amongst them were:

- (a) The R&AW would not confine its recruitment of officers only to the IPS and the armed forces as was the practice in the IB. It would take its officers from a wide variety of disciplines in the Government service as well as directly from the open market. The preponderance of IPS officers should be gradually reduced.
- (b) The post of the head of the organisation, now called Secretary (R), would be an ex-cadre post to which the Government can appoint any suitable person, either from the organisation or from outside. In the IB, on the contrary, the post of Director is a cadre post to which only IPS officers can be appointed.
- (c) To enable it to recruit candidates with a special aptitude for intelligence from a wide reservoir, the R&AW would be kept out of the purview of the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC).

In 1968, the question also arose as to which Ministry would supervise the functioning of the R&AW. The then Home Minister, who was against the bifurcation of the IB, subsequently agreed to it and wanted that the R&AW, like the IB, should be under the control of the Home Ministry. On the other hand, the then Defence Minister felt that since the Armed Forces would be the principal consumers of its intelligence, it should be under the Defence Ministry, as in the case of the external intelligence agencies of France, Italy and other continental European countries, which are controlled by the MOD. The Government finally decided to follow the US and UK models and place it directly under the Prime Minister.

In building up the R&AW, its founding fathers studied western models, particularly those of the US and UK and incorporated a number of useful practices such as:

- (a) Creating a permanent service for the organisation and reducing the number of deputationists.
- (b) Separating the responsibilities for collection and analysis, without, however, creating separate services for these tasks. In the CIA, there is a separate division for collection (called the operations division) and another for analysis (called the intelligence division) and the officers are

generally not inter-changeable. An officer recruited to the operations division would spend his entire career in that division and similarly an officer inducted into the analysis division would be an analyst throughout his career. This division of responsibilities is based on the principle that the two tasks call for different qualities. In the R&AW, the posts are inter-changeable. An officer may work in the operations division one year and move over to the analysis division the next year.

(c) At its inception, the principal consumers of the R&AW were the Armed Forces and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). To improve the quality of collection and analysis of military and political (external) intelligence, a Military Intelligence Advisory Group (MIAG) and a Foreign Service Advisory Group (FSAG), headed respectively by a senior Army officer and a senior IFS officer, were created and placed directly under the head of the organisation. Their responsibilities were to advise the organisation on improving the quality of its output, ascertaining the intelligence requirements of the armed forces and the MEA on a continuous basis and ensuring better co-ordination between the R&AW on the one side and the Armed Forces and the MEA on the other.

(d) The next important consumers were the IB and the MHA in respect of intelligence relating to the insurgency in the North-East, international terrorism and external threats to VIP security. No need for similar advisory/co-ordination arrangements with them on an institutional basis was felt since officers of these set-ups had for many years worked together and knew each other.

(e) The founding fathers anticipated that in the years to come there could be increasing demands on the R&AW for economic and scientific and technological (S&T) intelligence as well as for a psywar capability and, therefore, created small Economic, S & T and Psywar Divisions manned by officers either directly recruited from the open market or taken on deputation from the concerned Government establishments.

THE COLLECTION MACHINERY

A number of deficiencies in the collection machinery have come to notice since the last re-vamping of the intelligence community was done in 1968. These are due to the following reasons:

(a) The R&AW, like the IB before it, was set up by an order of the executive and not by an act of parliament. This was the prevailing practice in the Western countries till the Second World War. Since then,

their authorities have realised the advantages of having their existence regularised through an act of Parliament. The CIA was the first intelligence agency to be created by an act of the legislature defining its functions. The British Government has recently passed similar legislation in respect of the Security Service (internal — MI-5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (external - MI-6).

(b) The intelligence agencies do not have a specific charter of their responsibilities, revised from time to time. In 1990, the Government, at the suggestion of the R&AW, initiated an exercise for giving it a formal charter, but the exercise remained tentative and incomplete.

The absence of formal charters delineating the respective responsibilities of different civilian and military intelligence agencies has often led to overlapping of functions and responsibilities, avoidable turf battles and infructuous expenditure due to different agencies chasing the same source or seeking to perform the same tasks. Two examples can be given:

(a) Since all the agencies collect tactical intelligence near or across the border without sharing with each other, for operational security reasons, details of their sources, not infrequently, the same agent works for a number of agencies, feeding the same intelligence in different language. The resulting danger is not only an avoidable waste of funds, but also the possibility of the consumers taking reports emanating from different agencies but based on the same source as independent corroboration and hence confirmed. This problem is not unusual. The intelligence agencies of other countries have also faced similar problems, but the presence of an overall intelligence co-ordinator above all the agencies, civilian as well as military minimises the ills of this problem. In India, there has been no sustained exercise to tackle it.

(b) The 1968 re-vamping has left the position regarding responsibility for TECHINT rather vague. In the US and the UK, there are separate agencies for TECHINT. The CIA and the SIS (MI-6) concentrate on HUMINT. However, the Director of the CIA, in his capacity as Director, Central Intelligence, coordinates the functioning of the TECHINT agencies which administratively form part of the pentagon. In the UK, the Director-General of the SIS has no such co-ordinating role. In 1968, the R&AW was made exclusively responsible for collection of external intelligence. This has been interpreted to mean HUMINT as well as TECHINT, an interpretation which is often challenged by the military intelligence agencies which want to have their own TECHINT capability. They already have it for tactical intelligence purposes, but want to

have its scope expanded. TECHINT involves huge investments in equipment and trained, specialist manpower and too many agencies taking it up would result in a huge wastage of funds and duplication of functions. TECHINT has a CI aspect too relating to ensuring the security of the communications of the Government, the Armed Forces, the Atomic Energy and Space Departments etc. In the US and UK, the separate TECHINT agencies are responsible for the CI too. In India, the R&AW does not perform this role and no other agency has been designated as the nodal agency for ensuring communications and computer security. The IB's CI role in respect of TECHINT is limited. The result would be a big gap in our technical security. The result was apparent in the way the decision relating to the privatisation of telecom services with participation of foreign companies seemed to have been taken without security vetting from the technical CI angle. In the US and the UK, any such proposal would not have gone before the Cabinet without first being cleared by their TECHINT agencies.

The role and importance of the MIAG and FSAG have been diluted over the years, the fault for which lies with the R&AW as well as armed forces and the MEA. Competent and up-and-rising officers of the armed forces and the MEA are increasingly unwilling to do a spell in the organisation due to an apparent feeling that this would not help them in their career in their parent services. Retired officers of the armed forces have now increasing openings in the private sector with much higher emoluments than what they would get in the R&AW and this results in difficulties even in finding suitable retired officers for reemployment.

In the organisation itself, the attention paid by the founding fathers to military intelligence is no longer there. Even in the initial years of the organisation, difficulties were being faced in getting suitable officers from the Air Force and the Navy, resulting in a preponderance of officers from the Army. This problem has got aggravated over the years with the result that the organisation has not been able to build up a satisfactory capability in respect of air and naval intelligence. In view of the growing strength of the Chinese Navy and the expected extension of its reach to the Indian Ocean area, maritime intelligence has acquired increasing importance, but the organisation's efforts in this regard have left much to be desired.

Any exercise for re-vamp should correct these deficiencies and give military and S&T intelligence once again the importance it deserves. Economic and financial intelligence and intelligence relating to information systems are also acquiring increasing importance. The organisation has a good analytical capability in respect of economic intelligence, largely based on open

information, but its capability for the collection of secret intelligence is inadequate.

Counter-terrorism is another field needing attention. The organisation had contributed to a number of spectacular successes in terrorism-affected areas, but this was partly due to intelligence received from security agencies of other countries and only partly due to its own collection successes.

The R&AW has had 10 chiefs in the 28 years of its existence so far, all from the organisation. Of these, two, who became chiefs in their early 50s, had a tenure of more than five years each and three had a tenure of about three years each. Three had a tenure of about 18 months each and one had only five months. One chose to quit after about three months due to differences with the then Government over some of its decisions relating to the organisation.

Intelligence collection is a highly specialised profession with the emphasis on operational secrecy, restrictive security and compartmentalisation. Any officer, who rises to the top, may not, therefore, have had an exposure to the entire range of the organisation's tasks and performance. It would take him at least about six months to familiarise himself with the entire range of functions and, only thereafter, would he be able to start making his own contribution to improving its work. Fruition of new ideas may take anywhere between 18 months and two years. It is, therefore, important that all intelligence chiefs should have a minimum tenure of three years.

Many Western countries and Israel have made the posts of chiefs of civilian intelligence agencies ex-cadre posts so that the President or the Prime Minister has the option to choose the chief either from the organisation or from other Government departments or even from the private sector. President Carter appointed Admiral Stanfield Turner of the Navy as the CIA chief. Mr. James Woolsey and Mr. John Deutch, President Clinton's appointees as Director, CIA, came from outside the organisation. President Francois Mitterrand appointed the then Managing Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE), the French external intelligence agency, and a close personal friend and medical doctor (Mr. Francois de Grosseoeuvre) as his chief Intelligence co-ordinator for West Asia and Africa. Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in his first term, appointed a politician to head the German external agency. In the 1980s, a British Foreign Service officer had headed the Security Service (MI-5), the internal agency. This was one of the very rare instances in the West for one, who had never had an exposure to police or security work or to the legal profession, to have headed an internal agency.

The reasons for periodically appointing outsiders to head intelligence agencies are as follows:

- (a) It could help in inducting fresh ideas and operational and analytical concepts into the organisation.
- (b) From time to time, it would enable the Government to have an independent assessment of the state of the organisation.

Even though the post of Secretary (R) is tenable also by an outsider, no Government has so far considered it necessary to use this option. The IB rules, it is understood, do not permit a non-IPS officer to head the organisation.

Intelligence collection, as already mentioned, is a highly specialised profession and the worth of an officer is judged by his operational capability to recruit agents and get from them a flow of secret intelligence. It is a recognised principle in the intelligence organisations of other countries that operational and analytical performance should be the main criterion for promotion and not just seniority. There is an average wastage of about 25 to 30 per cent at each level of promotion due to officers not considered professionally adequate being superseded and eased out of the organisation through golden handshakes. This systematic weeding-out of unsuitable officers at every level should explain the comparatively young age of many of their senior officers. Mr. Robert Gates became the head of the CIA when he was still in his 40s.

In India, seniority continues to play a very important role in promotions. Though the rules provide for golden handshakes, they have rarely been used. In the 1980s, there was a move to provide for a fast-track promotion for professionally outstanding officers, but it became a non-starter.

ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING

Assessment has three aspects :

- (a) Assessment of an individual piece of HUMINT in order to determine its reliability and acceptability.
- (b) Interpretation of an individual piece of TECHINT in order to determine what it means and what it indicates.
- (c) Analysis of accepted pieces of HUMINT and TECHINT in order to assess their implications in the short as well as long terms.

The first two types of assessment are continuously done at all levels, right from the lowest. The third type of assessment is generally done at the headquarters which would have a complete view on the basis of intelligence flowing from different stations. The collection agencies then report the

accepted pieces of intelligence and their analyses to a central assessment and monitoring machinery, which in the USA is the permanent staff of the National Security Council (NSC) and in the UK and India is the JIC.

The central assessment and monitoring machinery should generally perform the following tasks;

- (a) Ascertaining periodically from the consumers their intelligence requirements, vetting them keeping in view their relevance to national security, the capabilities of the collection agencies, the manpower and resource position and allotting collection priorities. Intelligence requirements can be tactical and strategic. Tactical requirements are generally passed on by the consumer agencies to the collection agencies, but strategic requirements have to be centrally vetted and prioritised, if collection has to be cost effective.
- (b) Monitoring the performance of the collection agencies in order to see to what extent they have been able to cater to the priorities and identify gaps and deficiencies.
- (c) Preparing short-term and long-term assessments on threats to national security on the basis of open intelligence as well as secret intelligence flowing from collection agencies.

The soundness of the assessment process depends on the following factors:

- (a) To what extent the officers at various levels in the collection agencies are objective and intellectually honest in determining the reliability and acceptability of HUMINT?
- (b) To what extent the interpreters of TECHINT are scientific in drawing their conclusions?
- (c) To what extent the analysts in the collection agencies and the central assessment machinery are objective and intellectually honest in their analyses?

Not infrequently, subjective factors creep in leading to distortions, which could also arise due to honest human error. Any experienced intelligence officer would admit that:

- (a) About a third of the pieces of HUMINT and TECHINT determined to be acceptable subsequently prove to be wrong.
- (b) An equal proportion of intelligence rejected as unacceptable subsequently proves to be correct.

- (c) Analyses often get distorted by factors such as incorrect or incomplete intelligence, the analyst allowing himself to be influenced by narrow departmental interests etc.

Distortions also arise due to certain institutional factors. The world over, civilian intelligence agencies tend to over-assess threats to national security so that they are not accused of intelligence failure if things go wrong, military intelligence agencies tend to over-assess acquisitions by adversaries in order to strengthen the case for new acquisitions and increased budgetary allocations, and Foreign and Home Ministries tend to down-play or reject intelligence or analyses which show their policies or judgement in poor light. Moreover, while the collection agencies over-estimate their performance, the consumers tend to depreciate it.

To provide a balance in the functioning of the assessment and monitoring machinery, certain principles have, therefore been laid down, namely:

- (a) Its permanent staff should have a mix of competent professionals taken from the collection and consumer agencies/departments and from the world of academics and strategic think-tanks.
- (b) To give it independence and adequate authority, it should function directly under the President or the Prime Minister.
- (c) The head of the assessment and monitoring agency should be an independent person who is unlikely to be unduly influenced by the viewpoints of either the collection or consumer agencies.

The head of the NSC permanent staff in the US, called the National Security Adviser, is generally such an independent person, often selected from the world of academics and non-governmental strategic experts. There could be exceptions such as President Reagan's appointment of Admiral Pointdexter as his National Security Adviser during his second term.

It was reported that before the Falklands War, the JIC in the UK was headed by an officer of the Foreign Office who allowed his judgement to be influenced by the prevailing view in the Foreign Office that Argentina would make a lot of noise, but would not act and disregarded the repeated advice of the JIC permanent staff that the developing situation needed close attention. Consequently, the Franks committee underlined the importance of the JIC chairman being an independent person working directly under the Prime Minister.

The JIC in India systematically performs the task of preparation of short

and long term assessments, but its monitoring of the performance of the collection agencies is not as systematic and leaves much to be desired. Moreover, the Indian practice of the civilian intelligence agencies sending their own short and long term assessments to the Prime Minister and other Ministers concerned, which may often contradict the JIC assessments prepared with their collaboration, creates avoidable confusion. In the UK, the intelligence agencies do not directly send their assessments to the Government. The JIC is exclusively responsible for this work. In the 1960s, the then chairman of our JIC suggested a similar practice in India, but this was not accepted.

The practice of the JIC periodically evaluating the performance of the collection agencies in meeting the priority requirements of the consumers and keeping the Prime Minister informed of the deficiencies and the action taken to remove them is more an exception than the rule.

Such evaluation is particularly important in respect of military intelligence. Just as the military constantly prepares itself during peace time for a war which may never come, intelligence collection agencies have to continuously finetune their capability to meet war-time requirements which may never arise. The ability of the military to win a war without major losses would depend upon the ability of the collection agencies to meet their war indicator requirements in time.

Relevant to this is the readiness time of the military and the alert time of the intelligence agencies. The readiness time is the time required by the military to convert its potential capability of peace time into actual capability of war time. The alert time is the minimum time required by the intelligence agencies to give the first warning of possible war preparations by an adversary. The alert time should match the readiness time. If it does not, the intelligence capability is not up to the mark. To make them match should be one of the most important tasks of the monitoring work of the JIC. This is another aspect which needs attention.

During the 1960s, our JIC was headed by independent officers not connected with either the collection or consumer agencies. In the middle 1970s, a senior, distinguished officer of the R&AW headed the JIC for about two years. Otherwise, it was headed by independent officers during the 1970s too. Since 1983, it is being headed by senior, distinguished officers of the IB or R&AW. So far, three officers of the IB and six of the R&AW have headed the organisation.

This practice was started in 1983 on the following grounds:

- (a) A professional, experienced intelligence officer would be able to give a better thrust to the JIC.
- (b) Both the IB and the R&AW are small pyramids with a very narrow top. As a result, promotion prospects for senior officers are very limited. Appointing one of them as JIC chairman would improve their prospects.

It would be useful to examine to what extent the appointment of officers of the collection agencies as head of the assessment and monitoring agency has improved the assessment and monitoring process and whether any change is called for.

THE CO-ORDINATION MACHINERY

Co-ordination has three aspects— institutional, operational and action-oriented. Institutional co-ordination among different intelligence agencies, civilian as well as military, and between the collection agencies and their consumers is important for the following reasons:

- (a) To make the production relevant to the needs of the consumers.
- (b) To prevent the collection agencies from wasting time, energy and funds in collecting intelligence which is already available in the records of one of the agencies.
- (c) To assist each other in evaluating the reliability and acceptability of reports by referring to each other's records.

Close operational co-ordination has the following objectives;

- (a) To ensure that different agencies do not mount separate operations for achieving the same result.
- (b) To prevent transgression of charters and consequent crossing of wires, resulting in possible exposure of operations, dangers to the agents and avoidable political embarrassment.
- (c) To benefit from each other's operational experience and assets.

Action-oriented co-ordination ensures effective follow-up action on intelligence, tactical as well as strategic. The Purulia arms-drop reportedly brought to light serious deficiencies in action-oriented co-ordination.

The agencies of other countries achieve institutional and operational co-ordination in the following manner:

(a) By having a common data base and a common computer network in fields such as counter terrorism, counter-narcotics and military intelligence so that agencies can easily make data checks without having to go through the rigmarole of sending memos, etc.

(b) By sharing officers with expertise in different fields. Thus, the Counter-Terrorism Centre of the CIA has officers from the FBI, the Drug Control Administration, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Immigration Service etc attached to it. The Counter-Proliferation Centre of the CIA has many officers of the Pentagon and the DIA attached to it. CIA officers go on attachment to the DIA for short or long periods. When the US troops were sent to Somalia, joint teams of CIA and DIA officers were attached to them.

Similar practices are followed in other Western countries. While, as a result, co-ordination is improving, it is still not totally satisfactory resulting in many intelligence failures and set-backs.

In India, co-ordination is a neglected aspect, with good institutional arrangements, started with enthusiasm, subsequently petering out. One had already referred to the dilution of the role of the MIAG and the FSAG. A system of regular, structured interactions between IB and R&AW officers, started in the late 1980s, was subsequently not kept up. Similar interactions with the BSF, started in 1992, were downgraded in importance. Co-ordination meetings involving the R&AW, the DRI and the NCB, also started in 1992, petered out. Counter-narcotics has been given high priority by the agencies of other countries which have built up their collection capability with the help of their Narcotics Control Administrations.

Since the 1980s, the R&AW has been taking an increasing number of highly competent IB officers in its operational and analysis divisions to benefit from their experience. Similarly, it has many experienced military officers on its staff, But, unfortunately, there has been no reverse flow of officers from the R&AW to the IB and the MI agencies.

It would, however, be incorrect to say that co-ordination is totally lacking. There are many good instances of co-ordination such as in respect of VVIP security by Secretary (Security) and in dealing with terrorism and insurgency. The successes against terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir would not have been possible but for effective co-ordination. The successful investigation of the Bombay blasts of March 12, 1993, was another result of good co-ordination.

How to improve this tactical co-ordination and give it an institutional, structured, strategic thrust should be an important objective of any revamp

exercise. Our agencies have not yet started working towards a common data base with a common network. When the agencies do not even have, as yet, a common data base with a common network inside their respective organisations, to talk of such an arrangement networking different civilian and military agencies would be premature.

In a large federal set-up like ours, co-ordination mechanisms have also to involve the intelligence and security set-ups of the State Governments. While such mechanisms exist under the over-all supervision of the IB, the Purulia air-drop showed their inadequacies.

THE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE (CI) MACHINERY

The importance of CI is obvious and needs no emphasis. All the secret intelligence collected by our agencies thereby adding to our knowledge of our adversaries would be of little avail in strengthening national security, if our sensitive departments and organisations allow themselves to be penetrated by the intelligence agencies of the adversaries thereby placing at their disposal equal, if not more, knowledge about us.

This subject would have to be treated in a separate paper later on. One could, however, make some general observations. The tremendous progress in communications, computer and satellite photography technologies have placed at the disposal of intelligence agencies well-endowed with funds and technical skills a fearsome capability to penetrate us not only through human moles, but also through technical means.

We are in the beginning of the era of microchip moles capable of carrying out clandestine tasks programmed for them by their maker without the knowledge of the user. The techniques for monitoring of telecommunications through satellites have advanced to such an extent that it would be safe to presume that all international telephone calls are being recorded by the monitoring stations of some agency or the other. The question no longer is whether an agency can monitor the calls, but whether it has the capability to process and analyse all the calls that modern equipment is capable of recording. As a result of these developments, CI against technical moles has become as important as CI against human moles, if not more important. One does not have the impression that there is sufficient understanding in our agencies of the implications of the entire change in the concept of CI and of the steps needed to protect ourselves.

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

This paper also does not touch upon the question of ensuring the trans-

parency and accountability of intelligence agencies in order to prevent undersirable or unethical practices and the advisability or otherwise of parliamentary oversight of their functioning. This also would have to be the subject of a separate paper.

The object of this paper was not to suggest concrete solutions, but to project the problem of intelligence revamp in its various aspects and highlight areas needing attention. What needs to be done, how and in what time-frame would have to be decided after a careful study by a high-powered commission. If and when a National Security Council is set up, this could be one of its priority tasks.

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Defence - An Overview

LT GENERAL J F R JACOB PVSM (RETD)

India today is faced with an extensive defence and security parameter; 14,103 kilometers of land borders, including 7,000 kilometers of border with countries with whom major territorial disputes still persist (Pakistan and China), a coastline of 7,600 kilometers and 2.5 million square kilometers of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to protect. Besides this, there are over 500 islands plus offshore hydrocarbon installations. The land defence perimeter spans some of world's most difficult terrain, the Himalayas in the North, thick mountain jungles in the East and North-East and the Rann swamps of the West.

China continues to occupy 37,555 square kilometers of Indian territory and 5,180 square kilometers in Ladakh have illegally been transferred by Pakistan to China. Pakistani occupation of so-called Azad Kashmir covers 78,000 square kilometers of territory. Pakistan's sponsorship of terrorism and insurgency in Kashmir and the North-East is of increasing concern.

China is a nuclear power. The Chinese armed forces, the world's third largest, are being continuously modernized. An expanding infrastructure in Tibet created over the years, sizeable ground and air forces together with a capacity of rapid re-inforcement enable China to be able to launch major offensive operations. Extension of rail, road and other infrastructural projects such as pipelines and air facilities are proceeding at a fast pace. The airfields in Tibet are being improved to take heavy military transport and civilian aircraft. The runway at Gongkor airport has been extended to 4,000 metres. China has held many exercises to reinforce her Army in Tibet. In March 1989, the 149 Airborne Division was moved from its base in Sichuan to Lhasa in 36 hours. There have been other such exercises at regular intervals. Significant too is the move of the control line military headquarters from South-West China in the Lhasa area. China is reported to have over 500 nuclear bombs/warheads. China has completed its underground nuclear test programme at Lop Nor. Out of the 500-plus nuclear devices that China has, about 200 are free-fall bombs capable of being dropped by a variety of Chinese aircraft. The bulk of the remainder are designed to be fitted into the large numbers of land-based missiles. China is also developing a range of missiles for its surface naval vessels and its submarines as well as neutron bomb and laser weaponry.

Lt General JFR Jacob is a former General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Eastern Army Command, who as the chief of staff, planned and executed military operations in the former East Pakistan during December 1971. His latest book on Bangladesh war of Liberation is being released soon.

Pakistan has waged three wars against India. Pakistan is currently sponsoring insurgency in Kashmir. It is fuelling terrorism and insurgency in the North-East. It is in the process of modernizing its armed forces. China is assisting it in building defence, industrial infrastructure, machinery and weapon technology. Chinese technicians are currently engaged in retrofitting and upgrading obsolescent aircraft and tanks. Pakistan in addition to getting weapons systems from the USA under the Hank Brown amendment is negotiating for a wide range of weapons systems and aircraft from East European Countries. She is in the process of acquiring 69 Mirage 3 and 5 aircraft from France.

Pakistan has the geo-military advantage of operating on interior lines. This gives it the capability of mounting a major offensive against India in a matter of days. It also gives her the capability of switching forces from one sector to another with great rapidity. India due to its geographical position and its exterior lines requires much more time to concentrate forces and to switch from sector to sector.

China has actively assisted Pakistan in developing nuclear weapons and missiles. The recent supply of 5000 ring magnets for the enrichment of uranium confirms China's help to Pakistan's nuclear programme.

Pakistan is said to have produced some 15 nuclear warheads and has enough weapon-grade uranium to fabricate between 10 to 20 more warheads. Pakistan, with Chinese assistance, has developed the HATF 2 and 3 short-range ballistic missiles. China has supplied Pakistan with M-11 missiles capable of being fitted with nuclear warheads and is assisting Pakistan in such a technology. Pakistan has linked its nuclear programmes to its claims on Kashmir. Pakistan's nuclear and missile development programmes should be viewed in this context. China and Pakistan are in the process of developing the Karokaram highway to an all weather highway to take sustained traffic.

Pakistan has disproportionately large navy considering her coastline of some 700 kilometers. It is developing the port of Gwadar near the Iranian border into a naval base with supporting airfield complex - naval and air force approaches to the Gulf through the Straits of Hormuz through which a large proportion of our oil supplies pass. Pakistan is expanding her surface, underwater and air arms. Her recent order of four sophisticated French submarines is indicative of her designs in the event of hostilities to target our commercial shipping.

Recent threats by the Pakistani Prime Minister Ms. Benazir Bhutto regarding going to war with India to liberate Kashmir should not be dismissed lightly. The balance of conventional forces is such that Pakistan does not have

the capacity to win a conventional war. The possibility of Pakistan using nuclear weapons to achieve her declared aims cannot be ruled out. Pakistan, by issuing conflicting statements about its nuclear weapons, is creating a fog of nuclear deterrence. The other factor in this geo-military equation is China. It is difficult to anticipate or legislate for Chinese intentions and actions. China still holds the territory it has seized in Ladakh enlarging its claims from that it originally mooted in 1962 by expanding claim lines. It still maintains that its border in the North-East is as in the Survey of India map of 1917, i.e. the inner Line in Arunachal Pradesh.

Indian defence planners, both civil and military, envision that any future conflict with Pakistan will be of short duration. Due to the present balance of forces any future conflict may be of longer duration. The pattern of a future war will also be different as industrial and infrastructural complexes are likely to be targeted.

China, despite recent protestations of friendship, looks on India as a rival in its path of political, economic and military hegemony in Asia. India must have the wherewithal to defend its border including Bhutan where we have a commitment to defend.

In 1974 we exploded a nuclear device at Pokharan. The decision to carry out this test was pragmatic. Unfortunately, the follow-up has been ambiguous. Had we gone in for a weaponization programme we would today have had the nuclear status of China, though in terms of nuclear arsenal a fraction of its capability.

Nuclear deterrence had kept the peace in Europe during the Cold War. The capacity to deter depends not only on the warhead but also on the delivery means. India should embark on a programme of fabrication of nuclear bombs/warheads. This should not present any great problems as we have sizeable stocks of weapon-grade plutonium and the engineering ability to manufacture these. India has taken a correct decision regarding the signing at the CTBT and should go ahead with a comprehensive nuclear testing programme.

To create a credible deterrent India requires to give priority to its missile development programme. It should aim to create both a first-and second-strike capability. The Prithvi now being deployed can be fitted with a nuclear warhead. However, its short range of 150 to 250 kilometers gives it a limited coverage of targets in Pakistan.

China has the ability to strike Indian targets from the Tibetan plateau. The Agni with its planned range of 2,500 kilometers is not capable of reaching

the Chinese heartland. In order to create a credible deterrence against China it is imperative that work to increase the range of the Agni to 5,000 kilometers is undertaken on priority in addition to the Prithvi programme. The development of solid state fuel missiles for use with our submarines and surface ships should be undertaken.

MISSILES

Pakistan's coverage of Indian targets with missiles is currently restricted to the range of the M-11 missile (300 Km.) With the development of the HATF-2 and HATF-3 this coverage will be increased to 800 km, which will bring Bombay and Delhi within missile range.

A comparative Table showing missile capabilities is as under:

TABLE			
PAKISTAN			
	Payload (Kg)	Range (km)	Status
M-11(DF-11)	800-1000	300	Supplied by China
HATF-3	500	800	Being developed with Chinese help
HATF-2	400	300	Being developed with Chinese help
HATF-1	400	80	Built with French and Chinese technology
INDIA			
Prithvi (SRBM)	500-1000	150-250	Being produced
Agni (IRBM)	1 ton	2500	Under testing
Agni-2	2.0 to 2.5	5000+	On drawing board

In view of the potential Pakistani and Chinese nuclear capabilities, it is imperative that:

An immediate nuclear weaponisation programme is put into motion to produce free fall bombs for aircraft and warheads for missiles.

Sufficient aircraft capable of dropping free fall nuclear bombs are modified from the existing fleet and additional ones inducted from friendly countries.

The Prithvi production programme is accelerated.

The Agni mark-1 be produced on priority. Agni-2 should be developed on a very high priority to provide a deterrent against China/Pakistan.

THREAT SCENARIOS

Indian force levels must be adequate to meet the following contingencies.

- * Full-scale war with Pakistan. This combined with a holding action against the Chinese in Tibet and containment of insurgencies;
- * Full-scale invasion by China with a holding action against Pakistan and containment of insurgencies;
- * Low-intensity operations against large-scale infiltration in Kashmir;
- * Naval operations in the Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea;
- * Policing of adjacent areas on request, e.g. Sri Lanka, Maldives, etc.

The Indian strategy should aim at force levels to counter these threats. The most likely threat scenario in the short term can be stated thus ; Pakistan with subsidiary threat from China, in the long term the main threat is from China.

The major combat components of the armed forces of India and Pakistan are given below. In the case of China, Chinese capabilities of waging an offensive from the Tibetan plateau are relevant.

Though Chinese armed forces total more than 3 million, China's capability to deploy troops on the Tibetan plateau is restricted by terrain, infrastructural problems and logistics. An assessment of capabilities is as follows:

Ladakh	1 army plus	3-4 divisions
Sikkim	1 army plus	3-4 divisions
Arunachal Pradesh	3 armies plus	9-12 divisions

(A Chinese Army consists of a basic 3 divisions).

The total assessed capability is that of 20 Infantry Divisions. China's

Navy has a blue-water capability. Presently her ability of operating in the Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal is restricted to her submarine arm which has more than 100 submarines, a proportion of them having nuclear propulsion. She has got Burma to agree to a railway connection to an Indian Ocean base for the Chinese Navy. Such a base will have a decided effect on the potential Naval threat in the Bay of Bengal.

A comparison of the major elements of the Armed Forces of India and Pakistan is given below (published figures);

	PAKISTAN	INDIA
ARMY		
Armoured divisions	2	3
Infantry divisions	19	22
Independent armoured brigades	9	5
Corps independent artillery brigades	9	3
Mountain divisions	-	10
Independent infantry brigades	9	7
Army aviation squadrons	15	14
Air defence brigades/groups	8	6
Para brigades	-	1
NAVY		
Principal surface combat vessels	14	24*
		*(including 2 carriers)
Submarines	6	15
Patrol and coastal	18	40
Inshore/Offshore	7	21
AIR FORCE		
Combat aircraft	393	707
consisting of		
Fighter ground attack squadrons	7	23
Fighter air defence	9	17
Recce squadrons	2	1
Naval air combat aircraft	4	64
Helicopters (armed)	10	75

Despite this hostile military environment neither the Rao Government during its tenure nor the United Front Government have addressed themselves to modernization and re-equipping our Armed Forces to meet the growing military imbalances vis a vis Pakistan and China. Armed Forces that have been neglected in peace cannot be revived quickly to counter threats that emerge. Modern weapons systems require skills that take considerable time to acquire and master. It is regrettable that no major weapons systems have been acquired during the last eight years.

Pakistan's defence expenditure as a proportion of GDP is officially reported to be some 6.88 percent of GDP, China's (last figures available) 5.63 percent. Both these figures are in reality actually far less than the actual expenditure. India's defence expenditure as percentage of GDP is progressively decreasing. In 1988 it was 3.37 percent, in 1989 3.15 percent, in 1990 2.90 percent, in 1994 2.53 percent in 1995 2.39 percent and for this year 1996 it is expected to be 2.3 percent. This decline is a matter of grave concern and the budgetary defence allocations are dangerously inadequate to meet our national security requirements particularly in view of the hostile geopolitical and geomilitary environment that obtains. The budget caters for an increase of 3.41 percent over the previous year, far less than the rate of inflation which is expected to rise to 10 percent. Further due to devaluation of the rupee, imports of weapons systems will require correspondingly increased outlays.

Revenue allocations show a marginal increase to meet increasing pay and allowances. The Capital Outlays are totally inadequate; for example, last year the Navy projected Rs. 4464.34 crores as capital outlay. This year it has been allocated Rs. 1920.25 crores. This will severely restrict its plans for the acquisition of ships, aircraft and weapons systems. The Air Force has been allotted Rs. 3441.71 crores to acquire capital assets. The allocation for aircraft and aero engines is Rs. 2655.83 crores. In 1995-96 the Air Force had asked for a modest Rs. 3364.02 crores as part of a phased programme. (The purchase of Sukhoi 30 ME would cost some 7000 crores). The Advanced Jet Trainer, upgradation of the MIG 21Bis fleet, 'AWACS' and other items have to be catered for. The Army has been allotted Rs. 3721.04 crores to buy new equipment; with this it has to purchase modern tanks, 155 mm SP guns, induct Prithvi Missiles and Arjun main battle tanks. The Army also has to make provision for the induction of the light weight infantry weapons systems as well as numerous other essential items.

There are some organisations that are being funded out of the Defence budget. The role and purpose of the NCC is such that its funding should more appropriately be met from the Human Resources Ministry allocations. R&D covers various areas in common with other scientific research. R&D should be

a priority and funded by allocations from the Ministry of Science and Technology. The ordnance factories except for armament factories, also make items for civilian uses, these should be funded from allocations from the Ministry of Industry. The Army is largely responsible for counter insurgency. The Army raised 36 battalions of the Rashtriya Rifles on the understanding that the cost of maintaining these battalions would be met by the Home Ministry. The funding of the Army's other Formations engaged in counter insurgency should also be met from the Home Ministry's allocations. Incidentally, the allocation for paramilitary forces (BSF and CRP) has gone up from Rs. 3413.42 crores to Rs. 4368.47 crores an increase of Rs. 955 crores (28 per cent as opposed to the increase of 3.41 percent for defence).

The Armed forces have to be made leaner and meaner as is the practice in most countries. This will mean increasing fire power generated (teeth) and cutting down on the tail. The Armed Forces must on their part review manpower and reduce noncombatant elements. They must also exercise strict control in interior economy. The funds released from this and other measures mentioned above should be utilized together with increased allocations to induct the state of the art weapons systems so urgently required.

The Government must ensure suitable budgetary allocations for the acquisition of modern weapons systems, modernization and upgradation programmes. The programmes will have to be phased in accordance with priorities worked out by the three Service Chiefs. The monetary demands will be substantial and consequently these programmes will have to be phased over a period of years.

Indian Defence Policy should be based on the assessment of the likely threats. Force level must be tailored to meet military threats that may emerge. Ground, Air and Naval Forces should be restructured to make the armed forces cost effective. This will call for trimming of non essential manpower and increasing the firepower that can be generated. The armed forces are presently manpower intensive rather than firepower intensive. The ratio of "teeth to tail" must be increased and non-essential elements drastically cut. The trend today in the developed world is to farm out much of the support base to public or private sectors. Economies in establishments and in manpower are essential not only for salaries but also the increasing pensionary commitments.

In view of the nuclear capabilities of China and Pakistan, there should be no further procrastination in our programme to create a suitable nuclear deterrent. This would entail a nuclear weaponization programme. A nuclear testing programme should be taken in hand expeditiously. Priority should be given to the development of longer range missiles such as the Agni-I and Agni-

II to serve as vehicles for carrying deterrent nuclear warheads. The Prithvi programme should also be accelerated. Pakistan's missile factory being built near Rawalpindi with Chinese collaboration makes it imperative for our missile programme to be given the highest priority.

We are dependent on overseas supplies for essentials such as oil and a number of other items. We should, therefore, develop an air base at Pygmalion point (Indira Gandhi point) at the southern tip of the Great Nicobar Island to ensure surveillance of the Straits of Malacca. The need for such a base was illustrated by our failure in December 1971 to monitor the U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet Task Force that sailed South of Great Nicobar. We were totally unaware of its movements. An air base should be located in the Laccadives in order to enhance our surveillance of the Indian Ocean.

There is no effective machinery for the higher conduct of war. There is need to set up a National Security Council with teeth. The earlier defunct council did not meet and was in any case toothless.

We still have no Chief of Defence Staff. The present system of rotation of Service Chiefs, whose tenure depends on the length of their remaining service, is unsatisfactory. In any case, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee can do little to influence the other two Service Chiefs.

The intelligence services need to be revamped. The existing Joint Intelligence Committee needs to be upgraded with a greater degree of control over the numerous intelligence agencies. More reliance should be placed on electronic intelligence and the means of acquisition of electronic intelligence must be put in place. It is pertinent to note that in the 1971 war in the East main source of intelligence was from the Army's signal intelligence unit allocated to Eastern Command.

Indian Force levels are just sufficient to provide for the minimum defence posture required. In the West we have marginal numerical superiority over Pakistan. Pakistan, however, has been acquiring modern sophisticated weapon systems whereas we have done little in the last decade to induct modern state of the art weapons systems.

The Force levels on our Northern Border with China are just sufficient to maintain an adequate holding posture. Due to the nexus between Pakistan and China it would be difficult to reinforce one Front at the expense of the other. Much the same applies to the Air Force. The Navy has to face a growing Pakistan Navy and an emerging Chinese presence in the Bay of Bengal. Induction of modern weapon systems, upgrading and modernization programmes for

the three services is a necessity. Funding for these programmes will have to be phased over a period of years. The Services must, therefore, accord priorities on the basis of "musts" "shoulds" and "coulds". At the same time they must prune unessentials in order to enhance the resources available.

The Armed Forces have to operate under difficult environs. Necessary improvements have to be taken in hand for their pay and service conditions. The shortages in officer intake are largely attributable to the comparative unattractive pay and service conditions. The dignity of the Armed Forces has to be maintained. The relative order of precedence between the Armed Forces and other Government Services has been downgraded after successive wars. This imbalance must be restored.

The Armed Forces of the country have served with dedication and competence. They require to be equipped suitably to defend the country against any aggressor. They also deserve to have adequate pay and other facilities consistent with the responsible roles they perform.

NOTE TO CONTRIBUTORS

Articles on National Security issues and Defence and Security forces, for publication in the USI Journal, may be sent to the Editor in duplicate, typed in double spacing. Subjects should be covered in depth with adequate research and reference made to sources from where information has been obtained. The length of articles should be between 3,000 to 4,000 words.

Articles may not be returned unless accompanied by self-addressed and stamped envelope.

Impact of Social, Political and Economic Conditions on Careers of Defence Personnel

MAJ NIRANJAN KUMAR

In the changing political, social and economic conditions in the country, the environment in which the defence forces find themselves is vastly different. Defence forces have had significant role to play in our society at all times. They constitute an important factor in nation building and national security both in peace and war. In their primary role in war, they must safeguard territorial integrity of our country against external aggressions; while in peace, defence forces are expected to rise to occasion in aid to civil authority to carry out counter insurgency operations, for the maintenance of law and order, the maintenance of essential services and assistance in the event of natural calamities. These tasks are carried out amidst the present day politico religious, socio economic, moral and regional environment obtaining in our country. As against the existing state of corruption, general inefficiency, politico-religious problems, regionalism and deteriorating moral standards shown by vast majority of our people, the men of the Armed Forces are expected to put up exemplary behaviour unconcerned by and unaffected by such environment and carry out their duties with dedication much higher than the nation's general standard. The society does not want to reflect it's own present state but what it ought to be as an ideal society. Ideally, that is what even the organisation wants, that the environmental pressures should not work on a soldier. But every man is a product of his environment and a soldier is the product of the society where he comes from.

AIM AND SCOPE

AIM : To evaluate the problems of recruitment, training and careers of personnel in defence forces due to the impact of social, political and economic conditions and suggest measures to overcome these.

SCOPE : It is proposed to examine the following in this article :-

- (a) *An Evaluation of the Problem* - It is proposed to examine the various problems of recruitment resulting in poor intake, problems

Edited text of the article which won the First Prize in Group II of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition, 1995. Maj Niranjana Kumar is with the School of Artillery, Deolali.

affecting training of troops and the types of training required and the careers of Armed Forces personnel so as to reach the root of the problem.

(b) *Suggested Measures* - Both external and at unit level to counter the threat. Most of these measures will be aimed at unit/subunit level which is the 'primary group'. However, certain external measures (i.e. measures at army level/civil management level) which would be required, have also been discussed.

AN EVALUATION OF THE PROBLEM

Ethnicity and Religion. The underlying cause of violence, unrest and insurgency in India are ethnic and religious even if the initiating causes of such unrest were not ethnic/religious. Since independence, these movements have invariably degenerated into ethnic or religious movements. For example, the Punjab crisis initially began as a case of political advantage using an agrarian issue (water) and linguistic issue (Punjabi vs Hindi). It gradually assumed a communal and religious form and later these were its fundamental issues. The danger, therefore, is that the movements in India are based on two principal paradigms of Indian Army's organisational and motivational model i.e. religious and ethnic and this has already been exploited by secessionists in the wake of Operation Blue Star.

Political Ideology. The politically desensitised atmosphere of the army particularly of regimental life, perhaps, contributes to the feeling that nothing can go wrong. The fact that literacy levels in the Army were not too high till some time ago as also the disdain with which the average soldier views the shady politics of the country perhaps contribute to such feeling. The fact that modern Army is apolitical leads to a view that the soldier is detached from politics, but is he now? Political ideology, therefore, is a political destabilising force. Illiteracy and blind faith can well be penetrated. Literacy rates in the Army have improved radically; coupled with this is the constant political ferment in Indian political scene. A greater receptivity to political ideology is palpable in the literate soldier especially when he frequently quells politically inspired disorders and agitations. In any case the soldier belongs to the same culture. The combination is potentially explosive.

Military Motivation. Military discipline till recently was an internal corporate matter for the Army. Unquestioning and motivated response to orders forms the basis of military functioning. Till about five decades ago the Indian soldiers motivation was totally corporate and centered only on the enemy "dushman". All else sank into oblivion. This mercenary trait enabled

old British Indian Army to exploit him; he, ironically, fought for the freedom of peoples and nations under axis occupation while freedom was denied to him in his own homeland. Is he so unquestioning now ? Insurgency and linked populist socio political issues (and some of the causes are indeed popular in a poorly administered country like ours) deny a specific image of enemy from being formed. There is every possibility of this confused image being exploited to raise idealistic and psychological doubts to shake the soldiers faith. And the soldiers most affected by dilution of ethics everywhere may be most idealistic and motivated soldiers. Our soldiers may not be sophisticatedly literate but could the reports of various human rights group, media coverage of atrocities, human tragedies and destruction in protracted aid to civil power and counter insurgency operations demotivate our more idealistic, sensitive and motivated troops.

Economic Realities. Liberalisation of economy and resultant socio economic changes coupled with gradual break up of joint families have brought about changes in the social values of all ranks in the armed forces. They are now more aware of the comparative deprivations and disparities in the structure of emoluments and gradual arbitrary erosion of status which was the bedrock of pride and elan of the armed forces. Low remunerations have not only resulted in dilution of quality of life but also brought in an abridgement of moral values. A career in the Armed Forces has become one of the lowest career choices of the country's youth.

Organisational Format of the Army. To a substantial extent, the Indian Army's structure is linked to it's parent social structure. This ethos absolved from British Indian Army's structure which utilised the normative forces of parent social order instead of harsh disciplinary methods and isolation techniques utilised by Western Armies. The basics of this caste based organisation were based on official doctrine of that period which tended to balance the communities in format of unit loyalty. However, the present day army organisation echoes the spirit of secular India wherein we believe in the doctrine of unity in diversity. But the organisational format can't be changed in one day and the present caste based unit system needs change.

Economic Development as Means of Control. A vested economic interest was created in military service by creating a new social elite of ex-servicemen. The stark fact is that in the ultimate analysis loyalty was secured by carrot of economic and social well being. As the exservicemen form part of the continuum of the military format their well being was and is a part of military's social contract. This fact lies open to exploitation due to the collapse of the welfare measures for exservicemen and their status. The Achilles heel of social linkage is being brazenly exploited by all political parties. Practically all major

political parties have exservicemen cells. It is significant that election manifesto of one even had demands for 'one rank one pension' as an election plank. The danger of reverse flow of political contamination into those serving in the Army from the parent social group especially in areas of exservicemen density is obvious.

MAN POWER AND RECRUITMENT

The present standing Army is approximately 9.6 lakhs including approximately 45000 officers. We have a reserve of only 2 lakhs and additional 50,000 in the Territorial Army. Assuming that the present figures are taken as a guide, it remains to design this force level in a manner which not only eliminates the present shortcomings but also generates positive and chaste ethos which will win over best talent in the country. The problems of manpower and recruitment are there for all to visualise :-

- (a) An aged Army which does not have a youthful profile.
- (b) Major deficiency in junior ranks.
- (c) Stagnation in promotion at higher ranks.
- (d) Lowered standards for conscription.

There is a need to analyse what is the situation in which the Army personnel are today. There has been some erosion and this has to be faced squarely. It has happened mainly because of frustration also partly because of lack of career prospects among other factors. Defence Forces career planning is unfortunately regarded as a departmental problem and not a national problem. Unless that is done we will never be able to get good material out of the tremendous potential that we have in this country. Army has to be made an attractive career both for officers and jawans so that it is able to face the challenges prevalent today in our society and nation itself. Unless the self esteem of a soldier is high his personal sense of honour will be low and his individual ability to preserve the nation's honour nil. As a corollary, unless we collectively have a very high sense of self respect and self esteem we cannot expect it in the Army and unless the Armed Forces are imbued with a sense of overbearing pride and honour you cannot expect them to make supreme sacrifice.

Despite abundant raw material available, the Army continues to be on the lower priority. Image of soldiers which hitherto was cherished has changed manifold. During First and Second World War connotation of soldiering was glory, recognition in society, patriotism, elan and passport to heaven. When

these values are applied to present day soldiers most of them cascade for social, political and economic necessities and changes. Nevertheless we need to identify values which must be related to a soldier of today. Do we want a semi literate, obedient, selfless robot to perform harakiri or a relatively intelligent, educated, physically fit soldier who is fully aware of his obligations and rights. Unfortunately, recruiting directorate has made revisions which have resulted in diluting the standards.

Class Composition. The first reaction on examining the linkage between Army organisational format and social ethnic pressures would be that this format should be immediately changed. In simple terms this would imply converting immediately or by stages to totally mixed all India class compositions. But this cannot happen in a day or a year or two without serious loss in motivation and unit cohesion, specially when units in so called peace stations are actually employed in aid to civil power or counter terrorism operations.

Training. Our present training system primarily lays stress on individual and collective training. Individual training is planned and conducted at the unit, training centres, military academies and various training establishments whereas collective training is carried out at unit and formation levels. Our present training philosophy and training norms have withstood the tests of time whether it is conventional or it is internal security duties and counter insurgency operations. However, a lot needs to be done to :-

- (a) Absorb the technological advances in weapon techniques.
- (b) Be prepared to operate in NBC environment.
- (c) Carry out psychological conditioning of troops towards national integration and our continuing commitment in Internal Security duties and Counter Insurgency operations.

SUGGESTED MEASURES

It is quite obvious that ambivalence of the parent social group in this case the Indian society and changes in social, economic and political conditions will invariably affect soldier's attitudes and motivation and also lay them open to manipulation. The only factor that can counter this is cohesion at unit/subunit level which enables a military group to perform effectively even in the face of social disintegration. The overriding importance of interface at unit/subunit level to counter subversion and manipulated demotivation needs no highlighting. It is pertinent to remember that only a fraction, a very minor fraction of

Sikh troops broke down in 1984. The crux thus lies in unit motivation and leadership. However, everything does not lie within Unit Commander's grasp. Numerous external factors play on motivation. Measures thus have to be taken both at external and unit/subunit level.

EXTERNAL MEASURES

External measures imply measures at Army and civil administration level.

Pay and Perks. The armed forces since the last decade have been seriously concerned with the quality and morale of their personnel. There is a growing concern amongst all ranks of services over the comparative deprivations and disparities in the structure of their emoluments. It is a travesty of justice that emoluments structure of Armed Forces personnel is among the lowest in comparison with salaries in other sectors, including most civil services when viewed from angle of life time earnings.

These inequities combined with acute stagnation and poor compensation for the risks and hazards of service life have led to poor attractiveness. The problem has been compounded by the steady erosion of status of service personnel compared to 1947 level. The compulsions of a developing country are well understood. However, as a nation we have the financial capacity to bear this additional cost. The cost of national security is high but not paying it can extract a still higher price in war or national crisis.

Erosion of Status. Since 1947 an arbitrary erosion in the rankings of defence forces personnel vis-a-vis officers in civil administration has taken place. This inequity must be removed at once. Pre-independence seniorities must be restored vis-a-vis civilian counterparts for better functioning.

Fauji Foundation. Our Army's interface with civil administration for soldiers and exservicemen is DSSA Board i.e. District Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen Board run by the states. This organisation is blatantly ineffective. It's charter is limited and it is unable to take any worthwhile welfare measures. It works more in the nature of a post office, forwarding petitions and liaising with police to verify discharge applications and other such sundry matters. The Pakistanis unlike us have set up Fauji Foundation which is an institutionalised corporate body located in Rawalpindi. It employs retired officers and men in various economic enterprises, runs hospitals, light and heavy industries and other service facilities. Could we commence an organisation on such lines. An organisation with some dynamism utilising the skills of parallel society - the Army has skills in business, hightech, transportation, construction, medicare to

name a few. It is felt that such a body would do much to provide the 'care' to exservicemen including employment and status. The successful examples of corporate enterprises, like AGIF and AWHO are there for everyone to see. Interestingly, the Fauji Foundation was set up with corpus provided by welfare donations for troops during Second World War distributed between India and Pakistan. It is felt that such an institution will do much to restore the pride of exservicemen and provide financial and job security assurance to recruits. The occasional 'medical mela' and other such help being given to exservicemen is totally reactive. We need a permanent, proactive dynamic structure.

Liaison Centres. It is recommended that liaison centres for both serving and retired personnel be established in insurgency affected areas for assisting the troops. Police repression and corruption has reached unimaginable proportions. The civil administration is indifferent; DSSA Board ineffective. Even court decrees are not executed. The principal worries of our troops are land, water and security of families. He is rapidly losing faith in effectiveness of the state or even its honesty of purpose. Letters to civil administration in most cases are not even acknowledged let alone replied. It is felt that we need officers right at administration's door to look after our troops.

IN HOUSE MEASURES

Class Composition. Should we return to the time honoured and battle tested concepts of one class regiments and the mixed class regiments from a particular region ? Or is it time to convert to 'all class regiments' ? This change would be in the interest of national integration as also stall the inroads being made by narrow sectarian and religious issues into the Army's apolitical and secular way of life. Experience shows that mixed all class regiments have performed well in battles and action and as in the Brigade of Guards and some other regiments and there was no adverse effect when such regiments were formed or converted. The one class composition is a relic of our colonial past and should be done away with to conform to our present day requirements. However, it would not be expedient to discontinue the older system in one stroke. The change over should be carried out in gradual and planned manner. It is admitted that no structural changes are ever painless. Patience coupled with perseverance will be required in dealing with this delicate issue.

Recruitment. Recruitment Directorate lays down physical requirements which are reviewed periodically. The dilution of standards of intake has to be stopped. More exacting physical and mental parameters would help in achieving the following :-

- (a) Self pride in soldiers.

- (b) Improving the image of the Army in the eyes of civil population.
- (c) Meet the requirement of mental and physical robustness in inhospitable field areas.
- (d) Improve functional efficiency.

Educational Standards. The rapid advance in technology underscores the need for soldiers with more qualifications than is prevalent now. The present 10+2+3 system of education was conceived to reduce the crushing burden on colleges and to impart vocational training to students either unsuited by choice or aptitude for higher studies. Though ideally education of potential soldiers should be undertaken under aegis of military teachers. Till the policy decision is made it is recommended that civil educational institutions should include a discipline from 8th standard onwards which should facilitate channelisation of individuals into the Army, Airforce & Navy. Some of the recommendations are given below :-

- (a) Minimum qualification of a soldier be retained as matric.
- (b) In all educational institutes subjects with a military bias be introduced.
- (c) Those considered fit for combat soldiers should be taken into the Army after class X.
- (d) Vocational training in Army Subjects for two or more years be provided for potential soldiers.
- (e) For technical arms such as Signals, Engineers, EME, training for 3 years may be given in specialised subjects after completing 10 years of basic education.
- (f) Technical entries may also be encouraged directly as NCOs and given a decisive edge in pay and perks.

It would also be expedient to raise Defence University primarily catering to requirements of Armed Forces. Soldiers/officers already enrolled with an aptitude/desire for higher studies can also be sent to this institute. These facilities can also be used by non optees and superseded officers to improve their prospects.

JCOs. Though controversial, the JCO rank in current structure is indispensable. Since this is reached late there is a need for direct recruitment of about 50 per cent JCOs. JCOs could either be selected through separate selection Board or candidates lower in merit for officers selection board could be given chance to opt as JCOs.

MEASURES AT UNIT/SUBUNIT LEVEL

Education in History/Indoctrination. One of the major problem when Army is deployed in internal security duties is the absence of a concrete enemy figure. This combined with subtle propaganda does much to neutralise the soldier's motivation and perception. As the Indian soldier, like all Indians, is regional in outlook 'regionalism' and such 'suggestions' open up an area of conflict. It is recommended that a process of nationalist indoctrination should be introduced from the initial stages. This should aim at the following:-

- (a) Emphasise the cultural and social links of all communities in India.
- (b) Emphasise that all communities and parts of India are interdependent for security and economy and that no part can stand alone.
- (c) Emphasise that throughout India's history India has been defeated only when it's communities were fragmented.
- (d) Highlight the fact that all separatist movements in India are being funded and masterminded by those who have no local stakes and those who face no threat to themselves.
- (e) Effort should also be made to sow seeds of distrust about the militants and try and form the image of an enemy.

Appointment and Training of Religious Teachers. Like all armies the Indian Army also relies on religious instruction for spiritual solace. However, in our case these personnel occupy positions of veneration far in excess of their actual status. This results from our culture. Due to conditions in our country it is felt that recruitment of religious teachers from the civil institutions be curtailed. The intake of religious teachers at Institute of National Integration should be increased with refresher being planned every 3-4 years. This institution is doing a fine job and needs to be developed. The charter of duties of such personnel also needs to be defined. It is suggested that :-

- (a) All unit standing orders should provide for a charter of duties for religious teachers.
- (b) Sermons delivered should be secular in nature.
- (c) Religious institutions should be joint as far as possible. Unit motivation should include talks on all religions.
- (d) Utilisation of religious teachers for astrology should be banned.

HARDENING OF TROOPS AGAINST PROPAGANDA

Apart from subtle contacts and approaches, the media, especially the regional media often carries exaggerated stories of local conditions and operations in a sensational manner. Added to this is the fact that electronic media is unfettered by the boundaries of countries. Whenever there is a communication gap and credible news is not available such manipulation will be feasible. Simultaneously, there is a need to train our troops to harden them against sensationalism induced manipulation. The suggested measures are :-

- (a) Prominent display of adverse media reports instead of concealing them alongwith a statement of actual facts.
- (b) Provision of verified facts to scotch rumours, video tapes, audio cassettes etc.
- (c) The fact that regional media is under threat and subject to manipulation needs to be explained.

The genuine credible link with troops is the unit officer-the real impact is his and his alone. This responsibility devolves on him and not on issues of 'Baatcheet' etc.

TRAINING

Training is an organised procedure for increasing the knowledge and skill of people for a definite purpose; in case of defence forces to make an unskilled civilian into a combat soldier. In our changing socio-economic conditions and plethora of job opportunities which have been thrown up also need to be covered in the training syllabus. The soldier of today and tomorrow must be able to grasp the basics of technological advancements taking us into the 21st century. To this end the approach to our training requirement would be :-

- (a) Distinct training for the Army's role in internal security duties.
- (b) Awareness and detailed knowledge right upto section commanders about various civil laws and special powers under various acts.
- (c) Joint training with para military forces and civil police.
- (d) Operations in NBC environment.
- (e) Human rights and violations.

(f) Special cadres on computers, electronics, medicines, financial management and human resource management. These cadres could be conducted by specially qualified instructors.

The object of training of a soldier would not be only to make him feel at his best in the operational area but also to develop his personality and knowledge so that he can take independent decisions and easily absorb technological advancement whether they be in military hardware and tactics or in this rapidly changing environment in India.

CONCLUSION

There is an inexorable link between social attitude and military discipline and motivation. In a larger sense the soldier's attitude reflects the social paradigm. Military history, however, provides numerous examples of disparate ethnic and social groups having survived the chaos of their parent social structure e.g. Wehrmacht's cohesion did not break till the end of the World War II despite destruction of German Society. The answer lay in unit cohesion and not political dogma.

The Indian Army provides an excellent example of sound unit cohesion transcending problems of parent societies, ethnic and religious groups. The root of this success has been unit cohesion and knowledge of troops, though one cannot run away from the notable failure of 1984. However, a minority of persons were affected and this happened only in those units where unit cohesion was weak. Though this failure has been absorbed by our modern army it would be justifiable to ascertain the causes of this failure and take corrective actions.

There is a need for the civilian population, bureaucrats and political leadership to understand the defence forces' ethos, traditions and style of functioning and that there exists a danger to the core values of ethos of the Army from within; primarily, the style of leadership abetted by the attitudinal changes amongst the Army itself as also from the general milieu of the society and domestic pressures. A general rise in political awareness, religious and ethnic feelings among the people as a whole affects defence forces. This itself need not cause any alarm but its development has to be recognised. There is, therefore, a need to introspect on the current policies and refocus our thought process to evolve future recruitment, training and career policies for defence forces personnel.

India's Foreign Relations Part-I

SAHDEV VOHRA, I.C.S.

INTRODUCTION

Before 1947, India's foreign relations were guided by the policy of the British to safeguard and promote their imperial interests. This included primarily the guarding of the northern frontiers against Russian advance and to enlist China, Afghanistan and Iran to the British interests. Britain had also set up outposts of the Indian Government at Aden, Oman, Bahrain and in the Persian Gulf region later including Iraq (or Mesopotamia) which was occupied after the First Great War (of 1914-18).

It was from the North-West Frontier Province and Kashmir, and the west of the Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan that the defence and security was maintained. Hence the mind-set of the rulers attuned to the British rule was to regard Russia as the threat, and these areas of India as vital for holding and defending the main land of India. The situation changed vis-a-vis China with the partition of the country. The Chinese empire now emerged as a major power after the Communist take over in 1949, whereas earlier China was plunged in civil war and ravaged by foreign (Japanese) occupation before the departure of the British from India. Otherwise the scenario of defence from the north appeared not to have changed.

Kashmir was a major strategic region for the implementation of British imperial policy. It was used as a buffer and an advance defence zone, and also a listening post for all the local developments in central Asia where the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Uigars (In Sinkiang) Turkmans and other tribes had fallen under Russian influence or dominion. The Pamirs, the Karakoram and the Kuénlung formed the bastions of the British and the state of Kashmir lay astride these mountain ramparts. Therefore, Kashmir was a vital element in the British scheme of defence. After 1947, this responsibility fell on the Pakistan government because of the forcible occupation of parts of the state. However, so far as the Karakoram Pass north of Leh, the capital of Ladakh and the Ladakh region of Kashmir was concerned, it remained with India after 1947. As a result, the responsibility of relations with China which had occupied Sinkiang in 1949, and was, therefore, the neighbouring country north of Ladakh, fell on India.

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The relations of Britain in India with Afghanistan were unstable and not free from mutual distrust. The Durand Line which formed the national boundary between India and Afghanistan had neither logic nor convenience on its side... It divided the Pakhtun, tribes into two roughly equal parts, on the eastern side in India, and on the western side in Afghanistan. The line was not convenient for defence. The Khyber, Bolan and other passes were in India (now Pakistan) but there were numerous routes into either side which were in use in the north as well as in Baluchistan. The Durand line did not extend in the North to the quasi-independent Dardic state of Chitral, Hunza, Gilgit, and others which acknowledged Kashmir's suzerainty and had a vital role in the defence from the north.

In the east Burma and China were neighbours of India. Tibet extended from Ladakh to Burma in the north beyond the Himalaya mountains. The remarkable thing is that there was not a single army unit deployed along the 1600-mile long frontier and the border was used for trade and travel only. In 1911 after China declared itself a republic, a Chinese detachment of Gen Erb Feng visited Rima in the north-east of India but beyond this intrusion peace reigned again. The border line was demarcated at the Simla Conference 1914 between India, Tibet and China for the portion east of Bhutan, but it was not ratified by the Chinese Govt. Nevertheless the earlier situation of an unguarded border continued along the Tibetan Table land. In Burma the British being the power in occupation, the border was again the Yunnan province of China. Free communication and trade was permitted along this border.

India's foreign relations were conducted from London and it was only the safeguarding of the frontiers in the north that was the responsibility of the Indian army. The army was deployed within the country for law and order and for "coming to the aid of the civil power," as it was phrased. The army was used to prevent any major breakdown of law and order beyond the resources of the police. Incidents of this nature were rare, but with the Jallianwala Bagh massacre of 1919, the army had become more alive to the needs of internal security. The Indian army had a strength of roughly 2,50,000 and of these, 30,000 were British personnel. The rest were Indians. The army was expanded to nearly one million recruits who were raised during the First World War and to two to three millions who were raised during the World War of 1939-45. The British Indian army had been raised in the mid-eighteenth century and had been the instrument for British advancement and conquest of India. The mutiny of 1857 showed up the essentially alien nature of British rule and the real feelings of the people towards it. There had been other mutinies earlier and the mutiny of 1857 was not the last one. However, the policy of divide and rule had been pursued by the British with success, and the communal divide between Hindus and Muslims had been nurtured both overtly and covertly by

the foreign power. There had been an increase in rivalry among the communities to seek more favours by way of communal representation in the services and the popularly elected bodies at municipal, provincial and national levels.

The Indian army was, however, recruited after 1857 mainly from the north west of the country - Punjabis, Pathans, Dogras and Rajputs and the Gurkhas, although the Marathas were also a main element for recruitment to the army. As far as the navy was concerned the responsibility of defence was a function of the British Royal Navy. India was given responsibility for coastal defence and a small Coastal fleet was based after the First World War at Bombay and along the coast from Karachi to Madras and on the coast to Calcutta. The Royal Indian Navy was slowly expanded and included Indian officers, besides the ratings who were of course Indian. The Royal Indian Air Force was also initiated in the years immediately before the second World War of 1939-45. The Indian squadrons performed creditably during the war on the North West Frontier and in the Burma campaign against Japan.

Before 1947, India's problems of defence were not strictly related to her own requirements. They were related to Britain's interests as an empire. Every threat was judged as an aspect of Britain's rivalry with the expansion plans of other overseas powers like Russia, Germany or Japan. The foreign relations that India had to forge after independence were essentially to be evolved in a new setting and the process was one of learning by making mistakes or avoiding them. The foreign policy aims of the British rule were neither a guide nor relevant to our needs and status after 1947. Moreover, the partition of the country had created a new set of problems. The relations between India and Pakistan, and between India and Bangladesh were vitiated by the legacy of the past. A new code of cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship has yet to be crystallised.

The needs for economic development have led to new relationship with the industrially advanced countries like the USA, Germany, Japan and the others. The globalisation of certain issues like nuclear power, universal environmental issues, and depletion of natural resources as the shrinking of distances have all led to greater inter-dependence between the developed and the developing countries. In this new context one can place the evolution of India's foreign relations.

I. KASHMIR

The partition of the country was the result of a political settlement between the British Govt, the Congress party and the Muslim League. Pakistan

was as a result set up as a new state in the Muslim majority areas of the former British India. The partition caused a massive migration of Hindus from the western part of the State of Pakistan, and Muslims from India to the new state. It is estimated that fifteen million people left their homes in this way and the exchange of population took place in a matter of weeks. The convoys that moved were each like a sea of human beings. For example, the Lyallpur convoy was ninety miles long and over a mile wide*, that is to say that ninety miles of the road were for those two or three weeks covered with a moving mass of people loaded with their wretched personal effects and exposed to hostile attacks.

The question of the state of Jammu and Kashmir further complicated the relationship. The Radcliffe Award had drawn the line of division partitioning British India, but as regards that substantial part of India which was ruled by the Indian princes, the decision was left to the rulers as to which dominion they would accede to. The decision was governed by the contiguity of the territory of the concerned native state to one dominion or the other but in the case of Kashmir the State of Jammu and Kashmir adjoined both dominions. Moreover, the ruler was undecided about accession to one state or the other, when the territory of the state was invaded by raiders from Pakistan in September 1947. The raiders were transported by the buses provided by the authorities of Pakistan and given logistic support by the Pakistan Army. The raiders advanced rapidly along the border roads from Muzaffarabad and Murree and reached Baramula and the Srinagar airport. The newly set up Government of India accepted the Instrument of Accession of the Maharaja of the State, flew a contingent of armed units to Srinagar and announced that the final decision regarding accession will be made according to the wishes of the people of the state.

The Indian Government also took up the question of invasion of the territory of the State by the Pakistani raiders at the United Nations. In the meanwhile, the forces of India and Pakistan fought in the State to occupy its territory. India has retained Jammu, Poonch, Kashmir and Ladakh and Pakistan has occupied Gilgit, Hunza, Skardu, and Muzaffarabad and Mirpur areas when they accepted a cease-fire in January 1949. The dispute between India and Pakistan over the territory of the State remains still undersolved, and has become the major bone of contention between the two countries. Pakistan placed itself in the wrong by invading this state, and insisted that the state formed a part of Pakistan as part of the settlement (between Pakistan and India) leading to the creation of that country. India insists that Pakistan has failed to honour the UN resolution requiring a vacation of the part forcibly

*See 'Fifty Years with the British', S. K. Kirpalani, Orient Longmans, Hyderabad.

occupied by Pakistan, as a preliminary to holding of a plebiscite. The confrontation over Kashmir has continued despite the two wars in 1965 and 1971. In 1987 the Pakistan Government launched a guerrilla warfare of Pak-trained militants armed by the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in occupied Kashmir. This campaign has continued for the last eight years (1987-1995) with the consequent increasing alienation between the two countries. The number of casualties of militants, innocent civilians and security forces runs in four figures. The disruption of normal life in the Kashmir Valley has caused great damage to the prosperity of the region, and will perhaps leave permanent mark of bitter memories.

The Simla Agreement of 1972 converted the ceasefire line into a line of actual control and agreed that the two countries will settle the dispute over Kashmir bilaterally without resort to arms. But the compromise of converting the line of actual control into one of international boundary which seems to have been considered at Simla is at present the only one that holds the field. Any other compromise that may be acceptable can only be discussed by the parties concerned. To expect an outside intermediary to intervene is merely evading the issue. It will be a test of maturity of both India and Pakistan to settle and secure the goodwill of the people of the Jammu and Kashmir state as a whole.

The border between the Pak-occupied Kashmir and China was settled by a treaty in 1963 between the two countries by which the Sheksgam Valley was ceded to China. The treaty laid down that the alignment was agreed to subject to revision when the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was finally decided. In the east of Ladakh, China occupied the Aksai-Chin area of the State unilaterally claiming that it was part of Sinkiang and was essential for a route between Sinkiang and Tibet. The route is at present in use. Any settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir state finally will have to include a settlement on these two border areas at present with China. The Siachen area lying between Sheksgam Pass is also in dispute.

II. NON - ALIGNMENT

Nehru had, as the leader of the Congress party, given a great deal of attention to relations between India and China and between India and Russia. Nehru had also been prominent in expressing views in favour of Ethiopia and Czechoslovakia against the invasion of the former by Italy in 1935, and of the latter by Germany in 1938 which took over by force the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia. Nehru had also spoken against the regime of France in Spain and in favour of the leftist forces fighting in the civil war against Franco from 1936 to 1938. When India became independent, Nehru as Prime Minister

had the task of living up to the ideals of the Indian National Congress. Nehru declared that India would not be aligned to any group of countries or powers but would follow a policy of non-alignment. Since India coveted nobody's territory nor had claims against any foreign land, India would remain aloof from all the conflicts and wars that arose only from such claims. This was a doctrine which happened also to suit a rather under-developed and ill-armed country which though vast in size was yet to emerge as a state with material resources and armed forces of any significance. A Non-Alignment Conference was held in India in 1946 attended by China, and other nations of Asia which were going to be independent. The Conference was a reflection of the prevailing mood among these nations that they would not like to be involved in the post war conflicts and claims and counter claims of the western powers. Nehru summing up his attitude in *The Discovery of India* said "It is surprising how internationally minded we grew in spite of our intense nationalism. The policy of non-alignment was not isolationism but rather a condemnation of the powerful countries and their policies of imperialism and wars".

India was going to develop friendly relations with China, and with the under-developed countries coming out of the colonial rule. But this did not mean it would shun relations with the Western World or with the Communist World. The preoccupation with the economic development and the Five Year Plans launched by India also required Nehru to pare down the defence forces. Since India was going to have no territorial ambitions and no claims, India would not need large defence forces. The army should be kept down to a low figure of 2,50,000.

While Nehru was busy pronouncing the need for the poor countries to stay clear from power blocs and remain non-aligned the West and particularly the USA was equally clear that there was a War of Ideology between the West and the Communist powers led by the USSR and China. The Truman doctrine of the USA announced that the USA would come to the aid of any country threatened by Communism. The USA acted on this basis in Greece, Turkey, in Europe, and in Korea in Asia. This doctrine was taken up and advanced in the succeeding Eisenhower presidency by Dulles with almost religious zeal from 1953 to 1959. He was the creator of the SEATO alliance system by which countries ranging from Turkey in the West to the Philippines in the east were brought together in a system of "containment" against the advance of Communism. Dulles visited India, Pakistan and other Asian countries in 1953. US Arms aid began to Pakistan in 1954. A Baghdad pact alliance was announced in that year consisting of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. It was a pious wish rather than a working arrangement for Iran and Iraq were not willing to toe the US line. Dulles then promoted the 'SEATO' alliance consisting of Australia, Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. Inclusion of Pakistan in this alliance

was rather far fetched. Far more significant was the fact that in 1958 Pakistan agreed to the flights of U-2 aircraft from airfields near Peshawar against the USSR.

It is clear in retrospect that while Pakistan obtained arms supplies from the USA, India was planning to arrange for economic aid for its development plans. India had received no backing from the USA, however, till president Eisenhower and Nehru established an appreciation of each other and Eisenhower pressed the US administration for India's needs of development to be met with US aid. Eisenhower's visit to India in December 1959 was a significant personal triumph for the US President. The Government and the Indian people took to him as a leader who understood India's aspirations and need for development.

Nehru had great difficulty in maintaining a position of friendship with the USA when Dulles was vigorously setting about dividing the world into those who were going to join in the crusade against communism and those who did not so join the USA. Nehru was condemned by Dulles as one sitting on a fence and Dulles announced provokingly that those who were not with the USA in this regard were against the USA. Nehru was equally adamant in his stand that India would not agree to be aligned with the USA against the USSR and China. While Dulles was organising the ring of SEATO countries round the communist world, Nehru succeeded in persuading China to join other developing countries like, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and several others to hold a conference of non-aligned countries in 1955 at Bandung in Indonesia. The Conference steered clear of alignments and staked a claim on behalf of the developing, newly emerging countries that they had a point of view and a voice of their own. It was not paid much attention to by the powerful countries, nevertheless, it grew as a movement. Subsequently, meeting of non-aligned powers gained in importance when they were held in Egypt and Yugoslavia respectively. Nehru and non-alignment became synonymous and his point of view seemed to gain in relevance. The test of a real threat to India's security was yet to come when China invaded India in 1962. (Even earlier, in 1959 China and India had confronted each other in bloody encounters in a disputed frontier.) Till the war with China, Nehru remained convinced that non-alignment was a workable basis for foreign relations in all situations.

In 1955 President Tito of Yugoslavia visited India. In the same year Khrushchev and Bulganin visited India. They announced aid for setting up a steel plant in India which the USA had refused. They also announced that the USSR supported India's case in Kashmir.

The visitors were popular and seemed to give the impression that non-

alignment was not a bar to her receiving aid and political support. When relations between India and China began to go sour after the Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959, the Russians supported neither India nor China. Privately, however, Russia warned India to remain wary. Negotiations began also for sale of defence equipment including fighter and transport aircraft by the USSR. All this confirms the difficulty in maintaining non-alignment. For once it is accepted that aid and support are needed when a country is in conflict as India was over the border issue with China and over Kashmir with Pakistan, clearly non-alignment was not workable. In 1962 there was a thirty-one day border war with China in which India received a humiliating defeat. Its forces had to withdraw in the North-east. In the north, China managed to advance still further beyond Aksai Chin region which it had occupied earlier. The Indian authorities sought aid from the USA and the UK. At this moment the Chinese withdrew in the north-east beyond the McMahon line and announced a cease-fire unilaterally. India's non-alignment had been exposed as a non-workable basis for international relations.

Non-alignment was not a workable formula on another count also. India's five year plans required a large amount of foreign aid not available from the World Bank and other international aid agencies. The funds of these agencies were also largely derived from the USA and to a lesser extent from other western countries. Therefore, aid from these western countries was a sine-qua-non for the success of India's development plans. You could not on the one hand refuse to side with these countries in international disputes and on the other expect them to aid your plans and ask for financial aid. President Truman had announced on January 1, 1949 a Point- Four programme for aid to developing countries. India had a serious problem of food shortage and late in 1949 US had provided food assistance to India. Again in 1950 India's request for a two-million tonne food aid was agreed to. In 1952 an economic aid programme of \$ 115 m was mooted and the US aid for India's economic development programme continued on an increasing scale. Even as regards defence equipment, India asked for and received 200 Sherman tanks in 1952 and 54 C-119 transport aircraft. The Aid-India Club of USA and other Donor Western countries met for the first time in 1958 and raised an additional sum of \$ 350 m as short-term aid. Although, the amounts were relatively small compared to the aid given by the USA and Western Countries to their allies, a pattern of aid to India was thus established .

In 1956, under PL 480 law passed in 1954, India received food supplies worth \$ 80 m. Unfortunately the food situation worsened when a series of weak Monsoons reduced the foodgrain production to as low as 110 to 120 million tonnes whereas the requirement was 140 million tonnes even at the current low levels of consumption. At the same time, the USA was carrying

a large surplus of foodgrains due to increased yields and subsidies to the farmers. The world demand was low, and the USA agreed to give food to India as a special form of aid in blocked rupee funds. That is, India would not have to pay in foreign exchange, and the payments it made would be kept in a rupee account which would be spent only in India. This was the aid provided by PL 480 for all countries, and India was one of the main beneficiaries. Certain conditions were, however, imposed by President Johnson when this aid was given. At the same time, the seed hybridisation technology as applicable to wheat and maize was introduced into India by a US agro-scientist Dr. Borlang. It depended however on large doses of chemical fertilisers and ample water supply. In the Punjab, Haryana and the Western UP (but particularly in the Punjab) the new technology caught on and the prospects of food shortage gradually receded.

In 1963 President Johnson sent General Maxwell Taylor to India regarding India's needs for defence aid. After this trip Taylor recommended a five year \$ 500 m programme for India for the defence plan drawn up by the Indians. The US had given supersonic aircraft F-104s to Pakistan; they were denied to India. Six Indian mountain divisions were to be equipped with better communications, transportation and air defence, for the defence of the northern frontier.

As the US refused to provide F-104s, the Indians took up a Soviet alternative. The USSR agreed to provide 45 MIG-21s and to set up factories to assemble another 400. The war of 1965 between Pakistan and India forced the USA to review its policy. It had supplied arms to both sides and now decided to stop all future arms supplies to them. A decade of intense involvement in the affairs of the sub-continent had yielded no result. Instead, Pakistan had entered a close military alliance with Communist China.

III. WAR IN KOREA 1953

The Truman Administration had enough faith in the institution of the United Nations as an instrument of international action during the war in Korea. India had had an experience of the United Nations which was able to arrange a ceasefire between India and Pakistan over Kashmir in 1948-9, but was not successful in enforcing the vacation of the Pak-occupied areas of Jammu and Kashmir State as a preliminary to holding a plebiscite. Therefore, when South Korea was the scene of an invasion by the Communist Regime in North Korea in 1950, and Truman appealed to the United Nations to organise an international force under the UN flag to oppose the invasion, India did not offer to send any troops, India sent a Red Cross contingent to work among the UN forces in South Korea. Stalin was furious at the matter being taken to the

UN by the USA, and the Russian delegation made the mistake of absenting itself from the meeting of the Security Council when the question came up before it. The USSR representative could otherwise have vetoed the dispatch of a UN force to South Korea. The war in Korea developed into a serious conflict between China and the USA when the Chinese forces crossed the Yalu river from Manchuria to aid North Korean forces. India had no role in this war but China made use of the good offices of India to conduct negotiations with the USA. It was a war in which China suffered heavy casualties, as heavy as nearly one million by the end of the war.

The war in Korea had led to a rise in the world prices of primary commodities like jute, cotton and other commodities exported from developing countries. The economy of Pakistan in particular prospered and the Pakistani rupee was valued at higher than the Indian rupee by Pakistan Govt. Korea was treated by the USA as a test case for the so-called domino theory, that if the UN/USA allowed China and the USSR to overcome Korea, this would lead to other countries like Vietnam to fall into communist hands. Attlee the Prime Minister of UK came to USA to advise Truman that instead of relying on the domino theory, the USA should negotiate with China on the assumption that China would behave like Yugoslavia, and might be weaned off the alliance with the USSR. This advice was not heeded. Ultimately China and the USA had to make peace which was arranged in 1953.

India's role in the war in Korea was her first assay in international affairs. But China and the USA used the Indian Ambassador in Beijing for negotiations and passing on messages and warnings to each other since they had no other mutually acceptable contact. The management of the prisoners of war Camp in South Korea was entrusted in the Indian UN custodial force under General Thimayya. The prisoners were given the right to exercise their choice whether they wished to be repatriated to the Communists or stay in South Korea. India won all-round praise for carrying out this difficult task with impartiality. Hardly any prisoner changed his original choice and this indicated the naivete of the US policy makers who thought that the Communists had simply brain-washed their forces, and that the latter could be relied upon given the choice to abandon Communism. In 1954, France arranged a nine-power conference in Geneva to deal with the question of the successors of France in Vietnam and to arrange the modus vivendi between North Vietnam held by Ho Chi Minh and South Vietnam. Krishna Menon played an active role at the Conference as a "tenth power".

Nehru's prestige as a leader of developing countries now helped India to gain a position of weight in international affairs. The position was, however, gradually weakened by two factors: The first, that India and Pakistan were

more interested in Kashmir than in fighting communists, and secondly, the defeat at the hands of China in 1962 brought Nehru's and India's prestige down. Thereafter India's voice remained muted till 1972, when India's role was reasserted by Mrs Gandhi.

IV. RUSSIA - SUEZ - HUNGARY 1956

Nehru favoured Russia Partly because of his past associations with the country. Like Wordsworth felt about the French Revolution, Nehru, felt excited about the new dawn in Russia heralded by the Revolution of 1917. Nehru stuck to this vision of Russia even though there was cause for disillusion. For example, the Encyclopaedia put out by the Bolsheviks dubbed Gandhi as an imperialist stooge. Stalin had refused to meet Nehru's sister when she was Indian Ambassador to Moscow. After Stalin, relations improved, presumably because Nehru's policy of non-alignment suited Russia. Khrushchev and Bulganin paid a visit to India in 1955 and this visit generated goodwill on both sides. Russia announced an agreement to build a steel plant in India and came out on India's side in the dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. This was no doubt due to Pakistan's acceptance of a role in the Dulles plan of gaining American allies on the long Russian frontier in Asia.

Relations between China and Russia had begun to go sour at about the same time. The Russians began to withdraw their personnel who had been sent to help China set up new industrial and defence projects. India was privately warned to be careful in its relations with China. China had frontier disputes with Russia of older vintage than India, but the Chinese were testing the ground regarding the Indian response to the probing of the border areas. India was in need of defence equipment including aircraft, and Russia was willing to make arrangements for supplying defence equipment. The problem was one of financing arrangements. A breakthrough was achieved by the device of a rupee system of barter. India and Russia entered into trade agreement under which the imports and exports would be financed under a rupee fund which would be paid into and drawn upon by both sides to achieve a balanced trade arrangement. Defence supplies would also be partly or wholly financed under this arrangement. Russia needed tea, textiles, leather goods, tobacco, coffee and supplied to India earth moving equipments and industrial machinery and defence supplies in return. This rupee-trade grew and became a significant factor for good relations between India and Russia. Annual trade agreements were negotiated to settle the goods to be exchanged each year and were largely adhered to. The Russian machinery was heavy and priced by weight, but at a time when India was keen to set up heavy machinery projects under its five year plans, the Russian machinery was the only one available for setting up heavy machinery projects. The Russian earthmoving equipment was welcomed

for irrigation and river valley projects and for road-making. The arrangement suited Russia because it enabled them to get consumer goods like clothing including woollen ware, tea, tobacco and coffee, and leather shoes which were very much in short supply there.

At that time Dulles had tried to enlist Egypt on the side of the USA against the Communist advance into the Middle East, by promising to finance the construction of the Aswan Dam. Later, however, in 1956, USA went back on this promise.

At that time, Nasser happened to be at *Brioni* with Tito and Nehru in a top level meeting of non-aligned powers. Nasser was deeply resentful at this volte-face by the USA which appeared to him as betrayal. Nehru also gave vent to his feelings of sympathy for Egypt. On return to Cairo Nasser announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. This was like a bolt from the blue to Britain. Already Britain had suffered humiliation when Mass adeq had nationalised the Anglo-Persian Petroleum Company in 1953. Now the Suez Canal was nationalised. Eden devised a secret plan with Israel and France to invade Egypt but it lacked the support of Dulles. The utilisation of the US fleet in the Mediterranean was essential for the success of the plan. Dulles refused and the plan fell through. Britain felt let down badly.

The USSR announced aid to Egypt for Aswan Dam and thus gained a foothold in the Middle-East. At this very time, the Russians were faced with an uprising in Hungary.

This revolution in Hungary was against Russian occupation by stationing Russian troops in that country. The revolution occurred about the same time as the nationalisation of the Suez Canal. There had been earlier a revolution in Poland in which the Communist leader Gomulka had been brought to power by popular resentment against the Russian overlordship. Now the revolution in Hungary overthrew the pro-Russian Communist government. This time the Russians hit back by deploying Russian forces and driving tanks down the streets of Budapest. The revolt was fierce and the measures taken by the Russians were ruthless. Nehru had been outspoken about the Suez Canal issue, but kept his own counsels in regard to the events in Hungary. This was taken note of by the liberal elements both in India and abroad who felt that Nehru had shown discretion to be the better part of valour where Russia was concerned. The silence of Nehru was also adversely commented upon by the Western powers who pointed out that the liberation movement in Hungary was a test for those who stood for liberty and freedom, and India had failed in that test. Nehru had spoken out in favour of Egypt against the USA, but not for Hungary against the USSR.

Russia played a mediating role after the war in 1965 between India and Pakistan. The Russian Prime Minister Kosygin offered his good offices in arranging talks between the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan. This war had demonstrated that Pakistan was unable to score a victory in order to enforce its will in the matter of future of Kashmir. Ayub Khan accepted the position and Lal Bahadur Shastri decided it would be in the long term interest of their mutual relations to give up the two important positions it had wrested in the operations, i.e. Haji Pir Pass, and Tithwal. The agreement was signed on January 10, 1966 and unfortunately Lal Bahadur Shastri died on Jan 11, 1966. Nevertheless, Russia could claim that it was an honest broker as between the two Asian neighbours and to some extent win a position of nonpartisanship rather than being merely a supporter of India.

Russia played yet again a significant role at the time of the revolt of East Pakistan against West Pakistan in 1970. More than ten million refugees from the future Bangladesh had fled to West Bengal in India and congregated mostly in and around Calcutta. This created a tremendous strain on India and also the political problem of becoming a ground of operation for the Bengali people from East Pakistan against the West Pakistan occupying forces. There was a threat from President Nixon to the region when he ordered Kissinger to "tilt" the US actions towards Pakistan. Resentment of India's independent attitude particularly over war in Vietnam was the cause. In this situation, India and Russia signed a treaty of friendship to come to the aid of each other in case either country was attacked by another.

Russia thus played a constructive role in defusing a situation that President Nixon had created by showing, as he put it, "a tilt towards Pakistan". Nixon's action was in contrast to Russia's role at Tashkent in 1966 when Kosygin had maintained an equanimity and patience which brought about peace. On the other hand, Nixon in 1971 created a threat of enlarging the risk and scope of a war by ordering the carrier *Enterprise* to move to the Bay of Bengal. Nixon had thus tried to use the massive armed strength of USA for a show of force. Russia and India were justified to debunk Nixon's threat by entering into an Indo-Russian treaty of friendship and cooperation.

In 1990, the USSR broke up and Russia lost the status of being at the head of the union and the republics became independent and the Union was dissolved. This created a new situation in Russia's relations with India. The new Russian Government desired to renegotiate the rupee trade agreement and to settle the accounts of the surpluses that Russia had acquired in the old account for the sale of aircraft and spares and other defence equipment. In keeping with their past relations the two countries settled the accounts amica-

bly. The supply of spares for aircraft and equipment already supplied, and assistance in setting up the manufacturing capacity for the spares where they had ceased to be manufactured in Russia was arranged.

The Russian Government and India are conscious that the political situation in the world has changed and call for a new basis of relations between them. Gradually the two countries have forged a working relationship which takes into account, the new role of Russia based on the economic principles of free entrepreneurship and thus setting up a new partnership between both India and Russia. India and Russia are likely to stand by each other in all this economic development.

V. RELATIONS WITH CHINA

In 1949 China occupied Sinkiang and in 1950 it occupied Tibet. The Communist Government was not merely restoring the past sums and achievements when they came to power. It improved upon those aims by converting Chinese suzerainty over Tibet into full sovereignty. Both Sinkiang and Tibet were declared autonomous regions; they were the homes of the two most important non-Han minorities. Government of India did not contest the claim made by China declaring Tibet to be an integral part of China. The People's Liberation Army marched into Tibet via Chamdo in October 1950 and entered Lhasa in 1951. A 21-point agreement was signed by the Chinese Govt with the Dalai Lama outlining autonomy for Tibet.

The Government of India appointed a Committee of officials to review the new situation on the long frontier stretching from Burma to Afghanistan and to recommend what measures should be taken with regard to these border areas. China had never had any troops in Tibet in the past. Nor had India posted any armed forces along the frontier. Another aspect was that the British rulers had sealed off the border tribal regions in the North-East under a political agency where no visitors were allowed and where there was no administration. The situation was different now in Ladakh area of Jammu and Kashmir State also. In the middle region in between, there were contacts of traders and pilgrims along the numerous passes between India and Tibet.

Tibet was, since the seventh century, an independent Kingdom which had on its early prime advanced into Central Asia and made peace with China and Nepal. Buddhism was introduced then into Tibet and developed a local variation of the religion. Called Lama Buddhism it had spread to Mongolia, and in the 13th century the Mongolian Chinese emperor Kublas Khan had adopted the Dalai Lama as his preceptor and "guru". This relation had been maintained through the centuries and in the eighteenth century China had helped

the Dalai Lama to repel the Dzungar mongols and since then two Chinese ambans were stationed at Lhasa to represent the Chinese emperor.

The British rulers of India were anxious to make entry into Tibet but found that the Tibetans were adamant against it. In 1904 Younghusband forced an entry into Tibet and defeated the Tibetans. Younghusband entry into Lhasa forced the Dalai Lama to flee to Mongolia. Since then Tibet has had a troubled history of foreign intervention. When the Dalai Lama returned in 1910, he had again to flee when the Chinese army briefly entered Lhasa in 1911. In 1914 the Tibetans met Chinese and Indian officials to define the boundary between China, India and Tibet. They agreed with regard to the boundary between Tibet and India in respect of the border east of Bhutan to Burma. The Chinese however refused to ratify it although their plenipotentiary had initialled the same.

Tibet was important to India as a zone of peace but it had become a disturbed area when the Communists entered in 1950. The Chinese rulers destroyed monasteries and stripped them of the treasures and sacred objects. They threw out the monks and denigrated the sacredness of religion and the vital role it played in the life of their people. No greater blow could have been inflicted on Tibetans than to destroy their religion and this is what the Chinese were doing. In the Chamdo region where the Kham people are more free booting and independent, there was a fierce revolt when the Chinese tried to expropriate the lands from the owners. The revolt spread but it was confined at first to that region. In 1956 when the Dalai Lama visited India, Chou En-Lai arranged to visit India privately. The young Dalai Lama expressed his unhappiness to Nehru regarding the Chinese actions in Tibet and Nehru mentioned it to Chou. The latter gave an assurance that Tibet would be left alone and the Dalai Lama would be given a free hand. Nehru persuaded the Dalai Lama to return. On return, however, he found that the promises made by Chou were false. In addition, the Kham revolt had now spread, and the people were fleeing against Chinese atrocities and thronging into Lhasa. The Chinese wilfully put the blame on the Dalai Lama although they knew well that the Kham revolt was a spontaneous phenomenon in which the Dalai Lama had had no say.

The Indian Government was also disturbed by the fact that the Chinese maps showed large parts of India south of McMahon line as Chinese territory, as well as parts of Ladakh covering Aksai Chin and areas east of the Karakoram Pass as Chinese. The two countries had signed an agreement in 1954 regarding border trade between Tibet and India, opening six passes in the middle sector. At that time, the Indian side raised the question of settling the boundary between China and Tibet. In their own enigmatic way the Chinese declared

that the question was not yet ripe for settlement. Later in 1950, when Nehru raised the issue with Chou-En-Lai on the latter's visit to India, Chou declared that while they did not accept the McMahon line, they were prepared to accommodate India if India would accommodate China's claim in the West. The reference was obviously to the Chinese intentions about Aksai Chin area of Ladakh. About the existing maps, Chou said that they had been prepared by the previous regime and the Communist Government had not had time to examine them. Chou expressed the view that the question of boundary could be settled on a political basis.

Despite all these clear indications, Nehru remained confident that India would be able to prevail upon China to accept its version of the boundary. This was a gross misjudgment and when the Communist Government put out a map, it repeated the previous claims on Indian territory. The Indian side protested but the Chinese Prime Minister gave a firm reply that the claims made in these maps were correct. Thus the issue had come out in the open. India was confronted with the Chinese claims and had to handle this claim of China which put the two countries in direct confrontation.

China had occupied Aksai Chin and detained the Indian patrol parties there. In 1959 near Lanak La pass an Indian police patrol within Indian territory had surprised a Chinese army contingent. The latter fired and killed Jemadar Karam Singh in charge of the patrol and five of the policemen. Angry exchanges between the two Governments followed and it was clear that the use of force would be necessary if India's claims were to be enforced. The Indian army was brought into the picture for the first time and they were ordered to set up border posts in the areas of the Indian claim.

There had been a strong Chinese demarche in Lhasa. The Dalai Lama prior to the Lanak La incident, warned of being placed under arrest, had fled on March 10. He reached Khinzemane on the border on March 31, 1959. The Dalai Lama sought shelter in India and was allowed to enter. The Chinese Government had launched a bitter war of words accusing India of having engineered the revolt in Tibet and the flight of the Dalai Lama. The Indian Government firmly rejected these charges as baseless but it remained undecided on how to deal with Chinese diplomacy of hurling false denunciations.

The importance of Tibet to China is clear if we recall that Tibet has protected China's western flank, while the Mongols and the other races from Central Asia from time to time made excursions into China. However, the policy of pushing the Hans into Tibet and making them a major element of the population was a new and unwelcome development. This is a matter for China to solve but India cannot be indifferent because Tibet is the natural bastion of

India from the north. If Tibet is to be opened to the world, the easier routes lie through Nathu La, and in the Middle Sector from Western Tibet than through Tsinghai and Sinkiang in China. The use of Lop Nor in Tibet for atomic sites and testing grounds is another unwelcome development that India has to take note of.

The border dispute with China remained unresolved. China had taken possession of Aksai Chin by building a road from Khatan in Sinkiang to Aru in western Tibet. This road passed through Aksai Chin. In return for India accepting this fait accompli, China was prepared to stay north of the McMahon Line.

Nehru had persuaded himself, possibly with Menon's abetment, that China would not go to war with India over this matter. But this is precisely what China did when it moved its troops into Thagla Ridge overlooking Namka Chu Valley east of Bhutan, just at the trijunction of the McMahon Line with Bhutan and Tibet in 1962. On October 20, 1962 China launched an attack here and in the Walong sector of the north east, and in the North West, China advanced beyond Aksai Chin. India had not prepared for the war and the Indian Army was driven back in a campaign for which it had neither planned nor prepared. The fault was entirely with the political masters who failed to give any directive as to the threat, and on the other hand, to have indicated that China would not attack.

The war lasted thirty one days and resulted in a Chinese advance in the Western sector right upto the Karakoram Pass. The USA and Britain declared that they would come to the aid of India. The Chinese declared a ceasefire after thirty one days. The Chinese withdrew north of the McMahon Line in the eastern sector, but the ceasefire was not converted into a line of peace. The non-aligned governments proposed a settlement which China turned down. In 1963, Pakistan and China joined together to make an interim agreement regarding the border with Sinkiang in respect of the Pak-occupied area of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

From 1962 to 1976, relations between China and India remained tense when Mrs Gandhi as Prime Minister reopened the Indian embassy in Beijing. During two wars between India and Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, China uttered words of warning to India and in favour of Pakistan. India nevertheless supported China's entry into the United Nations as a permanent member. When India reopened its embassy in Beijing, its representatives on occasion were insulted in manouvred demonstrations. China received the visit of the Indian Foreign Minister Shri Vajpayee in 1979. When the visit took place, it coincided with attack by China on Vietnam. The Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping

declared that it would teach Vietnam a lesson just as it had taught India a lesson in 1962. Vajpayee hurriedly cut short his visit at this open denigration of India and its foreign minister. In 1988, Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister, paid a visit to Beijing for resuming friendly relations with China. This time an agreement was made to set up a permanent committee of civil servants to negotiate a border settlement. A return visit took place by Prime Minister Li Peng of China to India. In 1994 the then Indian Prime Minister Mr. P.V. Narsimha Rao visited Beijing. The ceasefire line was declared to be the line of actual control and the officials committee was asked to look into and implement the demilitarisation of the border.

The new Islamic republics set up in Central Asia after the break up of the USSR in 1990 had its impact on the relations of China with Pakistan and India. China has a sizeable Muslim population in Sinkiang as well as in the adjacent Han province. China did not wish to take any chance with regard to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism into these regions bordering Central Asia. When President Clinton became the President of the USA and declared that Kashmir was an unsettled dispute and that independence for Kashmir was an alternative, China sent out signals of opposition. It warned USA against encouraging any destabilisation in Kashmir and advised Pakistan to settle the Kashmir issue by bilateral negotiations with India. Thus China's attitude that had baulked all Indian efforts from 1962 to 1988 to improve relations, showed signs of change due to a change in the political map of Central Asia. India and China have cooperated with each other in trade relations also and more border trade routes were opened.

In the nuclear debate China had adopted an attitude of opposing the nuclear powers retaining such huge nuclear arsenals while requiring other nations like China to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The Chinese have recently exploded their first nuclear submarine device. This seems to be aimed at having a commanding voice in controlling the South China Sea and the Paracel and Spratly Islands. They are not agreeable to have an embargo on future nuclear tests because they claim that they have a lee way to make in order to catch up with the big powers. In principle, however, they agree that all nuclear weapons should be banned so that universal nuclear disarmament is devised and achieved. In the meanwhile, in the nuclear arms race they are determined to be in the big league. India's nuclear stand of refusal to sign a non-proliferation treaty leaves them cold. On the other hand, China has in the past supplied nuclear technology and material to Pakistan and is currently presumably reported to have supplied Pakistan M-11 missiles and helping the manufacture of missiles which exceed the range of M-11 missiles.

China is also engaged in sale of arms to Pakistan, Iran and other coun-

tries in the Middle East and regards sale of arms as a legitimate means of earning foreign exchange, and does not see why it should conform to any taboos since the West continues the sale of arms to countries of their choice. On the other hand, China claims that it is making sales of arms to those countries only which are prevented by the West from acquiring weapons required for defence needs of their countries.

China is, in the present stage, prepared to treat India as a country with which it has no immediate problem because the border question will be left over to be solved through negotiations. In other matters it has no point of contention with India. The presence of the Dalai Lama is not a ground for dispute. India is prepared to accept this position and expects China to make no active move in support of Pakistan over Kashmir.

(To be concluded)

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Employment of Air Power in The Land Battle

SQUADRON LEADER ANU RANA SALUJA S.C.

INTRODUCTION

The advent of air power, by extending war into the third dimension has transformed the conduct, pace and indeed the very nature of warfare in the 20th century. Though today, air power has assumed a dominant role it must be seen in its correct perspective in relation to land and sea power. History gives enough evidence to substantiate the fact that air power has indeed substituted for land and sea power not completely and absolutely or indefinitely but to quite an extent. The Battle of Britain, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and the dropping of atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki are burning examples.

But the real impact and influence of air power comes with its closely coordinated application with land and sea power. This was amply demonstrated in the Arab-Israeli wars, the war for liberation of Bangladesh and most recently the Gulf War.

Fire power, mobility and the freedom to exploit them have been the fundamental and critical factors that have influenced warfare since the dawn of history. Today land warfare is coming to rely increasingly on mechanisation and armour to enhance fire power and mobility. This in turn is extending and expanding the battlefield, at the same time increasing the scope and capability for employment of manoeuvre forces. In the face of this, air power provides the only means and hope of maintaining or regaining control of the situation on the ground.

Under these circumstances let us see how our nation's Army and Air Force have adapted to the changing situation and what is our philosophy as far as battlefield strikes are concerned.

BATTLEFIELD STRIKES

The Air Force's task towards providing air support to ground forces engaged in offensive or defensive operations may be said to include :-

Squadron Leader A.R. Saluja is serving with a fighter combat squadron of the Indian Air Force.

(a) Fast concentration of heavy fire power whenever required along the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) against the enemy's first echelon army engaged in combat.

(b) Strikes aimed at destroying the enemy's capability to sustain the ground battle for any length of time by attacking its units when they are forming up in the concentration areas (CA) or interim concentration areas when on the move, disrupting resupply lines, preventing re-inforcements from reaching the FEBA and inflicting losses to the enemy, forces before they enter combat. These strikes would also be targeted against the infrastructure near the battlefield viz. bridges, road and railway choke points, C³I centres, maintenance and repair workshops, refueling posts, EW radar stations etc.

BATTLEFIELD STRIKES : IMMEDIATE

The application of air power at the FEBA or close to it against the enemy's first echelon army, traditionally classified as close air support (CAS) missions, are undertaken on demand from the surface forces against targets of immediate concern to them. These are undertaken when such forces cannot either produce the desired result from organic weapons or the disposition of target precludes an attack by surface weapons. The operational advantages stemming from the losses and the damage inflicted on the enemy are felt (both tactically and in the morale boosting sense) by the troops directly facing the forces under attack.

Target Acquisition and Recognition. The informed reader will bear me out about the difficulties inherent in searching for, identifying and tracking targets which are dug in, camouflaged and dispersed. Especially when the pilot is going in for a high speed single pass attack in the tactical battle area. The type of battle visualised includes swift flowing mechanised operations and tank to tank confrontations. In such a situation the FEBA would be constantly changing making target recognition a major problem. For example, it is difficult to make out one type of tank from the other when the pilot is coming in to attack, to make matters worse the Pak army has the Chinese T-59 and we have the upgunned T-55; both derivatives of the original T-54 Russian tank.

Attrition. Enemy forces engaged at or near the FEBA by definition would be combat deployed and fully alert i.e. ready to react effectively. They are likely to be equipped with highly sophisticated and lethal Air Defence weapons which may include SAMs, radar controlled anti aircraft guns, quick reaction missiles integrated with early warning and battle field surveillance and

guidance radars. In this intense and lethal air defence environment own aircraft losses can be expected to be high.

A study of the US involvement in Vietnam (1966 to 1971) and Yom Kippur War of 1973 brings out certain facts as regards attrition rates in interdiction missions versus those in CAS missions. Given below is the analysis derived from the data of the Yom Kippur war.

- (a) On the first day of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 Israeli Air Force sustained an attrition rate of 4 per cent for 600 sorties flown.
- (b) The very next day attrition rate was down to 2.36 per cent for as many as 1230 sorties flown.
- (c) And on D-3 it was down to less than 1 per cent.
- (d) In the later part of the war it stabilised at around 0.5 per cent for 1856 sorties flown.

The reason for this tapering down of attrition rates (besides the use of American ECM equipment) was the redistribution of CAS and interdiction missions. In the later part of the war interdiction missions far outweighed CAS missions.

Fratricide. Besides these considerations what remains an overriding concern to both the land forces commander and his Air Force counterpart is the problem of effective identification and control of fire in the air space over tactical battle area. This is essential in order to prevent casualties to own troops and aircraft. Due to the very nature of immediate missions the response time is limited. This, coupled with the fluid situation on the ground, the presence of a high density of AD weapon systems, fixed wing aircraft and helicopters within the same air space, makes effective identification a prerequisite for conduct of operations.

In the Gulf war with all the sophisticated and advanced C3I systems, functioning under conditions of near complete air superiority, one of the friendly helicopters was shot down due to friendly fire. On another occasion a complete column of Chieftain tanks of the British Army was blown to smithereens by an A-10 attacker. This was in a war in which they had complete freedom of action, no restrictions in direction or mode of attack with sufficient time over the target area and with information in real time from the JTIDS. In contrast, where such sophistication does not exist, management of air space entails complex procedures like laying down corridors, height bands and time slots which besides making positive control of air space an arduous task, may also entail compromises on employment of air assets with maximum effectiveness.

Response Time. The pace of war, with extremely mobile mechanised forces, has put a premium on the factor of response time. With the demand and supply type of CAS operations, the processing of demands, issue of appropriate orders to the fighter wings, GLO's briefing about the tactical situation and target location, feeding of coordinates into the navigation attack systems, all contribute towards the factor of response time. All said and done, when the pilots navigate and reach the target area it may well be that the location/type of targets has already changed significantly or even that the whole operational situation has been compromised beyond repair.

Communications. Communications between the various elements in the organisation from the field units demanding immediate missions to the processing units in the chain at the Tactical Air Centre, Joint Army, Air Directing Centre etc, and the wings undertaking the missions are a critical factor in more ways than one. The importance of their reliability and security during operations need not be over emphasised. Besides, speedier the communications lesser will be the response time. The other area where communications will prove vital in the success of operations is the link between the incoming fighters and the FAC: whether airborne or ground based. To assume that there would be no communication jamming in the EW intense environment of today's war is indeed a dangerous presumption. Besides, the chances of a breakdown of communication between the attacking aircraft and the FAC cannot be ruled out. While the ground based FAC (with his limited look ahead into the target area) is for ever vulnerable to enemy mortars, forward patrols and sniping teams, the airborne FAC leads an equally risky and precarious life by exposing himself within the line of sight of a larger number of air defence weapons. The advantages of increased look ahead and a slightly better chances of target acquisition that accrue out of the employment of an airborne FAC must be viewed against survivability in the tactical battle area (TBA).

BATTLEFIELD STRIKES - PREPLANNED

Let us now go further into the battlefield, towards the rear of the tactical battle area i.e., the infrastructure in the battlefield and the second echelon army. The extension of the modern battlefield well to the rear of the frontline and the increasing importance of second echelon forces and resupply areas has increased the interdependence between combat action at the TBA and the action at the rear of it (for a depth of 100-150 kilometers). Battlefield strikes in this area are the ones that are likely to result in damage/losses to the enemy forces before they enter combat. These strikes would be aimed at stationary/semi-stationary targets including enemy reinforcements at the TBA and upto a depth of approximately 100-150 kilometers.

In contrast to the immediate missions, these strikes aimed at the infrastructure and the second echelon army would not be reactive in nature. If undertaken at the critical time, the payoffs from these missions would far exceed that of any other form of offensive air support (OAS). It is akin to hitting at the very root of the system. What is of significance is that, these strikes as an extension of the overall OAS operations can reduce the rate of enemy build up at the battlefield, which if unchecked, would easily exceed the organic fire power capability of own forces, thus escalating the requirement for immediate missions.

Since in this case the area involved is large the concentration of Air Defence elements consequently would be less. Besides, battlefield airspace management is immensely simplified. Close control of air strikes can be dispensed with and strike aircraft can follow maximum effectiveness and minimum risk profiles. Survivability over the battlefield may be considerably better because of the lesser time over the target area, especially so when the mission profile would dictate a single run attack on a well defined and better known target.

PROPOSED PHILOSOPHY

To achieve success in the overall campaign, the operations over the battlefield must be planned and executed in a joint manner right from the inception stage. The target prioritisation and resource allocation must be retained at the command headquarters level in accordance with army tactical plan with sufficient flexibility. This is essential so as to reallocate both targets and resources in the course of the campaign in keeping with own surface forces plan and predicted enemy action/intentions.

Keeping in mind the ground and air environment in our likely theatre of war, a favourable air situation cannot be guaranteed during all the stages of operations. Therefore, optimal and cost-effective employment of air power would be to direct the principal air effort at reducing the enemy's capability to sustain operations by carrying out preplanned battlefield strikes against semi-fixed, relatively large targets whose position in general would be well known. The guiding principle would have to be their integration with own surface plans, both in pro-active and reactive scenarios. These strikes would be both time and timing critical and when effective, their effects would be felt on a much larger section of the overall land campaign: offensive or defensive. These would be aimed at destroying /reducing the enemy's cumulative ability to mount offensive operations or effectively sustain a long lasting defence.

The emphasis must definitely shift towards preplanned missions; how

ever, the commander of the air assets must realise that in the tactical battle there would inevitably be situations when the use of ground attack aircraft in close support to land forces will be vital. At that critical juncture, the ground forces commander is going to need all the support Air Force can provide.

Therefore, immediate strike missions would be undertaken with a reduced response time by placing the dedicated aircraft on operational readiness, akin to those placed for Air Defence duties. This may prove vital especially when the tactical operations in a particular sector are likely to have a telling effect on the success of the overall land campaign. While resource crunch and cuts in outlay for defence acquisitions are likely to be part and parcel of the limitations in the planning process, the requirement to field dedicated attack aircraft for battlefield strikes cannot be over-emphasised. In this respect the combat helicopter which holds tremendous advantages in terms of target acquisition, easy and rapid deploy ability must be employed. In either of the two being deployed in the EW and AD intense environment the question of survival versus time over the tactical battle area needs to be weighed with great concern. The armour has indeed gone on to reduce their mobility by day to almost nought. In the face of this both attack aircraft and combat helicopters would have to be provided night vision devices so as to enable them to be effectively deployed by night. These aircraft would have to be equipped with airborne self protection jammers and chaff/flare dispensers to enhance their chances of survival over the tactical battle area.

Quick dissemination of friendly movements to end user in real time, by integrating satellite communication and automatic data handling systems is a must. This would have to be incorporated in order to cut down on response time, avoid fratricide and allow friendly strikes to be conducted with maximum effectiveness. This would ensure that strike missions can be planned and executed without any encumbrances as regards heights and routing limitations in the form of safe corridors.

Precision guided munitions, tactical ballistic missiles, remotely piloted recce/BDA (Bomb damage assessment) aircraft shall continue to be on the military commanders' 'wish' list till our political machinery sees the importance of these force multipliers and our country can afford them. As and when these systems do get integrated into the war machinery of the country they will have a telling effect on the conduct of the land war and will thence drastically influence the employment of air power in conjunction (not support) with the land forces.

Surprise, Deception and Unpredictability in Operations

MAJOR GENERAL B S MALIK, AVSM

GENERAL

It is strange but true that as one grows in service, one tends to take fewer chances and deliberately suppresses the innate human desire to be different. This is mostly due to years of training which teaches one to conform. One soon learns that the best plan is the one based on a successful precedence - militarily called a "template". Maj Gen Aubrey Red Newman says in his book *What are Generals Made of* - "One characteristic of multistar Generals is that they are basically conservative". We all say we should be practical, different, not bound by procedures, but are we? The result of years of suppressing the natural instinct is that we start ignoring even laid down doctrinal principles. While repeating parrot like, "Surprise is a battle winning principle", we start relying on SOPs and drills. Time and again, our patrols get ambushed by the ill trained, ill equipped and disorganised insurgents of all hues, posts on the LC get attacked and intrusions takes place by air and sea. When this happens, the lesson of surprise gets learnt temporarily by those who suffer losses, but it is easily forgotten.

ANALYSIS

We do lament, now and then, on this phenomenon but generally do not actively encourage individuality. This is what tends to make our plans very predictable. Whatever ingenuity is later found is forced on us due to the battle circumstances. Those who fail to read the battle correctly, and do not react wisely according to the circumstances but follow the book blindly, get soldiers killed and are generally consigned to the dustbin of history. The lower the level, the greater are the chances of deviating from the established norms to suit the battle situation. In the words of Doug Larson, "some of the world's greatest feats were accomplished by people not smart enough to know they were impossible". The question then arises, how can this innate ability be retained even as we grow smarter and learn all about the dangers and various aspects of warfare?

The answer may be in the active promotion of the idea of 'audacity in

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battle'. In order to be audacious, one does not have to be foolhardy. The correct meaning of 'audacity in battle' "is to feel/understand the correct application of established military principles, to the extent that one can appreciate them as a whole and not see them as different parts". It is boldness which stems from knowledge and confidence. It is this holistic view based on a sound foundation which will permit application of variations. Then, these variations based on application of the relevant factors will, carry within the plan the seed of surprise. Deception and unpredictability are ingredients of surprise. Surprise is the cause and its effect is deception and unpredictability in the plan. But a plan cannot be made just to cause "surprise" or "deception" or be "unpredictable". It is the execution of the plan, which should lend itself for "surprise" in a wider sense.

It is like a game of chess, where the player who plans many moves ahead of his opponent creates certain situations which, when unveiled further, cause "surprise"; This deceiving of the opponent and unpredictability is the seed of audacity. Trained over a long period in a defensive mode and reactive scenario we have gradually fallen into a pattern of predictable thinking.

We must first accept that like laughter, surprise, deception and unpredictability are cumulative products. Like, we cannot say it is only the words, or people or phrases which produce laughter. It is sometimes the situation itself, and that too, sometimes even the most serious situation produces laughter. Hence laughter is not inherent in the words, phrases or situations but is the end result or the outcome. To give another example - one cannot say which portion of the radio holds "sound" yet sound is an end product or built in all the electronics and the overall situation which develops due to application of the rules of physics. It may, therefore, be better for us to look for the principles involved in training our leaders to instinctively apply surprise, practise deception and be unpredictable.

Emphasis should be on the "approach" to the problem and "the problem itself and not the solution". Be it an insurgency or a conventional battle situation, we should identify and analyse the problem deeply. Our preoccupation with solutions will not help in arriving at audacious plans with inbuilt surprise, deception and unpredictability. In Jiddu Krishnamurthy's words "freedom from the desire for a solution is essential in understanding of a problem".

We need to clearly identify what is it that we want to achieve. Take an insurgency situation. Is it the "militant" we are after or "militancy"? If it is the former, then it is very clear that it is a near war situation, and all is fair as long as we can get him dead or alive. But if it is the "militancy" that we are after, then we would like him "alive" rather than "dead" and through

that, prove what we are really after, and thus save many others from becoming militants.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION

For some years, I found it interesting to look at the "other view" and I found it fascinating how the established norms can be easily challenged and yet carry conviction; Consider for a moment a quote from *Readers Digest* "Anger is not only inevitable, it is necessary. Its absence means indifference, the most disastrous of all human failings". Oliver Herford has a different view on gathering moss and he says "A rolling stone gathers no moss, but it gathers a little polish". Then again, "By always saving for a rainy day, we may lose a chance to dance in the sun". Kin Hubbard says "You won't skid when you stay in a rut". Most take it seriously. Also consider a saying by Bonnie Prudent "you cannot turn back the clock, but you can always wind it up again" or by Samuel Butler "silence is not always tact and it is tact that is golden not silence". The list is quite long, but let me end with the most familiar saying of our Army, our emphasis on the value of sweat to save blood in battle. However, view it differently as "sweat saves blood, blood saves life, brain saves both"; by Anon.

In the mid Sixties, Lt Gen Satarawala actively promoted the idea of "training for the unexpected". However, very few Commanders understood the spirit behind the idea and generally carried out routine planned training for the unexpected; It is something that happens routinely in the Army when we inform the unit about the "surprise check of their accounts". It follows from there that "surprise in battle" must be cultivated through correct training, psychological preparation and command support.

There is resistance to change and it is human nature to follow routine. If the routine can be somehow altered frequently without forewarning or predictability removed from routine, then the soldiers would get psychologically conditioned to be prepared for the unexpected. Soldiers usually follow a routine of early to bed and early to rise. If we reverse this routine periodically and make them do, all work at night and sleep during the day, then, they would get psychologically trained to be prepared for the unexpected. Generally, we have lectures and classes in the morning, after a morning's physical training period; if we change that routine by making them go for a short route march and then carry out tactical classes outdoor at the destination, the routine will get broken and troops will not be able to anticipate the next event.

There can be numerous examples of building in such unpredictability in daily routine for leaders and men alike. The process of psychological condi-

tioning must be inbuilt in all our activities and should not end up by a training capsule. However, variety should not be introduced just to suit the whims of the commanders. Troops will suffer if any on the spur change is introduced. Detailed well thought out overall plan will need to be built into the training instructions for this. The full details should be made known to only a few key staff officers. Lesser details people get to know before hand, the better will be the impact. Junior officers and men must be invited to suggest freely, after such activities, for bringing in improvement to suit local conditions.

TRAINING

Beyond the level of the Junior Commanders Course, once the general principles of warfare have been learnt, we should emphasise on teaching the varied methods of application. During exercises, we should create suitable conditions which should involve taking bold and audacious actions and calculated risk, even if we have to deviate from the established SOPs or norms but still achieve the result within the overall framework. "Yes, RISK-TAKING is inherently failure-prone. Otherwise, it would be called SURE THING-TAKING" - by Tim Mac Mohan.

No "solution" can rein for ever. "Appreciation" was a good solution for us to adopt when no other method existed. It now needs a change lest it becomes more of a "problem" by inhibiting us to use the technology of today which has increased our ability to see more of the "ground", change "relative strength" by applying force multipliers and cover vast distances quickly thereby increasing the impact of "time and space". The "appreciation" method is fool proof and once you follow it in writing your solution, or conducting a sand model/exercise or even a battle plan, you cannot be courtmartialled even if the ultimate plan is totally "unworkable" or gets people killed in battle.

We lost some battles in 1971 because Commanders were "academically" correct but "practically" wrong. Some of them faced reverses but were later exonerated as they could possibly "academically" prove that their actions were correct in battle. The "Appreciation" method is a means and should not be treated as an end in itself, since the boundaries of it inhibit practical sense because of the consideration of limited factors in a very narrow sense. How do you consider varying height of "sarkanda grass" on the ground, or "tired troops" in relative strength, or "fleeting opportunity" in time and space. Even, Dupuy's Model of Wargame allows consideration of more variables. Let us not be a slave to the "appreciation method" but use it as an aid. It is only then we will be able to actually "surprise" the enemy and make "unpredictable" original plans.

In a conventional battle situation if we have to cross a "Ditch Cum Bund" (DCB), then the obvious question arises, why is this problem created? Obviously to separate (as long as possible) armour from infantry. Therefore, our plan should cater for the quickest crossing of maximum troops allowing tanks to follow or better still crossing of tanks catering for DCB through requisite grouping and attempt of multiple crossings. Use air-borne/heliborne/infiltration, but change the pattern of crossing. Why do we attempt limited A/B vehicle lanes? Why not cater for as many lanes as possible? Why not have infantry given to help engineers to take on non-technical/carriage/manual work? Why not multiply mech strength by ferrying infantry in armoured personnel carriers? Why attack in two rows in a platoon, why not try nine rows per company to achieve quickest combat ratio on DCB in our favour, before the defender can match it. There can be many variations. The main idea is to crack "the problem" of "DCB". The situation should provide the answer not the template. Once the possibilities of crossing and build up increase, the surprise, deception and consequently unpredictability will follow as a by product.

RESOURCES FOR SURPRISE AND DECEPTION

For surprise and deception you do not always need extra resources but with marginal increase in "key" resources and by innovativeness in their application the options can be increased thus upsetting enemy's visualisation of own capabilities. This can be achieved by the speed of action in adopting the available options which normally decrease as plan unfolds. Let us again take the scenario of an attack across a DCB. We generally attempt two or more crossings over the first DCB and then find out that the "key" resources do not permit more than one crossing over the second DCB. If somehow, we can establish two or more crossings over the second obstacle, with marginal increase in "key" resources like bridging and trawling or by cutting down the laid down pamphlet requirement of resources for the first obstacle by audacious planning and innovativeness, we can deceive the enemy, thus destabilising him on the second obstacle. Surprise will thus get in-built in the main plan itself as we would have created the capacity for the most unexpected and thus eliminated predictability. At the operational level, there need not be extra resources employed to achieve surprise. Greater the options at subsequent stages and speed of action will ensure the desired results. The "key" resources which increase the options would, of course, have to be identified for each operation separately. Since the surprise is a byproduct of the main plan it will always be more credible than a separate feeble attempt with limited resources without the backdrop of a main plan. In the present day and age of electronic surveillance such feeble attempts will always be found out before we imagine.

COMMAND SUPPORT

Essentially all officers should be impressed to have a conviction that they ought to look out for the opportune moment in battle to create for his command a favourable situation. We should build on the good old spirit of being a "gunman, poacher and gambler" taught to us at the Academy, as essential qualities of a soldier. The last one being relevant here, that is, of being a gambler. If a gamble is justified then an officer must not hesitate and be prepared to stake it all, feeling convinced that he will not be taken to task by his superiors, just because he tried or he did it differently; The key words are "not to do different things but to do the same thing differently". He would, however, need good arguments in favour of his actions in the general interest of the overall plan, and not be given any extra resources including time other than what he can create/innovate himself.

To explain it further, once information has been received about insurgents in a particular area, doing the "same thing differently" would translate into approaching the area as a small or big patrol, at an unusual time not like our three to four o'clock springing of the cordon. Instead of the full cordon, have only known routes covered or approaching the scene in local dress, type of troops permitting. Approaching the area with a "fake captive" after enacting a fake encounter with no actual casualties. The list is endless and limited only by the imagination and experience of the leader.

The "no mistake" or what the US Army in a recent news item called "zero defect" syndrome is our biggest enemy in this regard. We need to develop a culture of separating the "mistake" from "person making the mistake" and thus not condemn a person for having tried something different which, in his wisdom, was for the betterment of the organisation both in war and peace. The CO who introduced the disruptive pattern uniform in his unit many years back was sacked, but just a few years later we as a Army adapted the disruptive pattern uniform; This is not to suggest that one should not air ones ideas. After all to quote Grit "Many great ideas were lost because the people who had them couldn't stand being laughed at".

CONCLUSION

It is not the "academic" introducing of surprise in our training, but tuning our mind to appreciate surprise which is important. We need to learn the basic principles of warfare and then have the wisdom to try out variations with courage and foresight.

Any method is a good method and so is the "appreciation method" but

let the rules of the game not kill the game and its spirit. Truly, warfare is an art and so is leadership - it cannot be turned into a science. Let us develop the aptitude to "attempt differently" and then nurture it. This will give us leaders, who will come out with battle winning slogans, like "leave the highways and get on to by-ways" which amongst many other things helped us win Bangladesh operations. Let us learn to not merely tolerate but actively encourage individuality and the spirit behind the famous Israeli maxim. "If there are no orders think what the order will be and act". It is not surprise, it is the spirit of surprise that we need to revive so as to be unpredictable in any battle situation.

The reader may note that this writer, in keeping with his prescription, offers no crystallized solution as to the 'how' component in regard to the development of audacity/appropriate mind set. Every Commander should strive within the parameters of his personality and his circumstances. After all, only *carte blanche* would enhance the ability to innovate which lies at the heart of risk-taking and contingency planning. I would like to end with a quote from MM Kennedy "It is better to be boldly decisive and risk being wrong than to agonise at length and be right too late".



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**IN PURSUIT OF ENHANCED CONSUMER
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The Kashmir Issue : Rhetoric and Reality

MAJ MAROOF RAZA (RETD)

On the Kashmir Issue, many of our views have come to be dominated by distortions, it is thus imperative for us to analyse the rhetoric against the reality, so that a clearer insight into the many aspects to the imbroglio on Kashmir may be gained.

To recall the events that led to the conflict over Kashmir, it would suffice to say that for the interest of a handful of personalities at partition, the cycle of mutual Indo-Pak distrust stopped at Kashmir, leading to a Pakistan-led invasion of the Valley in October 1947. India only became militarily involved in J&K, once Kashmir had formally acceded to India, and the battlefield stalemate that developed between India-Pakistan since the 1947-48 war, has remained largely unaltered. However, it was India that first took the issue to the UN, at the encouragement of Lord Mountbatten. Sadly, the Indian stand at the UN - as enunciated by Sir Gopalaswami Aiyangar, on a brief that was authorised by Pandit Nehru - was'nt a match for the brilliant and articulate exposition of Pakistan's Sir Muhammad Zafarullah.

This led to the "Jammu - Kashmir Question" becoming the "Indo-Pak issue" and the end result was a three part UN Security Council resolution of April 13, 1948. The resolution required (a) an immediate ceasefire; (b) the total withdrawal of "all" Pakistani nationals (including its military and paramilitary personnel) from the region of Jammu and Kashmir, while permitting India to retain her troops in J&K; and (c) finally a plebiscite to determine the will of the people - but this was "only" to be implemented once the ceasefire and Pakistani withdrawals were completed. Since Pakistan never implemented part two of the UN resolution requiring a total withdrawal, the plebiscite could not be held. Thus, the current Pakistani rhetoric on the subject lacks credibility.

Since the 1948 cease-fire India and Pakistan have accepted the stationing of a United Nations Military Observers Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Whereas, India has seen only a minimal role for the UNMOGIP since the 1972 Shimla Accord, Islamabad has continued to keep the UNMOGIP humoured in its efforts to keep the UN's role alive on the subject. Interestingly, the UNMOGIP, though a UN observer mission, has no official role related to human rights issues - their role pertains only to monitoring developments on the ceasefire-currently effective since December 17, 1971.

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The post-war Shimla Accord of 1972, supposedly achieved success on two aspects. One, was the acceptance of the ceasefire line (CFL) which with due adjustments, became known as the Line of Actual Control (LC). The other was to limit any future negotiations on Kashmir only to a bilateral Indo-Pak level. In reality however, Zulfikar Bhutto had outmanoeuvred a magnanimous Mrs Gandhi from his hopeless position (after the defeat of 1971). The Shimla Accord states that Charters of the UN are the principles governing Indo-Pak relations, and that a final settlement on Jammu & Kashmir was to be subsequently negotiated. No wonder, since 1990, Pakistan has been harping only upon precisely these two latter issues.

The current insurgency in the Valley, has repeatedly been stated to have begun due to the alleged election malpractices of 1987, whereby Farooq Abdullah had returned to power with a National Conference-Congress party alliance. However, "if the current upheavels were a direct consequence of the 1987 elections, then why was the uprising in 1990 and not in 1987 itself?" The answer lies in the fact that the Valley's populace had been alienated over a period of time and a combination of international, regional and domestic factors had caused the uprisings in 1990. The 1987 elections were only a catalyst and not the cause of the current crisis, and Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir, since 1990, is a consequence of New Delhi's failures.

Little is also known about the fact that in mid-1988, large bands of disillusioned Kashmiri youth had crossed the LC into POK from India, numbering some five thousand in all, to seek training and weapons from Pakistan. It was they who returned in 1989, prepared and armed to create the turmoil that followed. In later years, their strengths were beefed up with all types of guerrilla fighters who have followed a strict pro-Islamic agenda. However, claims about Sudanese mercenaries in the Valley have largely lacked conclusive evidence. This misnomer is perhaps due to the apprehension of persons belonging to the chief ethnic group from Poonch - called 'Sudhan'. Hence, the presence of such "Sudhanese" in the Valley has been wrongly inferred to be indicative of the presence of Islamic militants from Sudan!

There are some, other than the Kashmiris themselves, who support the prospect of Kashmir's independence, essentially on the grounds that - 'If the people want freedom, they should get their choice'. In reality, it is not all as simple as that. First, the secession of Kashmir today, could set in motion the very Balkanisation of the Indian Union, particularly, as there are all sorts of separatists conflicts within India. The freedom of a people, be it Kashmiris or whoever, at the cost of the integrity of India and with the likelihood of the huge bloodshed it will entail, is certainly not recommended. Many years ago, the evidence of declassified US documents, revealed that Sheikh Abdullah had

attempted to negotiate with the Americans the prospect of independence in the hope that Uncle Sam would pay their bills! The US refused, hence Abdullah stuck to India instead.

Secondly, Kashmir lacks political leaders with any long term plan for Kashmir. Most of them are waffling a great deal about all sorts of grandiose ideas for the future, but are incapable of articulating anything substantive on independence. In the post colonial era, India's rare example of an independent democracy was achieved as the initial Indian leadership had acquired the art of state-making after years of study. To talk of independence and freedom is very well, but as so many countries have seen in these past few years, that soon after their euphoric freedom, they've been plagued with political and social chaos.

Thirdly, all this talk of making Kashmir a 'Switzerland in the East', carries little weight, if one is to examine the lack of economic infrastructures in Kashmir. In happier times, the Valley saw over 7,00,000 tourists, of which, not even 10 percent were from abroad. Most foreigners had visited the Valley as a part of their tourism package on 'India'. The Valley's tourism industry has definitely suffered in the past five years, but its other handicraft and cottage industries have continued almost as they were before the insurgency.

The truth is that the State of J&K has traditionally been one of the highest per capita recipient of the funds allocated from the Central Government. For its estimated population of about 8 million people, J&K receives Central grants worth Rs 950 crores, as compared to U.P's 140 million people that receive only Rs 4,500 crores. Unfortunately, these funds have often been diverted unaccountably with little being used for any development projects in J&K. And, such elaborate funding has continued through the past five years despite the total breakdown of order in the Valley.

Within the ambit of the economic issues, are the aspects related to industrialisation, employment and the tourism industry. The constant demand of the Kashmiris for greater heavy industry in the Valley and consequently, their claimed lack of better employment prospects for the people has a flip-side to it all. The state of J&K's location, terrain, inclement weather (for over five months each year) and its shortage of electricity pose immense hurdles for heavy industries. The distance of the Valley from our northern plains makes any major industrial venture rather expensive and non-cost effective.

New Delhi has instead compensated the Kashmiris by creating additional jobs in various central or state undertakings. Some 2,43,000 people are employed in such undertakings. The planning commissions' countrywide rationale

shows that around 1,00,000 government sector jobs are actually required in J&K. Thus, a whopping 143 percent extra employment has been created, as a compensatory measure in J&K.

Besides, J&K is perhaps the only State in the country where 'free' education is available upto the post-graduate level. So, it is not as though Kashmir has been neglected. On the contrary, in relative terms, New Delhi has given the Kashmiris an enormous amount of concessions. If it hasn't reached the common man, then the answer lies, to a great extent, with their erstwhile leaders.

Recent talk of a political reconciliation has centered around a dialogue with the All Party Hurriyat leadership. However, herein lies another contradiction. The term "Hurriyat" stands for freedom. Most of its representatives either want independence, or are pro-Pakistan. So, there is little hope of reconciliation with New Delhi with an outfit which retains a distinct anti-India bias.

Finally, we must understand the essential aspects that govern Article 370 and the 'Special Status' accorded to Kashmir, by the Delhi Agreement of 1952. These are supposedly meant to bind all future dealings of New Delhi with Srinagar, and these do require from the Kashmiris (a) to accept Indian citizenship; (b) to accept the President of India as their head of State; (c) acknowledge the supremacy of our tri-colour; (d) the Sadar-i-Riyasat (Governor of J&K) to be elected by the State Legislature with the President's consent, (and not to be nominated by the Centre); (e) J&K to be within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; and (f) any internal emergency could only be applied with the concurrence of the State Legislature. Almost all these specific issues have now been diluted in one sense or another, to such an extent, that it appears almost impossible to revive their spirit, if ever at all. Thus, as the 'Special Status' has lost all credibility, should it now be scrapped? We are unlikely to witness a 'pre-1953' era in Kashmir again.

If Kashmir is a true "test case" for the Indian Union - and I believe it is - then the question is - how much time is actually devoted by the Centre towards the Kashmir issue? Considering that J&K fields only six MPs as against 85 from UP, there is, at the end of the day, little urgency in New Delhi to find a solution to the ongoing problem in the Valley! This, coupled with our characteristic sluggishness towards most such issues of concern seems to reflect the ongoing apathy towards India's current problem number one.

Indian Infantry Divisions in World War II - Part I

MAJOR GENERAL CHAND N DAS (RETD)

THE GENESIS OF WAR

GERMANY

Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in 1933 and soon after withdrew Germany from the League of Nations. When Field Marshal Paul von Hindenberg, President of Germany, died in 1934 Hitler became sole master of Germany. He had disposed off all his rivals by killing them or sending them to prison camps. He then became the Fuhrer (Leader). In the next few years Hitler devoted his energies to economics and military re-armament.

Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany was restricted to a hundred thousand army. Germany, however, overcame this restriction by training each officer and man to hold atleast one rank higher and a leader. In 1935 Hitler openly announced that he intended to build up Germany's fighting forces. In 1936 his aggression began when German troops marched into the Rhineland and re-occupied the border zone between Germany and France from which German forces were barred at the end of World War I.

Hitler said later, "the 48 hours after the march into the Rhineland were the most nerve-wrecking of my life. If the French had marched, we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs". But the French did not march. The Germans built strong defences - the Siegfried Line - in the Rhineland.

The Soviet government entered into a non-aggression pact with France and Italy. France tried to create a network of pacts and alliances to hedge in Germany. Though reaction to Hitler's great strength was strong, Britain followed a foreign policy of appeasement.

By 1938 German army marched into Austria and made that country part of the German Reich (Empire). Next Hitler claimed the Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia bordering Germany. Britain and France agreed to an alteration

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of the border and on October 1, 1938 Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister of England, returned to England after a meeting in Munich, Germany with Adolf Hitler. To a cheering crowd he waved a document signed by Hitler promising that the people of Britain and Germany would never go to war with one another. "I believe" said Chamberlain, "it is peace in our time".

In March 1939, Germany marched into the rest of Czechoslovakia and Hitler announced "Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist".

With the signing of the Moscow Pact with Hitler and the British confirmation of the Polish guarantee by a formal Anglo-Poland alliance the stage was set for war.

On September 1, 1939 Germany invaded Poland. Britain and France had promised to help the Poles. At 11.15 am on Sunday, September 3, 1939 Neville Chamberlain announced on the radio:

"This morning the British Ambassador in Berlin had handed the German government a note saying that unless we heard from them by 11 o'clock that they were prepared to withdraw their troops from Poland, a state of war would exist between us. No such undertaking has been received and consequently the country is at war with Germany".

France had also promised to help the Poles. Once Britain had declared war, France acted and by 5 pm she was at war with Germany and before the day was over, so were Australia, New Zealand and India.

ITALY

Italy under Mussolini started pursuing a policy of expansion and though there was a 25 year Friendship Treaty with Ethiopia, Ethiopian and Italian forces clashed in December 1934 in a disputed zone on Italian Somaliland border. The League of Nations, after investigations, declared Italy to be an aggressor but failed to apply full sanctions. As it had failed to prevent the German occupation of the Rhineland, it gave Mussolini a free hand in Ethiopia with united Italy backing him. In November 1935 Italian forces captured the Fortress of Mukalle in Ethiopia without a declaration of war. In April 1936 Italy renewed offensive and captured Addis Ababa. Emperor Haile Salaisse I fled and Ethiopian resistance collapsed. In May 1936 Italy annexed Ethiopia. The most important result of this war was to give both Mussolini and the Italian nation a much exaggerated opinion of their military prowess resulting in a more aggressive attitude in their foreign policy.

JAPAN

From the beginning of the century Japan had an aggressive policy. The occupation of Korea and Formosa was but a prelude to further ambition of expansion.

From 1931-37 Japan had been pursuing a policy of aggressive expansion and domination in China. On July 7, 1937 Japanese troops in North China, ostensibly on night manoeuvres, clashed with Chinese troops near the Marco Polo bridge near Beijing. This affair initiated a full scale invasion of China which the Japanese termed "the China Incident". It may be considered as the start of World War II.

Japanese troops captured Beijing and Tientsin and in subsequent months advanced west and south against relatively ineffective Chinese opposition to reach the Yellow river. Nanking was captured and ravaged by Japanese troops. The offensive continued and in 1938 advance on Hankow was renewed and Canton was captured in October 1938. Extending war in South China it cut off Hong Kong from the mainland.

Taking advantage of France's defeat in Europe, the Japanese landed in Indo-China in September 1940 and began its occupation.

AXIS POWERS

Germany, Italy and Japan had formed the Axis. But when the war in Europe began in 1939 only Germany had taken the field, the other two remaining neutral in its initial stage. Not long after, Italy also became involved but Japan maintained her neutrality as it was engaged in a prolonged war to subdue China. After the incident at Mukden in 1931, it occupied Manchuria. When Japan was opposed in the League of Nations, she relinquished her membership of the body and when time came joined Germany and Italy.

When the war opened in Europe Japan had already a million men in China engaged in breaking Chinese resistance and in this process had advanced southward controlling the entire coastal region and moving towards French Indo-China.

INDIA

In India, the Indian National Congress, which had already launched its movement for freedom, had achieved its first stage with the Government of India Act of 1935 which was based on the principles of autonomy for the

provinces with a federal form of government. Though the new constitutional experiment in provincial autonomy worked without any serious breakdown, by October 1938 a demand for the revision of the constitution was made so that the Muslims may attain full independence and in September 1939 they declared their opposition to the federation.

At the time of the declaration of war in Europe the political situation in India had become grave with the intensification of communal rift and the Muslim demand for independence, on the one side, and opposition of Indian Princes to the federation owing to their fear that it would encroach on their despotism, on the other.

Thus psychologically and politically India was not prepared for participation in a war which England might wage on account of her politics in Europe or in the interest of her Empire. Militarily also, India was in no better situation. The Indian army had been primarily intended for defence of the country against any invasion from the Northwest. The whole strategic planning prior to 1936 was directed against such a contingency as Britain had always regarded a Russian threat from the Northwest a great danger. Even the danger of an offensive from Afghanistan was not ruled out. Thus a large number of units of the Indian army in India were deployed in the Northwest.

INDIAN ARMY

The army in India consisted of Indian forces and such British troops as were posted in India for training or for strengthening the Indian military potential. In 1938 the total strength of the Indian troops was 1,25,800, the British 15,900 and that of Gorkha units 18,700. In addition, there were a few state force units for Imperial Service. While research and experiments elsewhere after the Great War had led to the production of new and powerful land weapons and development of armoured vehicles, the Indian army had remained virtually unchanged in respect to armament, equipment and means of mobility. Two Indian horse cavalry regiments were equipped with armoured cars. The field artillery was still armed with obsolete weapons. In infantry Lewis gun was being replaced by lighter automatic and units were given the two inch mortar.

AN INDIAN DIVISION

An Indian infantry division in World War II usually consisted of three brigades, each of one British and two Indian infantry battalions.

In 1939 the Indian army had only recently begun to be modernised and

mechanised. In the early stages of the war the artillery of these divisions was almost entirely provided by regiments of the Royal Artillery and armour support by regiments of the Royal Armoured Corps. As more equipment became available and the policy of Indianisation of artillery was accepted, Indian soldiers quickly became skilled in its use, resulting in regiments of Indian artillery taking their rightful place within these divisions and Indian cavalry regiments converted to the armoured role in forming Indian Tank Brigade with lighter tanks. Machine gun battalions were raised and later also equipped with 4.2 inch mortars.

The commander of an Indian Infantry Division came usually from the Indian army, whilst division and brigade staffs were drawn from both British and Indian army sources.

Initially there was some reservation against giving command of battalion and brigade to Indian officers but as war prolonged and requirement of officers grew due to expansion and casualties in war, some Indian officers were given command and senior staff appointments where they earned not only their rightful place, but were invariably decorated for their distinguished services. Even the junior officers and men carried out difficult assignments with distinction and were decorated with the highest gallantry awards.

NOTE

The legendry Mountain Batteries were born out of Golandaz Batteries. After the 1857 revolt most of the Golandaz Batteries were disbanded and only the Mountain Batteries remained. It was only in 1935 that the artillery was Indianised.

2ND INDIAN DIVISION

The formation was raised in Iraq in August 1942 and was based at Basra as the Line of Communication Formation for the forces in the Middle East. It had a very large number of administration units, transport companies, workshops and medical units.

3RD INDIAN DIVISION (THE CHINDITS)

The 3rd Indian Division was formed in India in August 1943 as a special force. The first Chindit Expedition of Major General Wingate in 1943 was in the nature of a primary effort in the operation behind the Japanese lines. In 1944 the second Wingate Expedition consisted of six brigades fighting as infantry columns in long range penetration operation behind the Japanese lines

in Burma. The Special Force was inducted into Burma by road and by aircraft to bases established at "Aberdeen" in the Indaw area, "Broadway" east of Mandalay-Myitkyina Railway, "White City" on the railway line and later at "Blackpool" between Hopin and Mogaung to block enemy supply routes and to disrupt its efforts. Having established the bases the force fought its way northward up to the railway valley to assist Stilwell's Force and to force the Japanese to divert forces from the Imphal front. The Japanese, though surprised initially, attacked vigorously. Air supply in enemy territory in thick jungle during the monsoons was unsatisfactory. After Wingate died in an air crash the expedition was withdrawn in August. Before the Chindits were withdrawn one brigade was moved to assist Stilwell's forces and to capture Mogaung. In capturing Mogaung on 26/27 June 1944 3/6 GR suffered more than 250 casualties (killed and wounded).

Four Victoria Crosses were awarded to the Force of which two were won by 3/6 GR in the fight for Mogaung.

Captain Michael Allmand - Posthumus Rifleman Tul Bahadur Pun

The Special Force suffered 3628 casualties in these operations.

The Division re-formed in India and trained for a similar role but was disbanded in 1945.

4TH INDIAN DIVISION

The Division was the first Indian formation to go overseas. It was formed in Egypt in 1939 and was in the van during nine campaigns in the Mediterranean theatre. For the first operation by Wavell against Sidi Barrani in December 1940 it moved 250 miles of desert to win one of the most complete Victories of all times. In four days four enemy divisions were destroyed and over 20,000 prisoners taken for the loss of 700 men.

It subsequently moved to Kassala in Sudan and fought in Eritrea, where in the battle for Keren, Subedar Richpal Ram of the 4th Battalion Rajputana Rifles won the first Victoria Cross for the Division, with only a handful of his company remaining, battled to the death to hold the position so hardily won - Syria, where Vichy officials had connived at German infiltration, and after a hard fought battle had captured Damascus, the Western Desert no less critical an encounter on the Halfaya escarpment. Its major battles included Omars, Banghezi, where it destroyed 12 junkers troop carriers and captured or destroyed 183 aircraft, EI Geebi, Tobruk, Derna airfield, Wadi Akarit, Merse Matruh, Ruweisat Ridge, Alamein, Mareth Line when Subedar Lalbahadur Thapa of the 1/2 Gorkhas almost won that victory singlehandedly and won the

Victoria Cross and in Tunisia Havildar Major Chhelu Ram of the 4/6 Rajputana Rifles at Djabel Garci gallantly led the assault and made the supreme sacrifice which brought him the Victoria Cross. In Italy it fought a desperate battle at Cassino Monastery Hill and Hangman Hill. Moved to the Adriatic Coast it took over a wide front. The breakthrough on the Rapids led to an enemy withdrawal with the Division in pursuit mopping up rearguards and liberating Chiati, Pascara and Cltta San Angelo.

In Central Italy it stormed Alviri Ridge and severe fighting ensued in the San Maria de Tiberina and Cedrone areas.

East of Arezzo the Division engineers built "Jacob's Ladder", a jeep track of outstanding ingenuity. It was in this area that Lt. St. J.G. Young and Sowar Ditto Ram proved their blood brotherhood with Subedar Subramanyam who also gave his life on a minefield to win the Division's second and third George Crosses.

The Division was the first to break through the main Gothic Line positions and Monte Calvo, Teveleto, Monte San Giovanni, Auditore, Gemmano which was captured after 11 previous attacks. At Factano crossing Rifleman Sher Bahadur Thapa of 1/9 Gurkhas by his daring and cold courage brought his battalion its first Victoria Cross.

Following up swiftly, San Merino was occupied and the Rimani Line was broken.

After the outstanding achievements the Division was moved to Greece where it was deployed in Macedonia right upto the Yugoslav border.

The Division captured 1,50,000 prisoners and suffered 25,000 casualties, more than the strength of a whole Division. It won over a 1000 honours and awards which included four Victoria Crosses and three George Crosses.

Field Marshal Earl Wavel wrote: "The fame of the Division will surely go down as one of the greatest fighting formations in military history, to be spoken of with such as the Tenth Legion, the Light Division of the Peninsula War, Napoleon's "Old Guard". Even beyond its fighting reputation it will be remembered for the spirit of the mutual trust and fellowship maintained between all ranks coming from so many different races and creeds.

"Jo Hukum".

THE FIGHTING FIFTH

The Division was formed in India from the Deccan District Headquarters and two brigades moved to Sudan in 1940 and where they were joined by a British Brigade already there. Almost continuously in action or in transit by land, sea or air from one battlefield to another during five years of war, the 5th Division is one of the most travelled formations of the Indian army and has justly earned the title "The Fighting Fifth".

From the wilderness of the rocky peaks in Afghanistan, over thousand of miles of sands in North Africa, Iraq and Persia to the steaming jungles of Burma, the Division played a leading part in the defeat of the Italians, the Germans and the Japanese in crowning its epic campaigns with the occupation of Singapore and Java on the surrender in the East.

During its successive battles, more than 200 decorations were awarded to the officers and men in the Division including the Indian army's first Victoria Cross of the war to 2nd Lieut. Premindra Singh Bhagat, Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners at Gondar - Abyssinia in January 1941 and three more Victoria Crosses won by L/Cpl J.P. Harmen of the 4th Battalion, the Queen's Own in Royal West Kent, Jamadar Abdul Hafiz of the 3/9th Jats and Jamadar Ram Sarup Singh, 1st Punjab Regiment.

Lord Mountbatten, South East Asia Supremo wrote that he was proud to pay his tribute to the Division whose record was "second to none".

On reaching Sudan, one Brigade joined the 4th Indian Division which had been sent there to reinforce them, two remaining Brigades were re-formed to include three British Battalions. On 19 January 1941 the Fifth went into full scale action offensive at Gallabat and Fort Dulogoronos and continued it to capture Keren and Amba Alagi where the Duke of Aasta surrendered. They won the battles of Barentu, Teclesan and Massawa and had taken prisoners more than twice their own number.

Transferred to the desert after a brief respite, troops of the fifth created a diversion from Giarabub towards the Jalo Oasis. Operating from Giarabub it made a cross-desert dash of about 300 miles and captured Jalo taking 700 prisoners. When the Germans started their counter offensive on 21 January 1942, the Fifth fought a series of rearguard actions in which they suffered heavy losses; but took a heavy toll of the enemy. After re-forming the Fifth were in the defensive battle of El Alemein and at Ruweisat Ridge avenging some of its earlier misfortune, took 2000 prisoners in its last action in the North Africa theatre.

The Division was then moved to Iraq and Persia and was formed into an Armoured Division with 7 Armoured Brigade (Desert Rats) and two Infantry Brigades. It also trained as a strong GHQ reserve to protect airlines to India, and land route to Russia and the oil fields.

In June 1943 the Division came back to India and in November was in action against the Japanese in the Arakan and later drove them out of Ngakyedauk. In the counter attack by the Japanese and after more bloody fighting in Ngakyedauk Pass was reopened and relieved the 7 Indian Division which had been cut off. After the Ngakyedauk Pass battle, the Fifth started on an offensive role which led to the opening of the Maungdow-Bathidaug tunnel routes.

When the Japanese turned their attention to Manipur, the Fifth was moved to Manipur where it brought the Japanese to battle and scored conspicuous successes. Two Victoria Crosses were won in the grim fighting at that period. At Kohima L/Cpl J P Harmen, Royal West Kent won him a posthumous Victoria Cross and Jamadar Abdul Hafiz of the 9 Jats, also posthumous, on the Imphal-Kohima Road.

After three month's siege around Imphal, the Kohima road was reopened with the meeting of the 5th Indian Division and the 2nd British Division in June. The Fifth then pushed the Japanese back from the Imphal Plain down the Tamu road through Kabaw Valley and the Tiddim Road through Chir Hills to Chindwin and Kalemmyo. They held the Japanese at Bishenpur. The Japanese eventually started retreating and the Division was the first to recross the Burma border, but the progress was slow. Deploying wide patrol detours it took the enemy completely by surprise and it swooped on Tongzang to dislodge the Japanese.

Before the assault on Hill 160 and the last height before Tiddim the tanks were brought up to support the attack and Tiddim was captured.

In one of the flanking movements 2/1 Punjab captured the strong enemy position at Sialum Vum overlooking the road for Tiddim to Kennedy Peak. Here on 25 October 1944 Subedar Ram Sarup Singh of the 2/1 Punjab won the Victoria Cross posthumously.

Kennedy Peak fell to the Division and encountered little serious opposition. The Division pushed on to Kalemmyo and linked up with the 11th East African Division.

Having fought continuously for 14 months the Division then returned to

Assam and rested for two months before engaging again in March 1945. After capture of Meiktila the Division moved south towards Rangoon and swept forward 180 miles after several stiff actions. It captured a hill feature Shwempo Bluff, and secured a bridgehead across the Sinthe Chaung and capturing Pyinmana and Toungoo it advanced towards Rangoon. The Fifth was the first ashore at Singapore on 5 September 1945. After two months it was sent to Java to restore peace and order. It returned to India in 1946.

6TH INDIAN DIVISION

The 6th Indian Division was raised in 1941. It was sent to Iraq and Persia to counter a possible enemy threat to the Middle East Base from the Caucasus and to garrison these countries against infiltration.

Initially, there was political objection to the landing of the Indian Forces at Basra, but the landing of the Headquarters 10 Indian Division, 3 Field Regiment RA and 20 Indian Brigade was unopposed as the Government of Iraq decided to permit the landing. Disembarkation of the Brigade was completed on 19 April 1941. The convoy of transports carrying additional troops arrived in Basra on 29 April 1941. The British Air Base at Habbaniya was vital for the defence of Line of Communication in Iraq. When Iraqi forces occupied feature overlooking the Base, they were bombed out of its position and Basra - Shuaiba area was occupied. The 21st Indian Brigade occupied Ashar.

20th and 21st Indian Brigades advanced to Baghdad and Mosul was captured. Iraq became an operational base and the defence of the Persian Gulf was organised.

Operations against Iran were undertaken to secure Iran's oil and to ensure safety of Indian troops in the Middle East with the outbreak of war between Russia and Germany on 22 June 1941. On 25 August 1941 Russia invaded Iran from the north across the Caucasian border and the British and Indian troops invaded from the South and West across the borders of Iraq.

The Abadan oil refineries, the Anglo-Iranian oil installation at Gach-Sara and areas at Andimishk, Pa-Yi-Pul and Vaisiya were occupied. After a short stay at Sennah the Division moved to Baghdad and occupied Habaniya and Hamada. It then occupied Kasr-i-Shirin and Kifri with the primary role to maintain law and order which was, time and again, threatened by the trouble and unrest created by German agents. Their secondary but equally important task was to prevent interference by the enemy on the "Aid to Russia" route. In middle of December 1943 Khurra Shahr was occupied to guard the Russian and American installations.

7TH INDIAN DIVISION

The 7th Indian Division was formed in Attack (now in Pakistan) on 1 October 1941. The Division entered the Burma Theatre in August 1943 remaining there on active service until the Japanese surrender. The first action was in Arakan where in February 1944 in the "Battle of Boxes" it inflicted the first major defeat on the Japanese when the Japanese failed to capture the Administration Box at Sczweya. It was relieved on 24 February as the enemy suffered 5000 dead. Both 5th and 7th Division then resumed their attack at Buthidarang and Razabil, both of which fell in March.

Shortly afterwards, Divisional Headquarters with 33 and 114 Brigades moved to take part in the successful defence of Kohima, whilst 88 Brigade moved by air to Imphal and destroyed an enemy force at Kanglatonghi.

Advancing from Kohima in January 1945 to river Irrawaddy, a bridgehead was established at Nyaungu during the night 14/15 February, the river at this point being over 2000 yards wide involving the Division in the longest river crossing met with in any theatre of World War II. The bridgehead held in spite of ferocious counter attacks, the Japanese withdrawing in some disorder with the Division in hot pursuit. June saw the Division mopping up Japanese rearmaments, vainly attempting to escape across the river Sittang: after a further move east towards Pegu, the Division fought its final and successful action.

Four Victoria Crosses were awarded for acts of outstanding gallantry.

1. Naik Nand Singh - 1/11 Sikh Regiment
2. Naik Gian Singh - 4/15 Punjab Regiment
3. Rifleman Lachman Gurmung - 4/8 Gorkha Rifles
4. Lieut Karamjeet Singh Judge - 4/15 Punjab Regiment

The Division was disbanded in 1946.

8TH INDIAN DIVISION

The Division was formed in Meerut on 25 October 1940 under the command of Major General C.W. Harvey, consisting of 17, 18 and 19 Brigades. The Division first went into action in August 1941 when 18 Brigade secured the oil pipe line and refinery at Abadan in South Persia.

In June 1942, 18 Brigade having been rushed over from Mosul was over-

run near the Ruweisat Ridge by Rommel's tank in Western Desert and was never re-formed. In January 1943 the Division, formed of 17, 19 and 21 Brigades, was concentrated near Baghdad when Major General D. Russell, DSO, OBE, MC (The Pasha) took over command.

On 24 September 1943 the Division landed in Torcanto and for 19 months was almost continuously in action advancing through mountainous country and crossing river after river: Biferna, Trigno, Sangro, Moro, Rapido, Arno, Sieve, Senio, Sarterno and finally the Po and Adiga. The Gustav Line in Italy extended for Garigliano on the west coast to Sangro on the east, with the Cassino stronghold dominating the road. River Sangro and its southern approaches were overlooked from Sangro ridge on its opposite bank. The river was in spate but it was crossed in falling rain and snow on 19 November 1943. The 8th Indian Division captured the ridge after heavy fighting and held it against determined counterattacks.

The Division crossed river Moro after having assembled the bridge on the enemy bank and then pushed back to the South bank. It captured Calders on 13/14 December. The Rapido crossing in May 1944 supported by Canadian tanks pierced the Gustav Line causing the Germans to pull out of Cassino. Following up the Division captured Rocca d' Arce and Ripa Ridge and advanced 240 miles in June. Sepoy Kamal Ram, the Indian Army's youngest winner of Victoria Cross, won the award in his first action just after crossing of the River Gari.

The 8th Indian Division captured Monte San Bartolo in operations from 11 to 14 November during which Rifleman Thaman Gurung was awarded the Victoria Cross posthumously.

During the resumed offensive in April the river Senio was crossed against stiff opposition with both sides suffering heavy casualties. Sepoy Namdeo Jadhav Maratha Light Infantry earned the Victoria Cross.

In April 1945 the campaign ended when the 6 Lancers arranged the surrender of 11,000 men of their old enemy the First German Paratroop Division.

The Division won three Victoria Crosses:

1. Rifleman Thaman Gurung - 1/5 Gurkha Regiment
2. Sepoy Namdev Jadhav - 1 Maratha Light Infantry
3. Sepoy Kamal Ram - 3/8 Punjab Regiment

9TH INDIAN DIVISION

The Division embarked for Singapore in 1940 and formed part of III Indian Corps. At the time of the Japanese invasion the Division of only two Brigades was located in the eastern coastal area of Malaya with 8 Brigade at Kota Bahru and 22 Brigade at Kuantan. The airfields and beaches at Kota Bahru in the north east of Malaya saw action on the very first day of Japanese landing on 8 December 1941. 8 Brigade opposing the Japanese landing on the beaches at Kota Baru became engaged in fierce fighting between the Kelanta river and the coast before withdrawing to Kuala Lipis. On the bloody beaches of Bachok is a memorial erected by the Japanese to commemorate the 3,000 casualties they suffered against this Brigade.

Jetra on the north west of Malaya saw fighting from 10 to 13 December when the Japanese advancing overland from Thailand crossed into Malaya. 22 Brigade was also heavily engaged in the State of Pahang on both sides of the river Kuantau. It was in Kuantau aerodrome that Lt. Col. A. E. Cunnings, commanding 2 Battalion 12 Frontier Force Regiment won the Victoria Cross for conspicuous gallantry.

The Division fought action at Kampar, Slim River, The Muar and Nyur but the Japanese deploying flanking movements forced the troops to withdraw. The fighting at Slim river was the last action in Central Malaya on 7 January 1942 before Kuala Lumpur fell. The Japanese tanks over-ran the position resulting in heavy losses. The action on river Muar, which was the last natural obstacle in Johore between the Japanese and Singapore, was fought from 16 to 23 January. On 25 January 1942 the engagement at Niyor was the last one fought on the Malayan Peninsula. Thereafter, the returning troops destroyed the causeway connecting the Peninsula to Singapore island. Remnants of this Division linked up with 11 Indian Division for the final battle on Singapore island. The Japanese, however, repaired the causeway and the Johore Strait on 8 February. The Troops covering the defence of Singapore fought gallantly but due to shortage of water, food and ammunition surrender was made on 15 February 1942.

10TH INDIAN DIVISION

The Division was grouped in Iraq in May 1941 under Major General "Bill" Slim, and in four years over 4000 miles from Tehran to Trieste, fought three little wars and two great campaigns. In Syria and Iran against Vichy and rebel forces to bar the road to India, then on to North Africa for the battle for Libya and Halfaya Pass and the bottleneck at Alamein, then it moved to Cyprus for regrouping and hill training and finally to Italy under Major Gen-

eral Deny Reid for hard fighting northward with the Eighth Army, the Gothic Line, Senio and numerous other mountain battles and river crossings; followed with many battle honours earned, decorations won and casualties suffered, before final victory in Europe. Security tasks on the Yugoslav border around Trieste completed the Division's war service.

Naik Yashwant Ghadya of the 3rd Battalion 5th Maratha Light Infantry won the Victoria Cross posthumously during the drive along the Upper Tiber towards the Gothic Line in Italy when he knocked out an enemy machine gun post and captured it singlehanded.

11TH INDIAN DIVISION

The 11th Indian Division less one brigade was formed in Malaya in May 1941 coming under the command of III Indian Corps. The Division at the outset of the Malaya campaign was located in the north of the Malaya Peninsula on the Thailand border. It was the first formation in action in North Kedah against the Japanese when they launched their attack on 8 December 1941. Jitra and Gurun in the north area of Malaya saw fighting from 10 to 13 December 1941 in which they suffered heavy losses in men and equipment. They made a fighting withdrawal against heavy odds and flanking attacks by the Japanese. In Central Malaya they fought at Ipoh, Kuantu, Kampar and Slim river from 26 December 1941 to 10 January 1942. Slim River was the last action in Central Malaya before Kuala Lumpur fell to the Japanese. After violent fighting on River Muar in Johar from 16 to 23 January 1942, it fell back to cover the defences of Singapore where what remained of the 11 and 9 Indian Division were amalgamated. Once again the Division found itself in the front line despite their exhausting two months ordeal on the mainline; it counterattacked and recaptured vital ground between the Naval Base and the Causeway with heavy casualties. Due to shortages of water, food and ammunition the garrison surrendered on 15 February, but at the time of the surrender, front of the Division was still intact and men fought gallantly to hold their position.

(To be concluded)

Korean War Veterans Revisit Programmes to Republic of Korea

MAJ GEN (DR) H B SINGH, PVSM (RETD)

After cessation of Korean war, a truce agreement was signed between North & South Korea in 1953. Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) was established for supervising the repatriation of war prisoners. This NNRC was composed of India, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland & Czechoslovakia. It was decided that the chairman of this commission was to be an Indian nominee. Further that the commission will take over the war prisoners who were not willing to be repatriated and the Armed Guards for the custody of these prisoners will be provided by the Indian troops.

Following this truce agreement, Indian Custodian forces comprising of various infantry regiments with supporting troops were sent to South Korea and given the role of providing armed guards for custody of the repatriable prisoners of Korean war. The Indian Custodian forces were located in the demilitarized zone (DZ) which the Indian troops & others around it called the "Indian village in Korea". I served there as a regimental medical officer in one of the infantry battalions, the 3rd Garhwal Rifles and looked after the health of a large number of Korean prisoners of war in the demilitarized zone.

The 60 Indian para field ambulance was sent by India to South Korea earlier which did a commendable job in looking after Korean war casualties and had become very popular for their excellent medical service and discipline. Later 60 Para Field Ambulance joined Indian Custodian forces in the DZ. The 26 Indian General Hospital proceeded to South Korea as part of Indian custodian forces which provided specialised service and other medical facilities to the custodian forces. Later 64 Field Hospital of US Army joined us in the DZ. Since there were a lot of medical officers of various countries in the demilitarized zone, Hind Nagar Medical Society was formed with the aim of coordination for better health of the local forces.

After the Korean War truce in 1953, Korean War Veterans Association (KVA) was formed with headquarters in Seoul (Republic of Korea). Korean war veterans have since been meeting each year to recall the memories of the tragic & fateful events of Korean War (1950-51) and while looking at it they have remembered and appreciated the support and overall contribution made

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by India, its government and its people towards Korean War by sending 60 Para Field Ambulance and its troops as member of NNRC and Indian Custodian forces.

The South Korean Veterans also wanted to remember with deep appreciation, the role & support towards the Korean War of United Nations friendly countries who fought for freedom and democracy of South Korea and thus to help maintain liberty of South Korea. To commemorate the fateful events of the Korean War on 25th June, the Korean war veterans association has been inviting the ex-Servicemen of United Nations countries who served in Korea from 25th June, 1950 to July 27, 1953 alongwith their spouses & immediate decendants and for this, they have been allotting a quota to each country within their financial limit after due approval of KVA headquarters Seoul.

Under the Korean revisit programmes, KVA headquarters Seoul has been inviting the Indian Officers with their spouses and immediate decendants every year through the Korean Embassy (Defence attache) at Delhi. I had the pleasure of availing such a revisit Korea programme recently in September, 1995 alongwith two other officers. The itinerary of the revisit is worked out by the KVA Seoul. This consists of, among other things, tour of Seoul and its vicinity, visit to national cemetery, Korean war museum, National museum, Korean war monument, Pan-Mun-Jon & Dora OP, a reception by the KVA President and presentation of Ambassador for Peace medal and its certificate.

I would like to mention here that this great country of Republic of Korea has grown at tremendous pace since 1953 when we were there about 42 years ago; the economic and industrial growth of Republic of Korea has been dynamic. The miracle of its modern economy, clear blue skies, high buildings, smooth super highways, thriving export industries has made for a better life for its people, a truly great achievement. This has been due to the hard work put in by the great people of that country. Between North Korea & South Korea exchanges & contacts are being made for improvement of relations. Ultimately, we wish both the North and South Korea come together for future economic growth and betterment of the great people of Korea.

These revisit programmes have been greatly appreciated by all the veterans of the United Nations friendly countries as this gives them an opportunity to meet each other and appreciate the progress made by the Republic of Korea. The Korean war veterans association and the people of Republic of Korea have to be complimented for their great effort to bring their country to great economic heights. In these revisit programmes we get fresh view of Korea, a chance to renew our fraternity with the land & the people with whom we stood shoulder to shoulder in battle.

We wish them great success and a very bright future.

Letters to the Editor

Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the services.

I

Dear Sir,

INTEGRATION OF MOD WITH SERVICE HQ

I read with interest the article on the above topic by Col Ivan David (USI Journal Apr-Jun 96). He has brought out a fairly convincing argument in favour of merger of Service HQ with the much maligned MOD. And, of course, he is not alone in advocating such a move.

Some of the points put forth are not exactly convincing. National Security is common to all and we cannot say that it is the duty of the Service personnel only. Hence, whether the interface with the political leadership is with the bureaucrat or military professional should not make much difference. After all, it is up to the political leadership to decide at what level and from what source it should get the information.

The time consuming and "triplicated bureaucratic channel" as the author puts it, is not explaining the real position. Integrated Finance is to assist the expeditious finalisation of proposals which involve investment. It is not a super body as it is made out. This would continue even after the 'merger'. It is the administrative wing which is responsible for the policies and the projects.

Other points relating to carrying matters of day to day routine to the MOD, falls into the category of "delegation". It is a known factor that the Services woefully lag behind when it comes to delegation of authority-administrative as well as financial. The paper work in the units, Service HQ, to say the least, is terrible. It is high time, this is seriously looked into. There is great scope in bringing down the level of decision making on minor matters to the unit level. Working procedure needs to be reviewed to make it time bound and efficient. What is the need of day to day training courses to come to even the level of the Command HQ?.

But, so far, we have not brought out any major danger in the existing system. Apart from the "review" at more than one level and point, the main reason for the advocacy is avoidable expenditure. If we were to prove that we really mean this, is it not high time to think of the first step at least?.

At present we have different HQ for each of the three Services. Won't it be in the fitness of things to merge these three HQ into one? After all, it won't result in any service disability and would definitely result in increased efficiency and economy. Once this is stabilised then we can move for the next step, namely, integration with the MOD.

Yours Sincerely

D-II/351, Vinaya Marg
New Delhi-110 021

Col V. Sadasivam

II

IZZAT OF THE MEN BEHIND THE GUN - ANOTHER RESPONSE

Sir,

Brig. N. B. Grant is very correct in saying that the Army cannot compete with big business and multinationals in paying its officers and men. That will only bankrupt the Government and perhaps spoil the army itself. Of course, armymen should be paid better than civil servants taking into consideration the special hazards, though it may not be possible for army officers to get promotions as fast as the IAS officers. The Government has scores of secretaries at the top in the states as well as the Centre, whereas the army can only have commanders proportionate to the men they command. All these have to be compensated by restoring the izzat of armymen. In a society where izzat is generally proportionate to one's power and pelf, it is difficult to get izzat just because you are a soldier ready to sacrifice your life for the country. Therefore, one can only console oneself as Lt. Gen. S.N. Sharma says, "No status of Chiefs and highly placed commanders, remote from the combat soldier and his immediate officers, really worries men, - they sense the regard and respect given to them by their peers..."

As for the statistics of the shortage of officers in the Army, there seems to be a lot of distortion in presenting it. The 12,500 officer shortage has been there for long and the JCOs have been manning those posts. Unlike foreign armies, the Indian army never had lieutenants as platoon commanders. The JCOs have been doing the job of young officers. So, an Indian army unit cannot have as many officers as there are in foreign armies where the next rank after a sergeant (Havildar) is Second Lieutenant.

In this scenerio, the late Gen. B.C. Joshi's plan to promote 13,000 JCOs to officer rank to make up the deficiency, cannot be faulted because these JCOs are already manning the posts of officers. There can be two opinions on the comparative efficiency of a lieutenant of two or three years service and that of a JCO with more than 10 years of service. In the US Army, "in practice, the lieutenant is getting on-the-job training from the platoon sergeant". (*Getting it right* by F. Dunnigan).

In fact, this plan is nothing new. Former Army Chief the late Gen. J.N. Choudhury in his *Arms, Aims and Aspects* wrote: "A committee was set up to reexamine the need for continuing the rank of VCO, but with the coming of independence, the proceedings of the committee were shelved. Perhaps all JCOs could be placed on a special list of officers and, while performing their present duties on their present emoluments, be known as Second Lieutenants and Lieutenants with possibly the Subedar Major being given the rank of captain. This change of titles in itself would remove a number of anomalies..." The embarrassment the JCOs face while serving with the other armies in the United Nations force is such an anomaly.

It is good if we can have university toppers and MBAs from prestigious institutions to join the army. But there is no possibility of it now, and even if they come, they may prove misfits in the army because all the time they will be comparing the life they could have had in the civil and get frustrated. A contented average young man will make a better army officer than a frustrated genius.

A few words about Brig. Grant's statistics on the break-up of those who volunteer to become army officers. He says "40 per cent were those who did not make the grade for university education". And then again "nine (out of ten) under the category (sons of serving officers) were those who could not make the university". And his conclusion, "thus 99 per cent choose the Services for failure to get anything better, either socially or academically."

This is not at all true, to say the least. Entrance to the university is very easy now-a-days and a boy who has not enough marks to get college admission can never hope to pass the UPSC and SSB tests for the NDA.

Lt. Gen. Sharma has rightly said "possibly the best way to present this counterview is to compare actual performance when the army... was led by the cream of Indian society ... with the successive performance as the bulk of men progressively came from lower and yet lower, strata of society". Today's officers are more social and worldly wise and they have the difficult task of commanding educated men in complex combat situations. Gone are the days when soldiers blindly bayonet-charged into the dark at the command of their officers. Today, whether it is in Kashmir or the North East, the jawan is answerable for his actions not only to his commander but a host of official and unofficial human rights organisations. Our officers and men are performing a great job under very trying conditions that cannot be comprehended by the older generation.

Yours Sincerely

42-B, Pocket I
Mayur Vihar Ph. I
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Sub Maj. N. Kunju (Retd)

Review Article 1

World's Fissile Material Stocks

COL R RAMA RAO, AVSM (RETD)

THE AUTHORS' OBJECTIVE

The main objective of the authors as indicated by them (page 5) is "to record what is known, and not known, about the stocks held and production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (Pu) in the five declared nuclear weapon states as well as in other countries.

SIPRI proposes updating the information gathered, discussed and recorded in this volume, at regular intervals. The authors of this book, very rightly, suggest that every nuclear weapon state should publish annually the size of its inventory of Pu and HEU. The reason for this is simple. The USA has built up stocks of Pu and HEU amounting to hundreds of tons. Russia's inventory of weapon grade materials is perhaps only slightly less than the USA's. The other three nuclear weapon states, Britain, France and China have smaller inventories.

SIPRI proposes to publish, annually, updated editions of this book so that the world at large may have some idea of the amounts of readily usable weapon grade material available with the declared nuclear weapon states. An estimate of the amount of materials with threshold weapon states are also to be published.

As at the end of 1990, the USA had an estimated total of 97 tonnes ($\pm 8\%$) of weapon grade plutonium. This was apart from an estimated 15.2 tonnes of reactor grade Pu fuel. In the 1960s, the US had built nuclear weapons using 2 to 3 kg Pu per weapon warhead. The Pu content of US weapons has since increased to 3 to 4 kg per warhead.

Russia's stock of nuclear weapon's material is estimated to be 115 tonnes (± 20 tonnes). Krypton (^{85}Kr) is released into the atmosphere from Soviet Pu production units. Based on the working of the various reactors in Russia, another estimate of Pu available by the end of 1983 was 125 tonnes and by

World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1992. By David Albright Frans and others, (Oxford : Oxford Univ., 1993), p. 246, £ 17.50, ISBN 0-19-829153-1.

Col R. Rama Rao is a well known defence analyst and has written several books and articles on defence issues.

end 1990, approximately 160 tonnes. In 1992 it was estimated that Russia's stockpile of nuclear warheads was between 27,000 and 34,000.

The size of the British nuclear arsenal is a closely guarded secret. SIPRI estimate, based on the production of weapon grade Pu and taking into account the amounts of the material transferred to the USA from time to time, is that Britain may have between 200 and 300 warheads. Its Pu inventory, for military use, is placed at about 7.6 tonnes.

France perhaps has 4.4 to 7.6 tonnes of weapon grade Pu.

A good deal of uncertainty remains, regarding China's nuclear arsenal. SIPRI estimate is that China has a stockpile of about 300 nuclear weapons. SIPRI adds that China's arsenal could well be three tonnes as much, i.e. 900 weapons (p 63).

Of particular interest to Indian readers is information pertaining to the amount of Pu produced in nuclear power reactors. As noted by the authors (of the book under review : p 71) -

"The inevitable consequence of irradiating Uranium in a nuclear reactor i.e. that neutrons are captured by U 235 to form U 239 which decays into Pu 239. Further capture of neutrons results in Pu 239 being converted into the heavier isotopes of Pu, namely Pu 240 to Pu 243. However only Pu 239 and Pu 241 are fissile, when irradiated with thermal neutrons and have value as fuel in power-reactors". Also, Pu in fuel discharged from a commercial reactor will have a fissile content of about 70 to 73 percent. Weapon grade material usually contains more than 93 percent of Pu 239.

The data given below (p 78) will be of interest to Indian readers. Estimate of Pu discharged in tonnes from spent fuel

	1980		1981-90	
	<i>Fuel Used</i>	<i>Pu</i>	<i>Fuel</i>	<i>Pu</i>
India	190	1.1	550	2.4
Pakistan	40	0.2	50	0.2

Estimate of fuel discharge in tonnes from power reactors :-

During the years

	<i>1991-2000</i>	<i>Pu Content</i>	<i>2001-2010</i>	<i>Pu Content</i>
India	2590	9.7	2940	10.2
Pakistan	50	0.2	30	0.1

Indian readers, however, must remember that Pakistan has uranium enrichment facilities as well as, perhaps, plutonium extraction facility.

The above data has to be studied in the context of the facilities available to Russia, Britain and the United States :

	<i>1991-2000</i>	<i>(tonnes) Pu Content</i>	<i>2001-2010</i>	<i>Pu Content</i>
Russia	8430	50.3	8430	48.9
UK	10620	30.9	5170	18.8
USA	18890	181.0	16540	171.4

SIPRI estimates that India's MAPS (Madras Atomic Power Station) has, until 1990, produced 300 kg of Pu. This figure appears to be very much on the high side since MAPS may not have operated at its rated capacity all along.

As of now India is under intense pressure from the USA to stop producing Pu or subject all its nuclear facilities to UN (read US) inspection. This apart, India's space programme which is for peaceful purposes alone is also being strongly objected to.

The lesson for India is clear. In an age where national economy can develop on a sound basis only if it is supported by technological excellence, the country can ill afford to go slow on the development of nuclear power, metal, material, and space technologies.

Review Article 2

Feeding China in the Next Century

K K MITRA

Lester Brown is the President of the World-Watch Institute, an environmental research group in Washington, D.C. The present volume has expanded the arguments Brown had provided in the articles published in the *International Herald Tribune* in 1994 painting a bleak scenario of grain scarcity for China which would severely affect the world grain market by the end of the third decade of the next century. As expected, the Chinese authorities vigorously contested Brown's thesis. However, there are signs of grudging recognition in Beijing today that there is cause for concern about the agricultural situation. In 1995, China turned into an importer of corn from being an exporter of corn following the rising food prices which mainly accounted for the worst ever inflation rate of 24 per cent in the preceding year.

According to Brown, the demand for grains - both food and feed grains - will rise dramatically in China with growing industrialisation and rising incomes. Simultaneously, rapid industrialisation would lead to loss of crop land ruling out rise in productivity. He cites the examples of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan where conversion of farmland to other uses combined with a decline in multiple cropping resulted in a loss between 40 to 50 per cent of grain harvested areas in the last few decades. By 1994, these three countries collectively imported 71 per cent of their grain.

China's grain area - already concentrated in a relatively small region, about one-third of the country, along the Southern & Eastern coasts - has dropped from 90.8 million hectares in 1990 to an estimated 85.7 million hectares in 1994. Along with the loss of farmland, there has been extensive diversion of irrigation water to non-farm uses - a cause for concern in a country where half of the crop land is irrigated and almost four-fifth of grain harvest comes from irrigated land.

The Brown thesis will no doubt come as a surprise to many because grain production in China rose from 200 million tons in 1978 to 445 million tons in 1994 placing China above the US as world's leading grain producer. However, despite significant drop in China's population growth rate from 2.7 per

Who will feed China? Wake-up Call for a small Planet by Lester Brown, London; Earthscan, 1995, p. 160, £ 9.95, ISBN 1-85383-316-9.

Mr. K. K. Mitra is former Principal Director, Directorate General of Security, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, New Delhi.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXVI, No. 524, April-June, 1996.

cent in 1970 to 1.1 per cent in 1994, China may well have 1.6 billion people by 2030. As food production declines, the demand for grains will rise. As their incomes grow, people tend to diversify their diets and consume more meat, milk and eggs necessitating substantial quantity of grain for animal feed. By 1994, the share of feed-grain in China had risen to about 80 million tons - roughly about 23 per cent of China's grain production. Further, grain is required not merely for feeding livestock and poultry. If every adult Chinese were to drink just one more bottle of beer a day, then Brown calculates that an additional 3,70,000 tons of grain will be required for producing that beer.

China may have a shortfall of more than 200 million tons of grains by 2030. Even if China is willing and able to buy that quantity in the world market, there will not be enough surplus grain available for export to China. In fact, over the next five decades, the demand for grain imports is likely to grow not only for China, but also for Africa, Egypt, Mexico and South Asia.

Almost two hundred years ago, Thomas Malthus had prophesied that a population explosion would imperil England's future by the early 19th century. But Malthus was proved wrong by the momentous changes of the 19th century, the great jump in agricultural productivity and the industrial revolution. Only time will tell whether Brown and the new prophets of doom will be eventually falsified by new discoveries, technological progress or change in dietary habits.

Perhaps, as Robert Paarlberg has argued in his excellent recent essay in *The Foreign Affairs*, the true challenge to World's grain production will come from Africa, not China. Between now and 2030, China's population is likely to grow from 1.2 billion to 1.6 billion - a 45 per cent increase - while Africa's population will probably jump from 600 million to 2.3 billion - a staggering 280 per cent increase. Besides, unlike China which would be able to finance its huge grain purchase out of substantial trade surplus, Africa may have to look for foreign aid and compete with other grain importers for a slice of the limited exportable surplus on offer in the world market.

One can only hope that the future may not be all that grim. The FAO and the World Bank projections of 1.6 per cent and 1.3 per cent, respectively, of annual rate of growth of world grain output are significantly higher than Brown's estimate of 1/2 per cent. During the last three decades, the world grain output has increased annually by 2.6 per cent. The farmers worldwide would, quite possibly, face the challenge of higher demand (and consequently the prospect of higher prices) by producing more. The need for grains may be reduced due to changes in dietary habits and less dependence on livestock products. China, above all, may be able to reduce the population growth rate further in the coming decades.

Review Article 3

Pakistan's Politics Under President Zia-ul Haq

LT GENERAL S L MENEZES, PVSM, SC (RETD)

General K.M. Arif's 'Working with Zia' is unquestionably the best informed Pakistani account of the Zia years, allowing for the variations in nuances as to the various developments in those years. There is no better person today in Pakistan than General Arif to recount the occurrences in the period in question. He was not only a witness, but also an observer of the unfolding events as the Chief of Staff of General Zia, first, in the latter's capacity as the Chief Martial Law Administrator, then, as the President of Pakistan. This book provides information which has hitherto not been available.

The first chapter briefly summarizes the decay in Pakistani politics in the post Jinnah-Liaquat Ali Khan period; the second, describes the acts of omission and commission of those who mattered, leading up to the fall of Dhaka and the emergence in 1971 of Bangladesh, from what was East Pakistan (the report of the Hamoodur Rahman 'Commission of Inquiry - 1971 War' has so far not been made public); the third, dwells on the political turmoil that enmeshed the country before the military displacement of the Z.A. Bhutto regime in July 1977; the seventh, and eighth chapters cover Z.A. Bhutto's trial and execution; the ninth and tenth chapters give glimpses of the major domestic policies during the Zia era; the next four deal with Pakistan - Iran relations, Afghanistan, Pakistan - US relations, and Pakistan's nuclear programme. The concluding chapter narrates the dismissal of the Junejo government and the aircraft crash that killed General Zia-ul Haq.

The author meticulously recounts, how, before the Zia years, General Yahya Khan and Z.A. Bhutto used each other for self-perpetuation in power. As an illustration of Z.A. Bhutto's whimsicality, the latter had appointed Lt. Gen Gul Hassan Khan as the Acting Army Chief in December 1971, and a few months later in March 1972 removed him, appointing him Ambassador to Austria. While the book under review is masterly in its ambit, but, for a

Working with Zia : Pakistan's Power Politics 1977-1988. By General Khalid Mahmud Arif, Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, 1995, p. 435, Rs. 550.00, ISBN 019 5775708.

Lt. Gen. S L Menezes is a former Vice-Chief of the Indian Army and the author of the well known book on the Indian Army, *Fidelity and Honour : The Indian Army from the Seventeenth to the 21st Century* (New Delhi : Viking, 1993).

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wider understanding of the then Pakistani polity, should ideally be read along with the *Memoirs of Lt Gen Gul Hassan Khan* (1993), both books perceptively published by OUP Karachi. Z.A Bhutto, for the purposes of his autocratic rule, had perceived General Muhammad Zia-ul Haq as the least likely coup-maker, sequentially appointing him the Chief of the Army Staff over the heads of several others. Political power was thereafter thrust on Zia, at the urging of Opposition politicians, as a result of Bhutto's misdemeanours, including the foolhardy rigging of the 1977 elections. Zia thereby becoming Pakistan's longest serving military ruler, 1977-88, in the garb of the temporary 'Operation Fair Play'. He possessed a prescient understanding of the political dynamics of his country, conjoined with an instinctive dislike of the politicians' pursuit of 'profit and patronage'. They had sought to use him, but, in the event, he used them. Except for the armed forces, he weakened all the other institutions of the state, like the bureaucracy, judiciary, parliament, and the political parties, him sharing power with the latter, rather than transferring power to them. His dismissal of the Junejo government signalled the political isolation of Zia from the mainstream of Pakistani politics. In the interregnum between Junejo's dismissal and the elections due in November 1988. Zia formed a caretaker government without a Prime Minister. Thus concentrating in his person, all the constitutional powers of the President and the Prime Minister. Soon thereafter, in August 1988, Zia died in a plane crash, and the country was plunged into uncertainty. Military rulers undoubtedly leave behind for their civilian successors more problems than are resolved.

As to the national polity of Pakistan, Gowher Rizvi, Fellow in International Relations. Nuffield College, in his brilliant Foreword, pithily encapsulates the very core of this illuminating book, 'Scholars have long rejected Samuel Huntington's persuasive but wholly ahistorical view that the armed forces of the Third World are instruments of modernisation, political stability, and economic development. Nevertheless, in Pakistan, the armed forces, especially the Army, is a central factor in the country's politics and the decision-making process. For much of Pakistani history, the military has played an active role and has intervened thrice to capture power. Even though it failed to institutionalise the role of the military in the formal political processes, it continues to enjoy considerable public esteem, and is seen by many in Pakistan as the ultimate arbiter in the affairs of the country...., In his Epilogue, the author elaborates, "Pakistan has alternated between military coups and corrupt, incompetent civilian rule. Her political system is firmly controlled by feudal lords and others who run political parties as their personal fiefs". Both these 1993 postulations by Rizvi and Arif are true even today, the author validly concluding that "... Bhutto and Zia fell short of public expectations". An unputdownable read.

Short Reviews of Recent Books

The Theory of Evolution. By John Maynard Smith, *Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 354, £ 7.95, ISBN 0521-45128-0.*

John Maynard Smith is one of the leading Darwinians today. He is in forefront of the study of sex, probably the most baffling topic in modern evolutionary theory. Few people in the world are better qualified than him to explain evolution to a layman and make it intrinsically interesting. Therefore, it is no surprise that the basic text written in 1975 bears testimony to both the brilliance of the book and the endurance of the neo-Darwinian synthesis.

In the present edition the author has explained causes of evolution in terms of processes of variation, selection and inheritance which can be seen to occur among living animals and plants. The chapters are written in such a manner that a lay reader can easily comprehend the complexities without being a student of biology. The text is replete with examples and simplified diagrams which makes reading very engrossing. Certain parts can be easily skipped without losing the continuity or the underlying thought.

The book helps the reader to understand the origins of species, the basic genetics, and evolution, all under one cover. Since awareness about evolution is a must in today's world this book is recommended for general reading.

— Cdr S. Kulshrestha

Justice and the Genesis of War. By David A. Welch, *Cambridge, Cambridge Univ, 1993, p. 335, £ 35.00, \$ 49.95, ISBN 0-521-44462-4.*

This book is an in-depth study of the causes of war. It is generally understood that wars have a 'realist' account of motivation—self-preservation or self-aggrandisement. In this book, author discusses the effect of one particular type of normative motivation—the justice motive which has been defined as “the drive to correct a perceived discrepancy between entitlement and benefits”. He analyses five great power-wars to prove the justice motive : the Crimean War, the French-Prussian War, World War I and II, and the Falklands War.

— Lt Col. Daljit Singh (Retd)

Informing Statecraft : Intelligence for a New Century. By Angelo Codevilla, *New York, The Free Press, 1992, p. 491, \$ 24.95, ISBN 0-02-911915-4.*

Codevilla, a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford, California, was a staff member of the US Senate Select Committee on intelligence from 1977 to 1985. He has scrutinised the US intelligence system which, in his view, is outdated and is not geared for tackling the challenges that face the US today, not to mention

the complexities of the 21st century. Codevilla offers an understanding of the basics of the craft on which the US intelligence apparatus may be rebuilt.

The perspective, in author's own words, has been that of an academic who has been as far inside as one can get, but who is no 'insider'. In fact, Codevilla makes it a point to take intelligence out of the field hitherto dominated by the "old boys" of the intelligence bureaucracy. Whatever may be his objective, the result of Codevilla's endeavour is a surprisingly well-informed study of the US intelligence system and the basics of the 'craft' of intelligence which is not only eminently readable but also a highly rewarding experience for bureaucrats and policy makers who might care to go through the volume.

Codevilla's book has one noteworthy shortcoming. He has tried but failed to conceal his bias against the intelligence establishment in the USA - especially the CIA. This may have something to do with the years he spent negotiating with and going through the memoranda sent by US intelligence agencies requesting funds which might have led him on a collision course with them. The book abounds with catchy one liners such as "the US has achieved its foreign policy goals despite, not because of, its intelligence system". The failures of US intelligence are, admittedly, many and quite well-publicised. But its successes are often unheralded. The intricate details of world-wide successful clandestine humint operations, the mass of sensitive sigint data or vital imageries collected from the skies will, unfortunately enough, remain well-guarded secrets which not even the most energetic researcher like Codevilla can ever hope to unfold.

Nevertheless, with all its glaring lapses into occasional lack of objectivity, Codevilla's book provides marvellous reading. Like Senator Moynihan (quoted in the Jacket), I have no hesitation in saying : read him though you need not always agree with him.

— K K MITRA,
Former Principal Director, D.G.S.

Essays on Strategy-X. Ed By Mary A. Sommerville, *Washington, National Defense Univ.* 1993, p. 276.

This tenth edition of eight very high class essays on strategy written by students of U.S. Military colleges, is worth serious study. The first two jointly won the 1992, Chairman JCS Strategy Essay Competition. The origins of a coup, with a provocative scenario in year 2012, is attributed to the military being given too many non traditional tasks! The other on National Defence is a masterly analysis of the U.S. defence strategy in the wake of the demise of the Cold War.

All the essays were recognised for this excellence by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff.

An interesting problem posed is negotiating with the enemy particularly with a bigoted enemy. It suggests, opening negotiations when the enemy realises that if he does not agree it would come to a much greater harm.

A book from the U.S. Defence University, which should find a place in all defence libraries.

-- Maj General Partap Narain (Retd) M.A. (Cantab)

Military Ballistics : A Basic Manual. By G.M. Mass and others, *London; Brassey's 1995, p. 215, £ 19.95 (Brassey's Land Warfare Into the 21st Century Series), ISBN 1-85753-084-5.*

In this concise and systematic presentation, the authors have explained the fundamentals of Ballistic Theory for the benefit of scientists and technologists concerned with munition and armament designing as indeed the inquisitive military student.

Besides the internal, intermediary and terminal ballistics, the nature and extent or degree of disruptive effect on the target, leading on to the various armament configurations, design and structure - projected as "Wound Ballistics", and high-speed photography which goes into ballistic research/examination, have made this book a very useful and comprehensive text-book on Ballistics.

— Maj Gen S K Talwar (Retd)

The United Nations At 50 : Recollections. By CV Narasimhan, *New Delhi, Konark, 1996, p. 253, Rs. 295/-, ISBN 81-220-0421-0.*

The United Nations is celebrating its fiftieth anniversary. It has weathered the storms and crisis of half a century and this world body, is still looked upon as a forum where nations of the world, can talk together, perhaps quarrel together, rather than fight against each other.

The achievements of the United Nations are impressive, though not widely acknowledged. During the Cold War period, when the world was close to nuclear annihilation, the UN played an important role in saving mankind from a world war. As far as the two super powers are concerned the war in Korea, later in Vietnam and the Cuban crisis are still fresh in our mind. The UN's role in Congo, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Gaza, Somalia, the Gulf, Rwanda and Bosnia are also well known.

The Cold War is behind us and the threat of nuclear war has receded, but until the complete elimination of all nuclear arsenals is achieved, the danger remains.

The author, Mr. C.V. Narsimhan of the ICS (1937) has been with the UN for 22 years, out of 50 years, of its existence. He has served in the highest echelons of the UN in various capacities. He also has the distinction of serving three secretary - Generals as Chef de Cabinet. Even after retirement in 1978, he continued to be associated with UN till 1993. Thus it would be obvious, that he is an authority on matters, pertaining to UN.

This book contains recollections of his association of 37 years with the UN. It is a personal account, giving glimpses of various personalities and world leaders. It is

replete with human interest, anecdotes and dynamics operating 'behind the scenes' in the building housing the UN on the East River in New York. It is apparent, that the contribution of the author, in the affairs of the UN is praise worthy.

The book is both enlightening and entertaining. It is strongly commended to those interested in international affairs, as well as the general reader.

— Maj Gen Ram Nath, SM

Power, Trade and War. By Edward D. Mansfield, *Princeton, Princeton Univ, 1994, p. 278, ISBN 0-691-04482-1.*

Edward D Mansfield applies the systemic approach to establish the triangular relationship among Power, Trade and War. He takes recourse to the hitherto shied away 'Operations Research' methods in reaching his findings. He examines in detail the determinants and various variants of war. War is a function of international trade, hegemony and concentration, rate of growth of gross national product, military expenditures, military personnel, national population, and distribution of power, polarity and concentration and capabilities. International Relations on a soft strand of diplomacy either resolve the problem or failure to do so may lead to conflict which, if remains unresolved, may lead to violence/war. The author has made a bold and successful attempt to provide an alternative to the subjectivism of the preserve of the Generals, an objective and quantitative analysis of the three most important factors in international interactions.

— Air Cmde SK Bhardwaj (Retd)

The World Aerospace Industry : Collaboration and Competition. By Keith Hayward, *London, Duckworth & RUSI, 1994, p. 225, £ 30.00, ISBN 0-7156-2602-7.*

Since the end of the Cold War, historic developments in restructuring of the aviation industry have taken place. The world aerospace industry generally lags the global economy in cyclic fluctuations being vital in international transport and is an important element of national security. A comprehensive but wide spectrum analysis of the entire industry and its operating environment - its structure, shrinking market, (especially defence), trade rivalry, trends and relations with the states and of states towards interdependence, has been done by Kieth Hayward in this well researched and documented publication.

The book has covered almost all the segments - civil, military and the space industry. The present state of the industry has been depicted as transitory in adjusting itself after shock of demobilisation, post Cold War and the general mood for peace and development all over the world. The issues that have received attention are the transition from aircraft to aerospace and portrayal of the pyramid structure → going down from prime contractors (system integrators). engine manufacturers (oligopolic state with 3-4 majors dominating), a large number of systems and equipment firms, and a huge comets tail of medium and small suppliers. The concept of economy of scale and economy of scope has been aptly advanced.

A number of very important issues have been raised by the author - why do states want an aerospace industry inspite of the fact that upto 1984, jet airliner programmes had accumulated losses upto \$40 bn from sales of \$180 bn and when only four or five programmes have been profitable out of 26 large aircraft endeavours since the early 1950's with seven failing to go beyond the 120 units? Is it, because more than in any sphere of activity, aerospace is a test of strength between states in which each participant deploys his technical and political forces? Further, he has critically appraised the prospects and future directions for the industry especially after the cold war, the existing overcapacity in the civil aviation sector and the question of state support for conversion of the defense aerospace industry in an era of falling defence expenditures in almost all the developed countries and reduced spending on R&D.

The author has made a distinct attempt at presenting the problems and prospects of aerospace industrial linkages as a component of relations between states and how they are viewed in political and economic terms in factors like jobs at home, balance of trade and exchange rates. This probably is due to the author being a Professor in International Relations who has specialised in the aviation industry with a number of publications to his credit. Although his observations are adequately presented in terms of graphs and other data tables, a greater thrust could have been given to the economic aspects of operations and how the industry is driven by this cost-cutting strategy where the operating margins are lower than other investments.

A worthwhile and valuable book for the military or the civil aviation planner or any one engaged in inter-industry comparisons or of international collaborations.

— Capt M S Mamik, IN

Ballistic Missile Proliferation : The Politics and Technics. By Aaron Karp (*SIPRI* : Oxford University, 1996, p. 228, £ 22.00.

A valuable book on the technicalities which go into the making of missiles, it is beautifully and dexterously interwoven with the problems of missile proliferation -- technical and political-and the reasons why such proliferation should be stemmed. The book will be of interest to those who are deeply involved in searching for alternate security sources and who seek to understand the exact value of missiles as an appropriate choice for security purposes.

— Dr Sudha Raman, Ph.D.

Cosmopolitan Democracy : An Agenda for a New World Order. Ed By Daniele Archibugi and David Held, *Cambridge : Polity, 1995, p. 190, £ 11.95 (PB), ISBN 0-7436-1381-0.*

A book containing six essay's by political and social sciences academics from Italy, US and the UK. They all agree that the international political and economic world order, as structured after World War II, has become dysfunctional because of the end of the Cold War.

Most of the arguments relate to a new viable international order as applicable to the US and Europe. Prescriptions on international democracy and reciprocal relations hardly touch on the complex difficulties experienced by the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. There is a suggestion that the UN, suitably structured, can promote a form of international democracy on a basis where citizens instead of governments are representatives of the UN. CAMDUN - Campaign for a more Democratic UN, in the authors view is already a step in this direction. Whether such optimism can become a reality only time will tell.

A book primarily addressed to students of socio-political disciplines.

— Air Marshal K D Chadha,
PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)

Globalization. By Malcolm Waters, *London; Routledge, 1995, p. 185, £ 10.99, ISBN 0-415-10576-5.*

Malcolm Waters has vividly and in a step-by-step manner brought out the transition of individual self into nation-state into the international system of societies and finally into the humanity in general. Globalisation/Worldisation/Universalisation has transcended all the barriers and the entire world is shrinking into a single entity, the 'global village'. World trade, multinational enterprises, organisational ecumenism, floating finance, migrant labour and transnational classes coupled with ever speedier telecommunication and transportation have made it happen. Though not acclaimed yet the germination of the title/idea could be traced back to the ancient sanskrit dictum-*वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्* (the whole world is a family). The book makes an interesting reading and the reader gets so much absorbed that he cannot but help completing it in one sitting.

— Air Cmde S K Bhardwaj (Retd)

Nuclear Weapons After the Comprehensive Test Ban. Implications for Modernization and Proliferation. Ed by Eric Arnett, *Oxford, Oxford Univ. 1996, p. 150, £ 20.00, (SIPRI Pubns), ISBN 0-19-829194-9.*

The book examines the relevance of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban in the post-Cold War era. The CTB which is being negotiated at the conference on Disarmament in Geneva has generated considerable expectations as well as good deal of cynicism. The SIPRI invited Scholars from a dozen countries to focus their study on the effects CTB will have on nuclear programmes and decision-making in the nuclear weapon States, the three nuclear threshold States and non-nuclear weapon States of Proliferation concern, viz., Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya and the DPRK.

The resultant study concludes that some States will indeed maintain their nuclear weapon arsenals and options under the CTB and one or two may even undertake some modernization. However, by and large, the CTB will foreclose a number of technologies to all three groups of countries. Further, the study also concludes, somewhat

optimistically, that the CTB will create a norm against nuclear modernization and strengthen the norm against nuclear proliferation.

As regards the three threshold States - India, Israel and Pakistan - the study concludes that none of these States has shown much interest in nuclear testing and none is thought to be on the verge of important modernization. As a result, CTB will have little effect on their current plans. Interestingly, the study also notes that the Indian military has little interest in the nuclear weapons programme and has not established a formal requirement for nuclear delivery or a strategic bombardment mission. Even if the production of fissile material is terminated, according to a 1993 SIPRI study, India will have produced enough plutonium for 65 to 105 nuclear weapons. Further, unless India moves ahead with fusion weapons, there is no reason for India to test even if it decides to exercise its weapon option.

The Indian contributor, Giri Deshingkar, concludes that relations between India and its hostile neighbours are improving, if not cordial and there is little reason to fear that China or Pakistan could covertly test to India's disadvantage. If they do, India can be confident that they will be watched closely by Russia, the USA and others. There are not many in India today who would agree with this scenario of hope.

According to the SIPRI study, the direct effect of CTB on the five countries of so-called proliferation concern will be negligible because Algeria, Iran, Iraq and Libya are already observing the no-test norm. Only DPRK may have a nuclear weapon to test in future. There may be some indirect effect of the CTB in reassuring these States, but to be fully effective it might require additional international measures.

To sum up, the book confirms that there is prospect of limited nuclear modernization and proliferation in CTB regime. Yet CTB will retain its importance and relevance by meaningfully constraining both.

Arnett agrees that the CTB does not place very effective constraint on the vertical arms race and the failure to follow through with the eventual goal of total elimination will erode the credibility of the NPT and the non-Proliferation regime and the spirit of the CTB negotiations. This publication is an eminently readable volume which is likely to be of interest to all those who are interested in disarmament and comprehensive nuclear test ban issue.

— K K Mitra,
Former Principal Director, DGS

Discourses on Violence : Conflict Analysis Reconsidered. By Vivienne Jabri, *New York : Manchester University, 1996, 204p. £ 14.99, ISBN 07290-39592.*

Vivienne Jabri has written a text for students of war and international relations and for the discerning lay reader keen on a deeper insight into the issue of inter-state violence. It is aptly subtitled 'conflict analysis reconsidered' for it examines discourses on violence in a post-positivist critical perspective.

The thesis presented is that war is institutionalised as a form of social interaction through reproduction by agents acting in a structure that is permissive of war as an acceptable option. Jabri utilises Kiddin's structurationist theory to present her case. To her neither the structuralist explanations as Wallerstein's world system's approach nor reductionist models as Mesquita's 'expected utility theory' are adequate conceptualisations.

Therefore, her resort to structurationist theory in that both agent and structure are implicated in the recursive nature of war as a social phenomenon. The social structure is the arena for the legitimisation, signification and domination of the discourse that favours violence. (Agents, acting in the capacity of their roles, draw on the permissive atmosphere of precedence for role fulfilment, thereby replicating the conditions that reproduce war).

The aim of the study being emancipatory, Jabri concludes with a discussion of the counter-discourse on peace in order that the public space dominated by the hegemonic discourse enabling war is contested.

The subject being vital, the approach academic and the content extensive, the prose is fairly dense. The language, so essential to handling the conceptual tools, is professional. Therefore its exclusivist nature daunts the readership - which of this journal comprises the practitioners of war. Nevertheless, its radical perspective would deepen the understanding of those readers who also consider themselves the wagers of peace.

— Capt Ali Ahamed

The American Revolution. By Colin Bonwick, *Hampshire : Macmillan Education, 1991, p. 336, £ 10.99, ISBN 0-333-37681-1.*

The American Revolution as a historical event has a much wider perspective than just an occurrence which saw the end of English rule over its colonies in the new world. It saw the emergence of not only a unique constitution and Bill of Rights but also a socio-political and socio-economic ferment which shaped the present US political, economic and administrative framework. If class privileges and kinships were the means to political access, there were equally strong egalitarian forces moving society to freedom, liberty and equality.

Readers not familiar with the 19th century American history may find it difficult to assess as to which among the American personalities of the time like Thomas Jefferson, Madison, Washington, Franklin, or John Adams made the greatest contribution towards shaping developments. On the other hand, students of US history will certainly find themselves greatly enriched in this domain from this book.

— Air Marshal K D Chadha
PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)

Leadership Abroad Begins at Home : U.S. Foreign Economic Policy after the Cold War. By Robert J Paarlberg. *Washington DC; The Brooking's Institution, 1995, p. 115, \$ 10.95, ISBN 0-8157-6803-6.*

A book based on the Brooking's Institute Project on integrating national economies. Issues discussed pertain mainly to the dominant position of the US after World War II and the re-orientation it has undergone in relation to the developed countries of the world after the collapse of the Cold War. In the context of international bargaining, preservation of national interest as dictated by deals amongst domestically elected politicians has today become paramount in the US. As a result, in all negotiations on technology, trade practices and agreements, the US today tends to be inwardly looking on internationally focussed issues. Hence many of her best intentioned policies become irrelevant.

A book essentially for mandarins of foreign offices to have an understanding of the internal dynamics that condition U.S. economic policies.

— Air Marshal K D Chadha
PVSM, AVSM, VM(Retd)

Maelstrom : The United States, Southern Europe and the Challenges of the Mediterranean, *Cambridge: The World Peace Foundation, 1995, p. 249 \$ 36.95 (HC) \$ 15.95 (Pb), ISBN 0-8157-3718-1.*

Maelstrom is the by-product of a conference held in Lisbon on 15-16 Oct, 1993. The authors, including the Editor, are all authoritative analysts & scholars, belonging to different regions and countries, who took part in the discussions and contributed substantially in the final outcome of the conference. The discussions focussed on the regional problems emerging out of developmental and democratic activities in the erstwhile totalitarian, feudal, repressive, poverty stricken, under-developed North/West African/Middle East countries vis-a-vis southern Europe & American interests in the fast changing geographic realities. In a broad sweep the area covered is from Europe to western China.

The problems of common security, revised role of NATO, incongruous perception of common problems & mutual interests defy quick & acceptable decisions. The scientific & technological advancements may bridge many gaps but do not abridge the perennial problems of mistrust, pride, poverty, domination, historical hostility/rivalry & recurring conflicts. The authors have valiantly discussed these problems & suggested possible solutions & alternatives, projecting various viewpoints, protecting various vested interests, even at the cost of 'MIGHT IS RIGHT' or simply suggesting might not be wrong while considering trans-Atlantic options for southern Europe.

The book is an excellent compilation of broad spectrum views, reviews of problems & remedies.

— Air Vice Marshal S S Malhotra
AVSM, VM (Retd)

Bridging the Non-Proliferation Divide : The United States and India. Ed by Francine P. Frankel, *New Delhi Konark, 1995, p. 410, Rs. 450/-, ISBN 81-220-0415-6.*

This book is a compilation of studies from a seminar discussing US-Indian differences over the NPT (Non Proliferation Treaty 1970). Though both countries have a common goal of nuclear disarmament they have extremely different approaches based on their national interests and imperatives. These papers were discussed after prior circulation; then modified to incorporate the results before publication. They cover a wide range of pragmatic issues, the "realpolitik", the technology the, differences and possible convergence of policy and action between two countries which have had official, scientific and technological cooperation for more than 35 years. The papers are classified and grouped covering a vast range of ideas, concepts and suggestions providing a thorough background to the main issues and a positive approach to future action; it is a balanced comprehensive source for study of the NPT, the CTBT, the MTCR and throws much light on what is happening in the current discussions between nations.

The USA has gained success for the NPT in most places and now considers India as the major stumbling block to what are internationally accepted NP norms, China and North Korea included. Overlooked is past experience of arms control and disarmament agreement when nations still did what they thought was in their current interests and again unconsidered are scientific opinions that technology is slipping away from mans control and "non-nation" states can get nuclear/biochemical weapons for use in internal conflicts or even export for terrorism. UN performance in conflicts all over the world certainly does not inspire confidence that it can as yet handle states and "non-states" which defy the world community. The US policy that any body who disagrees with the international NPT is a "rogue state", against world peace, and should be subject to US economic or even military muscle is itself suspect.

A book for serious study.

—Tindi

Builders and Fighters : US Army Engineers in World War II. Ed by Barry W. Fowle. *Virginia : Office of History. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 1992, p. 529.*

US Army Engineer responsibilities in peace and war cover all major construction including dams, floods and river control, power houses, bases, dockyards, airfields both within the US and wherever needed to support deployment overseas. All this needed more than 600,000 engineer troops with thousands of Corps civilians and hundreds of contractors. It is not possible to describe all the work done during the war: this history takes the form of a series of essays on selected events, representative of many others left out for want of space though equally valuable in contribution to a staggering engineer achievement. The essays are grouped under main heads of Mobilisation, Construction, Research and Development, Civil Works, and finally Combat Engineering. The last is the vital and ultimate task for which all others exist but in quantum and variety it is outstripped by the enormous organisational and physical

work required behind the battle zones to make possible the success of combat engineers. This book spreads far and wide, recalling forgotten achievements such as the first highway to Alaska, the Ledo road, rail route to supply Russia through the Gulf, the construction of heavy bomber airfields, and many (at that time) unique examples of engineer ingenuity, determination, and just plain sweat and blood.

There are a number of photographs, charts, diagrams and references to further sources with each essay. Altogether an excellent commemorative record.

— Tindi

The War of American Independence 1775-1783 by Stephen Conway, *London : Edward Arnold, 1995, p. 280, £ 12.99, ISBN 0-340-57626 X (Pb).*

The author examines in great detail the causes of the conflict leading to American War of Independence from no American Legislative representation in the House of Commons London, to levy of multifarious taxes justified or otherwise, to making executive branch all powerful, to Boston Massacre of 5th March 1770 by the unprovoked British Army on a peaceful civil crowd, to enacting laws threatening American liberty. British politician's determination not to make any substantial concessions to the insubordinate colonies precipitated open defiance and consequent war. The effects of American Civil War reverberated in Caribbean, European, African and Indian Theaters relating to British, French, Spanish and Dutch Powers.

American War of Independence has also been called the forerunner of the French Revolution starting in 1789 and heralding "liberty, equality and fraternity". Till the commencement of American War of Independence, wars were fought for monarchical and oligarchical interests. But this war was fought for ideals involving the entire population. The author, therefore, calls this war not the last of the old order but the first of the new order involving political, economic, social, financial, diplomatic and global dimensions. A new interpretation altogether.

— Maj Gen J N Goel (Retd)

Soviet Policies in the Middle East from World War-II to Gorbachev. By Galia Golan, *Cambridge : Cambridge Univ, 1990, p. 319, £ 10.95 (PB), ISBN 0-521-358590.*

Post World War II decades project a complex collage of power play between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Initially, while building up her naval and nuclear capability, Russia posed multipronged diplomacy to the threat of containment by the imperialist bloc and later adopting a more aggressive posture in the Middle East and Afghanistan, in the post Suez crisis period.

Professor Galia Golan has critically examined the development of Russian strategy and consequent policies in the Mid-East. She has thus placed, Russia's concern, initially with access to the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean, her support to Sadat, even Israel, and Syria and Khomeini's Iran in historic perspective. An interesting feature of

the review of U.S.S.R. policy is the changing perceptions of Russian leadership from Stalin-Khrushchev era to Brezhnev and finally Gorbachev.

Galia Golan's book is a useful study of the whys and wherefores of policy formulation in the U.S.S.R. during the Cold-War period.

— Maj Gen S K Talwar (Retd)

The International Politics of Russia and the Successor States. By Mark Webber, *New York : Manchester University, 1996, p. 366, £ 14.99, ISBN 0-7190-3961-4.*

The years 1990s witnessed tremendous changes in international politics; like the collapse of communism as an ideology, end of cold war, down-gradation of the Soviet Union from a super power status, its subsequent demise and emergence of fifteen successor sovereign states each imbued with distinctive national identity. These independent States are interdependent and thus vulnerable to possible exercise of leverage by each other. The historical legacy of Tsarist imperialism, Soviet communism and naming of successor States by Russia as 'near abroad' does breed-in suspicions amongst these States while dealing with Russia. The future of minorities in certain successor States has led to conflict rather than co-operation amongst States.

Political amicability, geographic proximity, economic complementarity and a shared perception that cooperation is necessary to overcome a common predicament play a major role in shaping the foreign policy of a country. This book focuses on foreign policy of these successor States both amongst themselves and also with outside major countries. The author analyses the various unsolved/half solved problems of these States like nuclear arsenal, distribution and management of conventional weapons and equipment of defence forces, the domestic economic predicament and its subsequent efforts at revival. The emergence and perpetuation of new found nationalism, regionalism and religious affinity/inclinations are also focused upon. The place of Russia, unique by itself, inheriting all the rights, obligations and debts of erstwhile USSR as a 'Continuer State' is well documented.

An interesting book for students of international politics interested in specialization in successor states to the former USSR.

— Maj Gen J N Goel

The Solzhenitsyn Files : Secret Soviet Documents Reveal one Man's Fight Against The Monolith. Ed by Michael Scammell *Edition I, INC USA : Chingo, 1995, p. 472, \$ 29.95, ISBN 883695-06-6.*

This book is a collection of formerly classified Soviet documents regarding Solzhenitsyn, analyzing his writings, orchestrating disinformation campaign against him and his final expulsion.

It brings out that despite KGB's momentous efforts and use of the State machin-

ery, Solzhenitsyn was not only able to publish all his novels, short stories and plays but was able to publish the *Gulag Archipelago* abroad.

These documents provide a record of one of the most significant episodes in continuing conflict between political power and normal principles that has been fought out in many countries. The documents have been arranged in strict chronological order to enable the reader to form his own judgement easily.

Solzhenitsyn was caught up in a major change of political policy that had nothing to do with him personally but was a consequence of the Brezhnev regime's determination to change direction of reforms started by Khrushchev. Solzhenitsyn represented the best hopes and aspirations of the liberal intelligentsia and of that progressive element in Soviet society that had backed Khrushchev's reforms.

The fascinating thing about the documents is that they confirm Solzhenitsyn's political hostility and his love of conspiratorial methods and the fact that KGB was aware of all the things well before anyone ever suspected. In fact, it appears like a personal duel between the writer and Andropov, the KGB Chief. The Soviet machinery was indecisive about his expulsion and even within the politburo Shchelokov disputed Andropov's approach to Solzhenitsyn and dissident writers. However, many of the documents concern brainwashing of the public with government's version of events. It was a means both of softening up public opinion to prepare it for stricter measures and of reassuring the Politburo that they were moving in the right direction.

This book presents for the first time in English, files kept by the Soviets on Solzhenitsyn and allows one to understand the life, importance and struggle against state oppressions of one of the most important writers of the East block.

— Cdr S Kulshrestha, IN

China After Deng Xiaoping : The Power Struggle in Beijing since Tiananmen.
By Willy Wo-Lap Lam, *Singapore, John Wiley, 1995, p. 497, \$ 34.95, ISBN 0-471-13114-8.*

Much has been written about the tremendous economic growth and material advancement under Deng's Socialist Market Economy in China. Many in the West feel that China is already an economic Super Power and was on its way towards becoming a military one.

Willy Wo - Lap Lam, who has unprecedented reach and unparalleled knowledge on the parleys in the inner conclaves of the Chinese Communist Party, is not too sure whether the Chinese political framework is compatible with the socio-economic changes taking place in Chinese society. There are many ideologues who question Deng's thesis that market mechanisms are not synonymous with capitalism or in contradiction with Socialist Planned Economy. In practice, according to the author, Deng's axioms have led to a brood of princelings - sons, daughters, in-laws of party big wigs who today are raking in millions by the day. Corruption is so rampant that checks and balances for restraint have only led to preservation of privilege. The Army has built large business empires and is the main cause of corruption.

The author says that China's prosperity is superficial as problems of unemployment remain unresolved. Labour surplus in rural areas is of the order of 200 million with an underground migrant work force of 60 million which is placing an unbearable strain on urban areas.

Finally, the author questions whether the efficiency of a police state is really compatible with free market economic development. The communication revolution has made a large section of the Chinese population aware of the global village and no amount of surveillance and repression can prevent its liberating influence. Another repeat of Tiananmen Square could well lead to an economic collapse and attempts to maintain Communist Party's monopoly on power could result in brutal blood-baths.

A book of great scholarship which is a must for those who want to understand what Chinese present day reality is.

— Air Marshal K D Chadha
PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)

The Taming of the Samurai : Honorific Individualism and the Making of Modern Japan. By Eiko Ikegami, *London, Harvard Univ 1995, p. 428, £ 35.95, ISBN 0-674-86808-0.*

Many of us had great respect for Japanese soldiers during World War II. Exemplary discipline, blind obedience to superiors, militant stoicism, disregard for life even searching for death, seemed to represent a somewhat strange culture to other Asians, themselves inured to hardship and death as a routine part of life. The author delves deeply into the Samurai of Japan with historical analysis and comment to evolve their impact on Japanese society and individuals as they developed from the tenth to the twentieth century. Her research shows how changes begun as far back as the 11th century gradually developed a society incorporating the tamed Samurai into the state system side by side with the more cultured, the aristocrats and land owners ultimately creating the modern society which could lose a devastating war and yet win the peace that followed it. The extreme violence and death cult of the Samurai began to change centuries earlier though above all else the sense of honour persisted. The Bushido philosophy expressing the ethics and way of the Samurai was deliberately adopted by pre-WWII militarists as a code for the armies; not just as death cult but also for its devotion to Public good, vassal-master relationship, and above all honour in service; all these made the Japanese combatant a formidable foe uniquely different to Western armies. But this did not reflect Japanese society as a whole where the state had centuries earlier controlled such violence. It is ironic that the book "Hagakure" embodying the philosophy of Bushido was written by a "tamed" Sumari bureaucrat about the year 1710, a man who never saw combat but dreamt and longed for the Samurai three centuries before him. A heavy book of much interest to those who wish to learn more about this fascinating society.

— Tindi

The Way of the Heavenly Sword : The Japanese Army in the 1920's. By Leonard A. Humphreys, *California, Stanford Univ, 1995, p. 252, £ 27.50, ISBN 08047 23753*

Meiji era marked the modernisation of the Japanese army on the West European lines with the dual purpose of protecting the island nation against the external threat of Western imperialism and internal revolts which paid rich dividends in quelling the Samurai revolt of 1877 and in winning the wars against China (1894-5) and the Russo-Japanese war (1904-5). The Meiji System disintegrated during the second decade of the twentieth century (1919-1929) because of its replacement by the Confucian ideal that embodied the entire nation as a great family working in harmony as one to ensure the preservation of state, its Emperor, its people and its collective values and the military conclusions by seizing the necessary resources to survive from already failed neighbours and winning a war against materially superior enemies by indoctrinating its troops with the psychological armour of unyielding spirit. The situation during the decade was further compounded by the intra-army and inter-army feuds due to the economic (end of wartime prosperity) and natural calamities (1923 earthquake) and the economic discontent among the bottom rung of the army leadership. Needless to say, these conclusions were not always rational.

A well researched and in-depth study of the Japanese army in the twenties of the twentieth century heightening its value and realism because the bases inter alia are the interviews of the principal actors of the Japanese army - the top, medium and the bottom strata of the Army leadership and the service officer background of the author. The book is recommended to all staff officers and army policy makers.

— Air Cmde S K Bhardwaj (Retd)

Images of Oliver Cromwell : Essays for and by Roger Howell Jr. Ed by R. C. Richardson, *Manchester; Manchester Univ, 1993, p. 231, £ 35.00, ISBN 0 7190 2503 6.*

Is this book, Oliver Cromwell has once again been 'exhumed' to be applauded and also reviled by twelve scholars of English history. While some rank him as one of the best British soldiers, others brand him 'imp of Satan'. No wonder, Cromwell was a model for modern dictators - both Hitler and Mussolini had his portrait in their respective offices. His 'wart' notwithstanding, Cromwell because of his personal leadership has made a niche in military annals. A book which will interest all anglophiles.

— Lt Col Daljit Singh (Retd)

Bombs and Barbed Wire : My War in the RAF and in Stalag Laft III. By Geoffrey Willatt, *Kent : Para Press, 1995, p. 128, £ 15.28, ISBN 1-898594-16-3.*

During World War II, the collapse of Germany was hastened by strategic bombing by the RAF. Large cities were reduced to rubble, thus affecting the will of the Germans for continuing the war. The RAF paid a heavy price for it, losing numerous bombers, with its crew members.

Geoffrey Willatt was a crew member, involved in strategic bombing. On the

night of 5/6 September 1943, his aircraft was shot down. Seven members were killed but Geoffrey miraculously escaped and was taken prisoner. Subsequently he escaped, to tell the tale. It is written after 50 years of the events and mostly based on memory. His days in prison, planning and execution of his escape, is however based on a diary, which he maintained in prison.

An interesting book, the only one, written by the 85 year old author, now living in Kent.

— Maj Gen Ram Nath, SM

Intelligence and Imperial Defence : British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire 1904-1924. By Richard J. Popplewell, *London, Frank Cass, 1995, p. 354, £ 40.00, ISBN 0-7146-4580X (Cloth), ISBN 0-7146-4227-4 (Paper)*

The book is concerned with the threat to the British Indian Empire during the period 1904-1924 on London and India based British intelligence operations. As the human tendency is to laud the successful, the failed Indian revolutionaries during this period were hardly given any attention. Historically, they paled into insignificance, not able to make any sizable dent in the mighty and burgeoning British Empire as they were countered by the intricate intelligence global network, starting from London and India to the Americas, Europe, the East and the Far East. Even at its peak, the intelligence network was organised at low key mainly because of the proclivities and sensitivities of the British people for public opinion at home and in the Indian Empire as well.

The fascinating aspect is that the origin of the intelligence organisation in India is traceable to the Thugee and Dakaiti Department in India which curiously was started when a bunch of sepoys going on leave disappeared mysteriously and did not return. Amusingly, the misgivings about the origin of Indian National Congress as the brain-child of the British Indian Intelligence have also been dispelled.

The author has carried out a comprehensive research which has been well documented, well referred and well bibliographed.

— Air Cmde S K Bhardwaj (Retd)

Strategic Views from the Second Tier : The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain and China. Ed By John C. Hopkins and Xeixing Hu, *New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1995, p. 277, £ 13.95, ISBN 1-56000-790-7.*

A product of the Research Conference sponsored by the University of California, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, June 1993 - this book helps to explicate, in an incisive manner, the real dimension of security perceptions of each of these countries vis-a-vis the other nuclear power. It also explains what went into the making of nuclear weapons' policies independent of the analysis of the other power's nuclear policies. A commendable book well written by accomplished writers.

— Dr Sudha Raman, Ph.D.

Breaching Fortress Europe. By Sid Berger, *Iowa Kendall Hunt Pub, 1994, p. 272, ISBN 0-8403-9516-2.*

This is a blow by blow account of combat engineer operations during the Normandy beach landings. Little known is that 50 per cent of the first US forces to land on OMAHA and UTAH beaches were engineers. Berger, a specialist in mines and demolitions led a reconnaissance unit while serving in the 1st Engineer Amphibian Brigade. His experience and understanding of this first punch into the Atlantic Wall gives his well researched record unusual realism and interest. Though he gives priority to accuracy over human interest preferring official records to oral history, the large number of photographs, quotations from individuals and other records, maps, diagrams and sketches make this a very lively and readable story of ordinary humans, everywhere doing what had to be done even when it seemed impossible. The result is a detailed authentic account starting from preliminary organisation and training going on to execution and the final exit from the beaches. It is well worth study by professional soldiers and for general readers interested in unusual operations of war.

—Tindi

The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire. Ed by P. J. Marshall, *Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. 1996, p. 400, £ 24.95, ISBN 052143211 (HC)*

Many more of us would read history with pleasure and understanding if all books were as well presented as this review of the British Empire and its impact on the modern world. With the benefit of hindsight, the authors and editor are able to record, analyse, assess and comment on events and their consequences. Their approach is in the present day context : a balanced assessment with a wealth of critical opinion, covering modern ideas of sovereignty, power, authority, freedom, education, art and human relations. The book is interesting for the general reader but also an authoritative record and judgement for the serious student. We perceive the slow change, from earlier beginnings to a period when powerful British traders sought mutual profits in accommodation and adjustment with local rulers, going on to the repeated use of force and coercion in order to maintain a dominant ruling position over subordinate "inferior" peoples for their own good at considerable human cost to the "altruistic" Empire builders. And finally collapse and change from Empire to Commonwealth under the impact of modern revolutionary ideas of universal freedom as a basic human right.

The book is superbly presented with well selected illustrations, maps, data and exquisite print. The authors have certainly succeeded in putting across the Imperial Experience and its influence on our modern world not the least was to make English "as she is spoke" the major mass communication medium in this civilisation of science, technology and universal trade.

—Tindi

Armageddon, the Second World War. By Clive Ponting, *London Sinclair Stevensen, 1995, pp. 312, £ 20.00, ISBN 1 85619 4787.*

This book deals with the various aspects of the Second World War other than

the conduct of military operations, the turning of a limited European conflict when Germany attacked Poland in September 1939 into a global war involving virtually the entire world barring a handful of neutrals. The emergence of coalition and alliances gearing up of economies and industries by nations to fight the war and various other aspects of the Second World War are covered in considerable detail supported by relevant facts and figures.

The author has very lucidly brought out the impact which the war had on certain populations which for the first time suffered over three times as many casualties in terms of people killed than service personnel. Besides casualties suffered by civilians in combat zones many civilians died due to effects of the war like the 1943-44 famine in Bengal in which 3 million people starved to death due to the rejection by the British Government of the Indian Government's request to allow import of foodgrains by reallocating shipping space. There was also the killing of Jews in ghettos and German concentration camps.

How the war brought about a change in the power balance resulting in the USA and USSR emerging as the two major powers after the war and the winding down of colonial empires is well described. Great Britain, one of the global powers before the war was reduced to just a European nation with strained economy.

The author has devoted a great deal of time and effort to painstaking research on which the great deal of factual and statistical information included in the book is clearly based.

Armageddon is a very readable book. Despite the wide area covered by it in considerable detail it is not heavy to read and the author's style constantly props the reader's interest.

-- Brig R D Law (Retd)

Lebanon : Fire and Embers : A History of the Lebanese Civil War. By Dilip Hiro, London, Weidenfeld, 1993, p. 274, £ 25.00, ISBN 0-297-82116-4

Lebanon is unique in the Arab world. It is the only member of the Arab League with a Christian President. It gives official recognition to sixteen Christian, Islamic and other religious sects. Lebanon has a history of bloody feuding between Christians and Muslims.

Though the country, managed to build up an image of peace and harmony after the First World War, in reality, things were different. It became apparent with the outbreak of a civil war in May 1975. It lasted three months, but was a forerunner to the longer and bloodier conflict, which followed seventeen years later.

This book gives an account of the 1975-90 civil war. It begins with a historical background to the war and the main narrative is divided into two parts; pre 1982, Israel invasion and after.

The author, born in the sub continent, was educated in India, England and the USA. He is a free lance journalist, settled in London and specialises in subjects pertaining to the Middle East. He has a number of books to his credit, including *The Second Gulf War* and *Desert Shield to Desert Storm*.

-- Maj Gen Ram Nath, SM (Retd)

The Middle East after Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait. Ed by Robert O Freedman, Gainesville, University Press of Florida, 1993, p. 373, £ 17.95, ISBN 0-8130-1214-7

Strategically located, the Middle East has been one of the most volatile regions on the globe, and assumed greater significance when it became the principal source of oil supply to the world. Therefore, by invading Kuwait on August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein delivered a devastating blow to the entire world by disturbing the established order of the Middle East and economic order of the world.

Saddam Hussein was forced to attack and annex Kuwait by the domestic problems and foreign policy concerns. The huge foreign debt estimated by end 1989 at \$ 90 billion due to eight year long war with Iran, precipitated an economic crisis in Iraq. Annexation solved many problems. First, Kuwait was a quick source of food, consumer goods and cash for hard pressed Iraqi economy. Second, it doubled Iraq's oil reserves as it now controlled 20 percent of the world's oil reserves. Thirdly, the occupation and subsequent troop deployment on Saudi Arabia's borders ended pressure to demobilize the million strong Iraqi army. Finally, Kuwait gave Iraq strategic access to the Persian Gulf. Unfortunately for Iraq, these were to be only short term gains, far outweighed by the losses suffered during Operation Desert Storm, five and one-half months later.

The crisis in the Gulf affected more than the regional players alone. Each one of the chapters of this book deals with a particular facet of the aftermath of the Gulf War written by an expert on the subject. The book covers four main areas; the military and political dynamics of the Gulf War; the policy of external powers; the gulf region and the eastern Mediterranean. The purpose has been to focus on various issues involved and thus must be studied by all students of military history for a thorough understanding of the Gulf War.

— Major General Prem K Khanna, MVC(Retd)

The Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq. By Eliezer Tauber, Essex, Frank Cass, 1995, p. 417, £ 30.00, ISBN 0-7146-4557-5.

Prior to the First World War, Syria and Iraq were part of the Ottoman Empire. Initially, it had declared its neutrality but later joined the Central Powers on August 2, 1914, after the war had broken out. When in October, two German ships under the German-Ottoman banner attacked the Black Sea ports, Russia, France and England declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The whole region saw active hostilities till the end of the war.

With the Allies in occupation of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the war, there

was a strong desire by the inhabitants of the Fertile Crescent whether Syrians, Lebanese or Iraqis to achieve independence for their fatherland. The Arab nation split itself into three ideological streams: the Arab movement for a single Arab State of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire; a Syrian movement for a greater Syria to include Mount Lebanon, Palestine and trans Jordan and a Lebanese movement for an independent Lebanon. Two years later, Iraqis too wanted to carve an independent state of their own.

This book covers the transformation in the political parties and societies which took place in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq as also the history of the first stage of the formation of these states after the First World War. It gives a detailed history of the power struggle within the Ottoman Empire for the creation of Syria and Iraq. The analysis which proves that in the post World War I scenario, national ideas prevailed over the general Arab idea, is based on a thorough research by the learned author. An ideal book for students of political history of the Middle East.

— Major General Prem K. Khanna, MVC (Retd)

The Palestinian Refugee Problem. By Shlomo Gazit, *Tel Aviv Univ, JCSS, 1995*, p. 36, \$ 12.95, ISBN 1-878379-321

A short but comprehensive analysis of the Palestinian refugee problem, the study under review by Maj Gen Shlomo Gazit is part of the published series by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University. The author has presented systematically the existing refugee problem and the different view points of the Palestinians, Israelis and Americans on the probable solutions to it. It is rather interesting to read the arguments of Gen Gazit which outrightly reject the existing Israeli view of the "right of return of Palestinians" to Israeli territory. The study on the other hand spells out other options for the return of the refugees. The author has advocated for a bilateral Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement that should not be restricted to written statement or document alone but should place emphasis on implementation. The study is concluded on a cautious note and goes on to say that 'no genuine, fundamental and lasting settlement of the Israeli - Palestinian conflict is possible without a comprehensive resolution of the refugee problem'. A well researched study, it is highly recommended to be studied by negotiators who are involved in the peace - process between Israel and Palestine and also by those who are linked with the refugee issues.

— Major (Dr) Sunil Chandra, PhD

Whither Israel? the Domestic Challenges. Edited by Keith Kyle and Joel Peters, *London; The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993*, p 292, £ 39-50, ISBN 1-85043-868-4

This book is a collection of thirteen scholastic essays written by highly qualified research scholars, specialists and academicians on Israel encompassing political, social, economic and diplomatic dimensions. The concept of "Greater Land of Israel" based on confrontation with Arab States gradually gave way to a path of peace, compromise, and co-existence with Palestinians. The problems of Israeli Arabs

numbering 80,000 i.e. fifth of the total population of Israel have been highlighted in correct perspective and much is to be done to ameliorate their sufferings. If Israeli Arabs unite then they can have a formidable political say by winning at least fourteen seats out of one hundred and twenty in Knesset because of proportional representation.

The status of women in Israel except for a few luminaries is as deplorable and pitiable as in any other developing country. The vexing question of 'captured territories in 1967' evokes reasoned, emotional and at times hysterical reactions from the Jews. The ideologues of Zionism will have to compromise on the principle of "negation of exile" and accept that Diaspora can exist socially and culturally in both oriental and occidental environment and Jews do not perforce have to migrate to the "forgotten land".

The million dollar question is whether real and long term peace between Israel and Palestinian State as and when formed/Arab States will become a reality or remain a mirage ? A thought provoking book.

— Maj Gen J N Goel (Retd)

Syria and Iran : Rivalry and Cooperation. By Hussein J. Ahga and Ahmad, S Khalidi, London : Pinter, 1995, p 126, £ 22.50, ISBN 1-85567-235-9

Even in modern times, religious affinity, ethno-cultural identity and arcane beliefs do form the bed-rock of political, economic and foreign relations amongst nations. And this is what happened between Syria and Iran because of Shia card in the 1970s.

The book traces the cementing of relations between Syria and Iran since 1979. Mostly because of mutual necessity, coincidence of national interests and achievement of strategic motives like defeat of Iraq, marginalisation of Israel, denial of a place in the sun for Palestinians keeping Lebanon in Syria's area of influence, and inter se flow of arms and equipment. The tensions also arose over pursuit of war in Lebanon, Iran-Contra affair, Syrian alleged involvement in 1986 in an attempt to blow up an Israeli airliner and taking of US hostages by Iran till released in 1991.

The authors have analysed the ups and downs, the rivalry and cooperation and margins of manoeuvrability in politico-strategic environment in the Gulf between Syria and Iran and their effect on Israel and other Arab countries. A very readable and interesting book.

— Maj Gen J N Goel (Retd)

Flying Under Two Flags : An Ex-RAF Pilot in Israel's War of Independence. By Gordon Levett, Oregon : Frank Cass, 1994, p. 284, £ 16.00, ISBN 0 7146 4102 2

This is the autobiography of a Royal Air Force officer who served with the air forces of two countries, the other being Israel.

Levett, born in the poor section of London, joined the RAF as an airman fitter. His work was noticed and his request for pilots training was granted, a rarity for LACs.

He passed with flying colours and was selected for commission, rather than a Sergeant Pilot. Unfortunately for him, he never saw action during the Second World War as he was continuously employed as a flying training instructor, first in the UK and then in Canada. By the time he was posted to Burma, the Japanese had surrendered. He ended the war there as a Squadron Leader, was court martialled for being AWOL, and left the RAF. He was broke.

It was lucky for Levett that when Israel was born a UN sponsored arms embargo was placed on it. It enabled him to join the rag tag team of flyers from all over the world in smuggling aircraft and gun running from the USA, the UK and from USSR from a base in Czechoslovakia. He had some hair-raising escapes delivering dismantled Me 109s, guns and bombs to the Israeli Air Force (IAF). He was never a mercenary, drawing official pay from the IAF. This led to his joining the IAF where he commanded the transport squadron as a Lieutenant Colonel. Before the end of the war he saw action flying Me 109s, Spitfires and Mustangs. He was lucky enough not to engage RAF aircraft, coming very close to it.

After this experience he shifted over to ferrying aircraft all over the world including six trips through India ferrying Spitfires from Israel to Burma. He was exceptionally well treated by the Indian Air Force while in transit. This was surprising considering that India had not recognized Israel.

This is a fascinating story extremely well written. It has a foreword by his friend, Ezer Weizman, the President of Israel. It is a welcome addition to the library.

-- Cdr S Varma, SC IN (Retd)

A Nation in Turmoil : Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1937-1958. By Yunas Samad, *New Delhi, Sage Publications, 1995, ISBN 81-7036-442-6*

The author, a lecturer in Sociology and Director of the Masters Programme in Race Relations at the University of Bradford also an Associate Fellow of the Rhodes Chair of Race Relations Oxford, University, is well qualified to author a book on Islamic Studies.

The book goes into details of the internal ethnic problems of an Islamic state from the time of partition till 1958. It was proved time and again that Pakistan as a sovereign state was not a stable entity, the Muslim League being a loose amalgam of the elite and popular forces, proved incapable of fulfilling its historic role as authoritarian role had become the lietmotif of Pakistan politics. The alleged monolithic unity of Muslims was shown to be false when Anjuman-i-Islam demanded the extension of separate electorate for Sunnis to maintain their distinction from the Shias and Ahmediyas and were declared heretics and Zaffar-ullah was removed from the Government.

A useful book for study by policy makers and citizens who like to keep abreast of the problems of our neighbour and its socio-economic development and how it affects India.

-- Brig Y P Dev (Retd)

NDC Papers 1/94 : Science & Technology, New Delhi, National Defence College, 1994, p. 87, Rs. 55/-.

A compilation of six papers of which, only one-Policy of R&D — is by NDC — Integrated Analysis Group. It stresses the need for upgrading of technology to improve productivity.

It starts with a critique of the Govt. Draft Technology Policy. Of the present personnel strength of 310,000, only 35 per cent are engaged in R & D. Population-wise number of people so employed is low. The DRDO - spends 27 per cent of the total. Suggestions include :-

R & D is part of R&DE, it should concentrate on development and engineering rather than research. Linkage with user and industry is essential. At least 30 per cent of R&D funding should be related to Industry specified projects.

It is hoped that the NDC will be better educated in future and keep up the effort.

— Maj Gen Partap Narain (Retd)

Kashmir : Global Untruths Exploded : The UN Resolutions That Never Were. By Dina Nath Raina, *New Delhi: Reliance, 1996, p. 74, Rs. 100/-, ISBN 81-7510-041-9*

After two of his best sellers - *Unhappy Kashmir* and *Kashmir; Distortions and Reality*, Dinanath Raina has come out with a reality to which we had paid no attention so far. The reality was lost to the world and irrelevant issues came to the fore. The foreign powers particularly the USA, have been following a two-faced policy from the very start -- the appointment of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). Instead of entertaining the Commission with its terms of reference and refusing to allow it to visit Kashmir, we relented under pressure. The Commission was confronted with a reality that Pakistan army was fighting in Kashmir.

The Commission went back to Geneva and adopted a resolution in August 1948 and another one in January 1949. None of these were UN Security Council resolution but ever since these have been taken as UN resolutions which they are not. The report was never adopted. Instead of being a complainant seeking justice from the UN for Pakistani aggression, India is in the dock at the alter of power politics. Initial follies sometimes prove very costly.

-- Lt Col Gautam Sharma (Retd)

Uniform Civil Code and Gender Justice. By Dinanath Raina, *New Delhi; Reliance, 1996, p. 136, Rs. 150/-, ISBN 81-7510-0419.*

Uniform Civil Code is the demand of all forward looking sections of society which is also one of the requirements of the Preamble of the Constitution. The

Supreme Court has also laid emphasis on this and directed the government to initiate measures in this direction. This essential and healthy approach is hindered by a limited few fundamentalists who cite man-made laws, tradition and a wrong interpretation of the scriptures. The so-called religious heads and some political leaders, who have no contact with national requirements have narrow ends in view with the result that social justice is denied to women and children -- an important segment of our social system.

The author maintains that this was done to make domination and chauvinism with the result that theocracy will get the upper hand, inspite of the provisions of the Constitution which lays down that: "Nothing in this Article shall prevent the state from making any special provision for women and children".

The last chapter on Uniform Civil Code and National Unity highlights this aspect and examines the problem in detail. Figures of the 1991 census on various states are cited to emphasise this point and show a high growth rate of some minorities as compared to others. The author rightly asserts that it is high time the majority and minority labels are given a decent burial.

— Lt Col Gautam Sharma (Retd)

Kashmir, 1947 : Rival Versions of History. By Prem Shankar Jha, *Delhi : Oxford Univ, 1996, p. 149, Rs. 275.00, ISBN 19563266-6*

The Kashmir dispute has filled hearts and minds in the subcontinent for fifty years. Truth and facts have been masked by emotion; issues have been confused by personal bias founded on assumed religious, moral, and human rights. Release of documents into the Public Domain have added to the vast mass of opinions claimed as expert and authentic. Many of us who were serving at the time of partition with direct personal experience of these eventful years are quite confounded by questions like whether Kashmir's accession to India was under duress; whether the Tribal and Pakistan Army ingress in 1947-48 was support for an internal uprising or an invasion; whether the present terrorist battles are an internal uprising or an invasion by militants from Pakistan. We even have a scholar who now attributes the accession itself to some grand British design executed during the partition of their Indian Empire.

Jha presents a brief study with journalistic precision and scholarly research. He aims to separate scholarship from polemics leaving the final conclusions to readers. He relies almost entirely on documents available for years, supporting his factual statements with later documents and interviews. Possibly, he tends to be over meticulous, in true scholarly spirit, but he certainly succeeds in presenting a cold record of events without personal bias of interpretation, inference or mind set. This is indeed a most timely study scraping away to the bared facts concealed behind years of deliberate and inadvertant camouflage. It is well worth study by all concerned with this major issue which may well lead to yet another war with Pakistan.

-- Tindi

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending September 1996

(The books reviewed in April to June 1996 issue have been added to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)

<i>Ser No.</i>	<i>Author's Name</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Year</i>
Biography			
1.	McAleese, Peter.	No Mean Soldier: The Story of the Ultimate Progressional soldier in the SAS and other Forces	1993
2.	Jayal, Brijesh Dhar Air Marshal (Retd)	Of Mandarins and Martyrs	1996
Confidence Building			
3.	Krepon, Michael & Sevak Amit	Crisis Prevention : Confidence Building and Reconciliation in South Asia	1996
Indian Economic Policy			
4.	Qasim, S.Z.M. & Roomwal GS Ed.	India's Exclusive Economic Zone Resources Exploitation Management	1996
5.	Chelliah, Raja J	Towards Sustainable Growth : Essays in Fiscal and Financial Sector Reforms in India	1996
India-Foreign Policy			
6.	Kapur, Ashok	The Foreign Policy of India and Her Neighbours	1996
India-History			
7.	Talbot, Lan	Khizr Tiwana the Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India	1996
8.	Naravane, MS (Dr)	Battles of Medieval India (A D 1295 - 1850)	1996

India-Strategy

9. Raghvan, VR
Lt Gen (Retd) India's Need for Strategic Balance :
Security in the Post-Cold War World 1996

Indian Ocean

10. Chandra, Satish(ed) The Indian Ocean Explorations in
History: Commerce and Politics 1987
11. Ray, Himanshu Prabha Tradition and Archaeology : Early
Maritime Contacts in the Indian Ocean 1996
12. Raghavan, Sudha The Indian Ocean Power Politics :
Attitudes of South East Asian and
South Pacific Countries 1996
13. Roonwal, GS The Indian Ocean; Exploitable
Mineral and Petroleum Resources 1986

Intelligence Service

14. Gates, Robert M From the Shandows' : the Ultimate
Inside's Story of Five Presidents
and How They Won the Cold War 1996

Kashmir

15. Raza, Maroof, Wars and No Peace Over Kashmir 1996
16. Wirsing, Robert, G. Kashmir : Resolving Regional Conflict;
A Symposium 1996

National Security

17. Arya, D.K. & Sharma
R.C.. ed. Management Issues and Operational
Planning for India's Borders 1996
18. Rao, RamaKrishna &
Sharma, R.C.. India's Borders : Ecology and
Security Perspectives 1991

National Security - South East Asia

19. Klintworth, Gary, ed. ; Asia-Pacific Security : Less
Uncertainty, New Opportunities? 1996

Nuclear Proliferation

20. Chari, P.R. & others Nuclear Non-Proliferation in India and Pakistan:South Asian Perspectives 1996
21. Cortright, David, Amitabh Mattoo eds. India and the Bomb : Public Options 1996

Regimental History

22. Sandhu, Gurcharan Singh (Maj. Gen.) 69th Armoured Regiment-1968-1993 1996
23. Palsokar, R.D. (Col.) Red Pompons : History of the 8th Gorkha Rifles-1947-1992 1993

South Asia

24. Roy, Asim Islam in South Asia : A Regional Perspective 1996

Somalia

25. Mayall, James, ed. The New Interventionism, 1991-1994 1996

War

26. Kolko, Gabriel Century of War : Politics, Conflicts And Society Since 1914 1994

USI LIBRARY

A total of 31 books have been presented by Maj Gen Gurdip Singh, AVSM, SM(Retd), to the USI Library. Some of the titles are as follows. The complete list is available in the USI Library.

- (1) Economics of Development. By Malcolm Gills and others, 1983.
- (2) Planning US security. Edited by Philip S Kronenberg, 1983.
Vietnam 1973.
- (3) Sixty Days to Peace : Implementing the Paris Peace Accords by
Walter Scott Dillard, 1982.
- (4) Nuclear Testing and National Security. By Roger N. Fritzel, 1981.
- (5) China policy for the Next Decade : Report of the Atlantic Councils
Committee on China Policy. By U ALEXIS Johnson and others, 1984.
- (6) Military Reform : The High Tech Debate in Tactical Air Forces. By
Walter Kross, 1985.
- (7) SDI and Arms Control. By Haward G. DeWalf (McNair Papers No.
4) 1989.
- (8) Securing the seas : The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance
Options. By Paul H Ntize and others, 1979.
- (9) Understanding US Strategy : A Reader. Edited by Terry I Heyns,
1985.
- (10) US Policy in Southwest Asia : A Failure in Perspective. By Robert G.
Lawrence 1984.
- (11) NATO's Future Towards a New Transatlantic Bargain. By Stanley R.
Sloan, 1985.
- (12) Special Operations in US Strategy. Edited by Frank B, barnett and
others, 1984.

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